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PREFACE
In the Fall of I968, the Peruvian government seized
the assets of International Petroleum Company, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
The move by the Peruvian military junta seemed out of keeping
with the traditional role of the Latin American military
establishments as defenders of the status quo and as friends
of the United States. Military interventions in Latin Amer-
ica have traditionally been carried out to prevent change,
or to veto an unacceptable national election. But the junta
which took power in Peru in early October seemed bent on
reform, and on a confrontation with American companies oper-
ating in Peru.
In undertaking this study, I originally planned to
analyze the military's seizure of Standard Oil's assets in
Peru,- hoping that such an analysis vrould shed some light on
the at:titudes of the '=new military. During the course
of study, it became increasingly clear that the seizure
of International Petroleum Company property x-^as incidental
to the actual coup of I968. At the same time, however,
the controversy surrounding the company in Peru proved sig-
nificant in a deeper sense than anticipated. Ownership and
operation of the La 3rea y Parinas oil fields becam.e a divi-
sive issue which split and weakened the Peruvian coastal
oligarchy, and undermined the United States government's
Vsupportive role behind this ruling elite. In undermining
the elite's cohesiveness as well as its good relationahip
with the United States, the I.P.C. controversy helped to
set the stage for the eventual military take over. In
1968, the Peruvian military argued, with a measure of
Justification, that the civilian leadership had proved it-
self incompetant in dealing with national problems. la
Brea y Parinas was a long term problem tackled by several
generations of Peruvian leaders. V/hile the I.P.C. con-
troversy did not play a significant role as the immediate
cause of the I968 coup, at the same time, the International
Petroleum Company played a very important role in Peruvian
politics over a period of several decades.
In preparing this study, the author wishes to acknow-
ledge the contribution of Professor Howard Wiarda, of the
University of Massachusetts, whose comments, suggestions
'c^nd encouragement made the experience both enlightening
and enjoyable. The Department of Political Science of
the University of Massachusetts provided a deeply appreciat
measure of financial assistance.
The management of International Petroleum Company
cooperatec to the fullest extent on this project by facili-
tating ray research at the company's offices in Coral Gables
Florida, I wish to thank in particular Mr. John Oldfield,
vi
and the other company executives who have chosen to remain
anonymous for personal reasons. They all made generous
contributions of time and insight. Former President of
Peru Fernando Belaunde Terry extended both his hospitality
and a marvelous first-hand account of the events of his
administration. Mr. Fernando Espinosa, former General
Manager of International Petroleum Company in Peru re-
counted his experiences in Peru frankly in a valuable
interview.
In addition, I acknowledge the cooperation of
General Pedro Ferndndez Baca, Director of Petroleos del
Peru, Mr. Bruce Sever, Peru desk officer at the United
States Department of Commerce, and Dr. Alberto Ruiz
Eldredge, Ambassador of Peru to Brazil. Finally, the
staffs of the National Archives and the Library of Congress
provided me with much of the ravr material of this study,
End their assistance was invaluable.
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INTRODUCTIOM
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
A multinational corporation can be defined as an
enterprise which does most of its business across national
boimdaries. To narrow the definition, the scholar can set
more definite criteria as to the proportion of business
done across boundary lines, and the volume of that business.
Typical multinational corporations such as Standard Oil
of New Jersey, Pfizer, Singer, or International Telephone
and Telegraph have at least half of their assets abroad,
and either do more than half of their marketing in, or get
more than half of their revenue from, countries other than
1
the United States.
The United States oil industry accounts for a larger
share of American investment abroad than any other industry.
In 1969* this investment totalled over twenty billion dollars,
and represented more than a quarter of all American foreign
2direct Investment. The oil industry is significant not
only because of its large scale, but because it is a pioneer
of vrhat has become an ever increasing trend for other
American industries to expand across national borders.
"^Jonathan F. Galloway, "Multinational Enterprises as V/orld
Interest Groups," Paper presented to the 66th Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles,
California, September 8-12, 1971. PP- ^-5-
^Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay- -The Multinational Spread
Of' U.S . Enterprises (Mew York: Basic Books, 1971). P- 27.
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Beginnins during the first decade of the 20th century,
American oil companies began buying producing and refining
facilities in the Third V/orld, including Latin America.
It was not until the I930 ' s that other American industrial
groups began to move in the direction of establishing
manufacturing operations in Latin America.
Given the current conditions in Latin America, with
economic nationalism on the upswing in Chile, Peru and
Bolivia, American owned subsidiaries throughout Latin America
are bracing themselves for vrhat could be a very difficult
period characterized by official hostility from host country
governments. VJith the Alliance for Progress over, and the
after effects of the Cuban Revolution nearly forgotten, Latin
Americans have begun taking a closer took at economic pro-
blems, and more than ever, at the mushrooming role played
by multinational corporations in their economies. Yet, to .
argue that Latin America is on the threshold of a wave of
nationalizations and open confrontations vjith American
economic interests might be as unfounded as the predictions
of continental upheaval made after the Cuban Revolution.
The problem of assessing the impact of the multinational
corporation on latin American socid} , economic and political
life is a very complex one. Increasingly, ix^tin Americans
have taken the view that these corporations have played a
IX
detrimental role in their national affairs. A variety of
arguments— social, political, and economic--have been advanced
to support this point of vieiT.
On the sociological level, the American subsidiaries
have changed the ownership patterns in Latin America. As
these enterprises move in and purchase or dominate industries,
they co-opt vihatever local entrepreneurial talent is avail-
able, thus transforming the national bourgeoisie into a
"transnational technocracy, " void of any legitimacy as a
national ruling class, according to Osvaldo Sunkel. The
middle class is also affected; part is incorporated into
the new economic structure and part is left out--ef fectively
barred from upward mobility and terrified by the prospect
of proletarianization. The working class is simply divided:
those few who find employment with the American subsidiary
companies become a privileged elite within the working class.
The balance of the labor force is left to endure the pro-
blems of unemployment and marginal economic exi stance. This
division of the working class makes it difficult to organize
labor, and the corporate absorption of the local talent inter-
runts the nevelopment of a native entrepreneurial class
-
Consequently, national development along the lines histori-;
cally followed by Great Britain and the United States is
Ximpossible.
The economic argument has been vrell articulated by
the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando
Letelier. When asked x^hether the government of Salvador
Allende was frightening foreign capital away from Chile,
the Ambassador replied:
In ger.eral terms, we have been exDortin.-y
capital, not importing it. . . between
1950 and 1967, 17 years, v^50 million
flowed into Chile as direct investments.
Mow deduct depreciation for such invest-
ments during that period, which the com-
panies took back out of the coun.try, and
the net figure would be only ,?2^7 million.
In the same period, the outflow of profits
and dividends just on investments was
'31.056 billion, about four times the net
investment
.
^
The Chilean argument is probably valid for the rest of
Latin America. From I96O to I968, there was a flow of
one billion dollars of fresh capital from the United States
to American owned subsidiaries in the under-developed world.
In that same period, incoming capital from, the less de-
veloped areas to the United States in the form of income
alone amounted to about 2.5 billion dollars. The latter
-^Osvaldo Sunkel, "3ig Business and ' Dependencia, ' a Latin
American view," Foreirn A ffairs . L, No. 3 (-^pril, 1972),
pp. 517-^^31; Sunkel takes as his iDoint of departure a
similar argument by Celso Furtajo, ''La concentracion del
Doder economico en los ulE. UU. y sus prouecciones en .America
Latina, " Fstudios Internacionales , I, IIo. 3-'-^ (1963).
^Orlando Letelier, as intervievred by Boffrey Smith, "As They
See It, ExproTDriation: Why Do They Do It?" Forbes , CVTII, i-Io. 1
(July 15, 1971). p. 3^.
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figure is a rather conservative estimate, according to
economist Raymond Vernon, and if other factors such as
royalty payments were included, the difference between what
the United States sends to the Third V/orld and what it gets
from there would be even greater.-^ However, there are
counter arguments; the United States Department of the.
Treasury suggests that there is more to the effects of
American foreign investment than the above figures indicate.
The Treasury Department holds that x^rhen an i\merican
subsidiary establishes producing facilities in a Latin
American nation, for example, a process knoxm as "import
substitution" takes place. That is, products xjhich vrere
previously imported into that country are henceforth pro-
duced locally. Given this import substitution, the obvious
advantage which the United States has in net capital flow
6
is minimized if not reversed. This argument assumes that
import substitution would not have taken place xfithout the
presence of the American subsidiary company. Furthermore,
in the case of extractive industries geared for exports,
there is only minimal import substitution. For example,
Chile does net need to import copper, but then, Chile would
be imlikely to import copper in any quantity in any event.
•^Vernon, p. 172.
^ Ibid .
. pp. 173-178.
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Related to the economic impact of multinational cor-
porations on the Latin American balance of payments is the
taxation problem. Since corporate subsidiaries often con-
duct their transactions with other subsidiaries of the same
parent company, that parent company can arbitrarily choose
to show profit in a certain transaction and not another.
For example, if an oil company in Ecuador produces oil at
one dollar per barrel, it could conceivably sell that oil
to another subsidiary of the same company at .pl.Ol; the
profit margin reported to the host country would be minimal.
The subsidiary receiving the oil could then market it in
the United States or elsewhere at two dollars per barrel,
with a profit margin of nearly lOO/L The host coimtry could
not tax the profit because the transaction took place outside
its national boundaries, between corporate entities over
which- it had no jurisdiction.
Latin Americans have grown increasingly suspicious of
multinational oil companies. As they develop a more sophis-
ticated understanding of economic complexities, they arc
reassessing their relations vjith foreign companies. This
reassessment has translated itself into more critical attitude
Latin Americans are no longer viewjng the foreign investment
in their comitries as an unqualified blessing bringing
Western capital and technology. The role of the United States
xiii
in particular as an economic missionary bent on industrial-
izing the' Third V/orld has come into question.
The political impact of the multinational corporation
is even more complex than the sociological and economic
effects of such corporations, and the corresponding theories
are even more controversial. The basic question raised is
whether multinational corporations intervene in the politics
of their host countries, and if they do, how far do they go?
Do such giants as Standard Oil of New Jersey or the Royal
Dutch Shell Company distort the precarious balance of
power which might exist within a relatively under-developed
nation?
Opinions range very widely. In his book Vlorld Crisis
in Oil , Harvey O'Connor refered to Peru as Standard Oil's
province. The thrust of his argument vras that Standard Oil
has dominated Peruvian politics in all matters affecting
7its own interests.' A similar thesis has been advanced by
8
a number of Peruvian political leaders. Yet, the spokesmen
for the oil industry flatly deny any meddling in the politics
of host countries by the oil companies. Writing in Inter -
national Affairs . Geoffrey Chandler, Trade Relations
"^Harvey 0"'Jcnnor, vJorld Crisis in Oil (New York: Nonthly
Review Press, I962), pp. 225-232.
^Alfonso Benavides Correa, El Petroleo Peruano. . j_o
Autopsia de un Clan , " (Lima: Papel Grafica ^ditora, 190I)
;
Jose ilacedo riendoza, Nacionalicemos el Petroleo.' (Lima:
Edi clones Hora del Hombre, I96O}.
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Co-ordinator for Shell International Petroleum Company,
attempted to put to rest what he sees as the myth that oil
companies influence the politics of their host countries.
He stated that
:
if an affiliate of an international
group were to meddle in internal poli-
tics in order to serve its ovm ends,
this xjould amoujit at the least to folly
and at the most to suicide vrhich would
provoke no sympathy.^
Chandler suggested that the oil company is part of the
society within which it operates. The company will argue its
case to the fullest , '"but the strength of its argument will
rest on the economic factors it can adduce to encourage or
or discourage particular measures affecting itself. " He
finally dismissed the widely held suspicion that bribery
was an oil company technique on the groujids of inexpediency,
for "lasting marriages are not based on venal affection.
"'^'^
This utilitarian morality, to the extent that it
exists, surely must be a relatively recent development.
Earlier in the century. Chandler's o\m employer. Royal Dutch
Shell apparently financed the illegal coup d'etat of Augusto
Leguia to a considerable degree. The financial assistance
granted Leguia was no corporate philanthropy meant to aid
^Geoffrey Chandler, "The Myth of Oil Power, International
Groups and National Sovereignty. " International Affairs ,
XLVI, No. ^ (October, 1970), p. 71?.
""^Ibid.-, pp. 718-719.
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Peru along the path to authoritarian bliss; rather, it was
a trade. Royal Dutch Shell financed the coup, and in return
Leguia was to give that company favorable concessions in
Peru. The record does show that this move on the part of
the multinational corporation was pure "folly, " for Leguia
got a better deal vjith Shell's competitor Standard Oil, and
being somexfhat less than trustworthy, he favored the American
company during his administration at the expense of Shell.
This incident merely proved that Shell was outmaneuvered
in Peru, and not that the technique used was inherently
inexpedient. And in any case, to argue that political med-
dling and bribery is unxfise does not prove that it does not
take place. Chandler's argument has limitations.
While generalizations about the size and recent growth
of multinational corporations abound both in studies and in
the press, the problem of actually defining their role in
various countries and their impact upon the political develop
ment of those countries is very difficult. The impact of
a given multinational corporation on one country might be
considerably different from the effect of that same corpora-
tion on the country's next door neighbor. Standard Oil's
subsidic^rj- , International Petroleum Jompany, was nationalized
in Peru. However, its Colombian subsidiary vjas able to iron
out its difficulties with the Colombian government. They
^^See the "Strictly Confidential (To be kept in locked files)
enclosure attached to a report by Carlton Jackson, U.S.
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probably employed similar tactics in both countries, and it
was in fact represented by the same executive in both cases.
However, there were very different results.
Within two weeks of the nationalization of Standard
Oil of New Jersey's properties in Peru, a military junta
seized the assets of Gulf Oil Corporation in Bolivia. '£ven
the most superficial analysis vrould show that Gulf's historic
role in Bolivia, and its position in that country did not
bear any resemblance to the position of International Petro-
leum Company in Peru. Multinational corporations and their
host countries interact on a wide variety of levels. It is
possible to make any number of theoretical assertions which
can then be supported by any number of examples ; but given
the variety of multinational corporate experiences, any
number of mutually incompatible hypotheses may be supported.'
It is precisely because of this variety that it is
necessary to proceed cautiously. One research technique
which yields particularly fruitful results is to examine
an industry or even a specific corporation and analyze its
impact on one or two countries. Beginning with Department
of Commerce statistics on the largeness of multinational
corporations, and simply dravjing the conclusion that largeness
means involvement in host country politics is of little use
—Trade Commissioner in Lima to the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, August 5. 1920. U.S. Department of State
Document iJo. 823-6363/32.
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in illuminating the operations of multinational corporations.
The scholar must discern the types of involvement and the
impact upon different categories of countries.
,
The fact that corporation "A" is very large and powerful
and that it operates in country "X" x^rhich is small and under-
developed in itself tells us nothing about the relationship
between corporation "A" and coimtry "X". It is possible
for corporation "A" to dominate the political system of the
host country, but perhaps the corporation's assets in the
country might not merit the time, effort and money iihich
such domination would entail. Furthermore, country "X"
might be v:eak in nearly every respect except in its ability
to deal with foreign capitalists. In other words, the rela-
tionship between any country and the foreign subsidiaries
which operate in its national territory is determined by
many variables, and not hy any global theory which pos-
tulates that foreign subsidiaries co-opt national elites
into a rootless and illegitimate "transnational technocracy. '
National elites may be co-opted, but not necessarily so.
The nature of the subsidiaries functioning in the country,
and the natioiial elite itself arc the factors which deter-
mine the rutcome of international coD^porate investment.
Moreover, it is not enough to study a particular indus-
try's operation in a country during a brief period of time.
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Some corporations have operated a Latin American subsidiary
for many decades and their more current policies should be
placed in historical perspective. It is quite possible
that instead of finding global theories to explain multi-
national corporations in the viorld today, vre might find an
historical theory which explains the existance of such enter-
prises and their impact in terras of predictable phases or
stages.
The objective of this study is to illuminate the
impact which a United States company as large and as powerful
as Standard Oil of New Jersey had on the politics of a rela-
tively feeble and under-developed country such as Peru.
How did a company which during the i960 ' s had annual revenues
three times larger than Peru's gross national product operate
as a citizen of that country? Hovr did a. company whose I969
payroll vias about ZS% larger than the entire budget of the
government of Peru operate as a subject of that government?
The answer to these questions varied through the years of
I.P.C.'s stay. The relationship of the company to the
government of Peru was shaped by many economic and political
factors vihich were essentially d3mamic. i.'hat factors molded
the nature of this economically unevon relationship? What
generalizations can be made about the effect of large cor-
porations on small or medium countries with limited industrial
xix
development?
Even though they were unevenly matched from a financial
point of view, in I968 the government of Peru dared to do
v;hat generations of Peruvian political leaders had wished
to do for decades: the military junta seized Standard Oil's
assets in Peru. The road from the I910 ' s to the 1960's .v:as
a long one, and one from vrhich the student of politics
can gain valuable insights into a widespread phenomenon--
the coexistence of multinational corporate giants in the
midst of national pigmies
—
pigmies, however, whose internal
dynamics are changing and who are no longer willing to accept
their traditiona.l subservience to such giants.
1CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF LA BREA Y PARINAS
The center of the conflict betireen International Pet-
roleum Company and the Government of Peru vras a very large
hacienda in Northwestern Peru--La Brea y Parinas. Ownership
of the subsoil of that hacienda was in dispute vrell before
Standard Oil of New Jersey entered the Peruvian oil business,
and these problems of ownership remained to plague the com-
pany and the country until the late 1960's. By I968, the
controversy had grown from the dispute over the hacienda alone
to all other properties and installations connected with
the refining, marketing and distribution of petroleum products
from that field.
In order to fully appreciate the nature of the conflict
between Standard Oil's subsidiary. International Petroleum
Company and the Government of Peru it is necessary to trace
the history of the dispute to its origins, and to follow its
development to the present. V/ithout historical persepctive,
the actions of most of the Peruvians involved would seem
highly irrational, and understanding the causes of the ap-
parent viciousness with which the political leaders of Peru
persecuted a beneficial, well-run and efficient company serv-
ing the petroleum needs of their country would be difficult,
if not impossible. While historical perspective will not in
itself vouch for the rationality of Peruvian, policies during
2the 1960's. it does Illuminate the sources of their irrita-
tion with the oil company.
The inanasement of International Petroleum Company foua;ht
desperately to preserve what they considered the legitimate
role of their company in Peru. That very struggle led them
to a deep involvement in the political process of the country,
covering the whole garnet of political action, from veiled
international intrigue to the outright financial underrrriting
of cabinets and governments, from gentle private persuasion
of political leaders to heavily funded public relations cam-
paigns aimed at convincing the population at large of the
justice of their position.
The hacienda of La Brea y Parinas was plagued by ano-
malies from the time that Peru secured its independence.
Hence, the legal problems over the title to the soil and
subsoil existed for as long as the country has existed as
an independent republic. It was to this early confusion
that International Petroleum Company and the Government of
Peru trace their arguments.
The extensive lands which are now called La Brea y
Parinas were first explored by a Spaniard around I629.
Captain Martin Alonzo Granadino, a resident of Paita,
acquired usage rights over the land in l6^2. However, the
property belonged to the King imtil after sixty years of
possession, when in accordance with Spanish law, it finally
3became private property. Granadino's heir. Don Juan Benito
de las Heras. formally acquired the title to the property
in 1689. Eventually, the land became the property of the
Roman Catholic Convent of Belen through Inheritance; it
remained in the hands of the clerics during most of the 18th
century and until I8I5. when usage rights were sold to Don
Jose de la Lama for a period of I50 years. By I830. the
convent was forced to close down, and de la Lama bought the
property. He no longer simply had usage rights to the pro-
perty; he was then the complete owner of the hacienda, then
known as Mancora.
In accordance with Spanish customs and law, the subsoil
of the hacienda remained the property of the King. The land
gave off surface emanations of a black substance alternatively
called brea or cope
. In Incas reportedly used the substance
to light up their pre-columbian ceremonies. After the estab-
lishment of the colony, the Spanish Crown directly exploited
this mineral. Brea , which was nothing more than petroleum,
was heated to evaporate the lighter elements. The resulting
thick black substance, mineral pitch, was used by the Spanish
government to waterproof ships. In 1735 the Crown decided
to lease this very primative mining operation to Montero de
Ugarte. After two successive leases, the Spanish government
rented the property to Juan Cristobal de la Cruz in 1802.
With the achievement of independence in 182-^, the mine
became the property of the Peruvian state, and in order to
raise revenue to pay the public debc, the Peruvian Congress "
enacted a law directing the government to sell all kinds of
state property. This law, dated March 5, 1825, provided
"that all kinds of goods, haciendas, mines, houses and
whatever real estate or property which belonged to the State,
and of which the State might freely dispose of, be used to-
1
wards the liquidation of the public debt." The law was
signed into effect by Simon Bolivar on March 9, 1825.
Soon thereafter, on September 22, 1826, the "pitch
mine" which up to that point had been the property of the
State, was sold to Antonio de la Quintana, in consideration
of a debt owed him. The mine was valued at 2,695 pesos by
the government's assessor, but Quintana was vrilling to settle
his ^,96^ peso debt for the mine. After the necessary legal
papen-rork was cleared, the sale was effectuated, and the Lima
government Issued a decree which stated in part that the
representatives of the State "take avray and separate the
State which they represent, from the operation, property
and dominion of the pitch mine of reference, which is given»
I
The entire text of the law was reproduced in a pamphlet issued
by the London and Pacific Petroleum Company in I916 and later
reissued by International Petroleum Company in I96O. Ilistoria
de La Erea ^ Parinas ; Articulos 2 Documentos Publicados en
191^pcr la London « Pacific Petroleuri Company , Ltd . (Lima;
International Petroleum Company, 1960}.
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ceded, renounced to and passed on to the buyer.
.
Hardly four months had passed when Quintana sold the mine
for an unspecified sum to Don Jose de la Lama, the owner of
the hacienda within which the mine was located. From that
point, De la Lama owned both the surface—the Mancora hacienda,
and the Amotape mine—the subsoil.
De la Lama died in I850, and his property was divided
between his widow and his daughter. The executors of the
estate decided to name the daughter's portion La Brea; it
apparently contained the bulk of the Imown pitch deposits.
The widow's share was called Parinas. In 1857 , De la Lama's
widow died, and her daughter inherited her part of the estate.
Henceforth, the property was known not by its old name—Mancora,
but by a name which was carried down to the present—La Brea
y Parinas.
Originally, the estate was larger than it was to be in
the 19th and 20th centuries. The hacienda stretched from
the river Chira in the South to the river Tumbes in the
North, and from the Pacific Coast in the V^est to the foot-
hills of the Andes in the East—an area comparable to that
of the state of Delaware. Through inheritance and partition,
the area was reduced considerably until it xras about one-
fourth the original estate. During the 19th century, the
2
Ibid.
6hacienda covered approximately 6^+3 square miles—an area
about half the state of New Hampshire.^ Lying on the
northern coast of Peru, the property covers terrain which
can best be described as desert. V/ater is available only
from the outside, or from the sea via a desalination plant.
Due to its remote location and the lack of lines of communi-
cation with Lima. La Brea y Parinas was isolated not only
from the vjorld, but even from the country within which it
was located, during its early years.
Peru had no lavrs or ordinances covering or in any way
regulating mining from the time independence was proclaimed
on July 28, 1821 until 1824. On June 22, 182^1-, the Peruvian
Congress enacted a law declaring that all colonial ordinances
vrere valid for the Republic. The effect of this law was
to place mining under the concession system; the State
owned the subsoil and gave exploitation rights to private
parties in exchange for a percentage of the minerals extracted
and/or profits obtained from the property--a roj'alty. The lavr
of 1925 which directed the executive to sell any state
property including mines was inconsistant with this long
established Spanish policy. The present Peruvian military
government maintains that the original avrard to ciuintana was
illegal in so far as it was inconsistant with the Spanish
•^Historical Resume of "la Brea ^ Parinas " (International
Petroleum Company ,'Tugust , I967).
ordinances valid for Republican Peru. However, that
conclusion seems unwarrented considering that the Spanish
ordinances had validity only through the 1824 law. What
the Peruvian Congress did in 1821+ could be freely contradicted
or undone by that same Congress a year later. In other
words, the sale to Quintana cannot be considered "illegal"
on the grounds that it violated an 182^^ law, when in fact,
it was carried out in accordance with another later law
which would take precedence over the earlier one.
In 1859. Edwin Drake drilled the first oil well in
Titusville, Pennsylvania, Four years later, on November 2,
1863, A, E. Prentice, an engineer working for the Campanfa
de Gas de Lima, drilled the first oil well in Peru, in an
area just north of La Brea y Parinas. During the 1860's,
as a result of the expanding Industrial Revolution, interest
in petroleum skyrocketed. Reflecting this new interest,
the Peruvian Congress enacted a mining law on April 28, I873.
Its purpose was to promote the petroleum and coal production
in the coimtry. The law established that petroleum and
coal seekers could "denounce" their discoveries and establish
pertenencias or claims which would be limited to an area of
200 by 200 meters, or 400,000 square meters. The pertenenc ig.s
Revolutionary Government of Peru, National Office of Information,
Petroleum in Peru—The History of a Unique Case for the World
to Jud/:';e (Lima: Petroleos del Peru, I969) , p. 2?.
8were given as concessions—their holders had to work them
continuously in order to preserve their right to extract the
mineral. The law also provided a four month period within
which mine operators would have to present their papers to
the Mining Court in Lima for re-validation. Otherwise, old
claims would be considered null and void.
The owner of La Brea y Parinas at the time of the
initiation of this new ordinance, Genaro Helguero, did not
submit his title for validation. He simply assumed that
since the law dealt with mining concessions, and he owned
his mine, it did not apply to his property. In I875 Helguero
hired an American to do some exploratory drilling on his
property. The venture proved a success; petroleum was
found in commercially exploitable quantities.
On January 12, I877 the Peruvian government enacted
another mining law simply establishing a surface tax on mining.
Instead of requiring continuous exploitation of the mine,
the new law required a semi-annual payment of fifteen soles
per pertenencia
.
Again, Helguero assumed that the law did
not apply to his property; he took no action, and the govern-
ment made no move to enforce the lav:—a fact that could be
interpreted as either confirming Helguero 's stand, or showing
that La Brea y Parinas was so far removed from national life
physical factors that the question of enforcement never
came up.
9Helguero apparently intended to exploit his oil holdings
outside the confines of Peruvian mining regulations. From
his point of view, La Brea y PariFLas had a special status;
the mine had been sold to him, not given as a concession.
The status of the property might never have become problematic
except for the fact that in the next decade British oil pro-
moters became interested in the property and Helgruero decided
to sell. The idea of an untaxed and untaxable oil field
privately owned and therefore outside the reach of the Lima
government must have appeared very tantalizing indeed. The
situation seemed too good to be true to the British investors;
they demanded clarification of the status of the mine before
proceeding with the purchase.
In response to these pressures, on January 1^, 1886
Helguero petitioned the Court of Claims of Paita to have his
title to the surface property and the mineral subsoil of La
Brea y Parinas confirmed. In the petition Helguero argued
that the subsoil of his property "remained outside the law
which authorized prospecting and claims, inasmuch as the
nation could not dispose in favor of third persons of what
5
it had previously disposed of by legitimate sale." On
February 12, the Judge of the Court of Claims ordered that
"Chronological History of 'La Brea y Parinas" Oilfields of
the International Petroleum Company, I826-I963. " Peruvian
Times, July 28, I967. p. 13-
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the imopposed petition be granted. Apparently, the British
investors were not completely satisfied, and they demanded
some assurance from the government in Lima. On October 12,
188?, Helguero filed a new petition with the Peruvian
government asking that it recognize that he, and not the
state, was the "absolute owner" of the minerals underlying
his property, that his dominion was complete and total,
and that no one could prospect or make claims inside the
boundaries of his property, in so far as Quintana had ac-
quired the land by sale and hence it was not subject to
6
the procedures created by the ordinances.
As fate and the whims of the Peruvian bureaucracy would
have it, Helguero 's petition was handled by both the Mining
Department and the Acting Attorney of the Supreme Court
—
with opposite results. The Mining Department concurred with
Helguero 's petition, and further stated that the Laws of
1873 and 1878 could not have retroactive effects detrimental
to interests which dated back to 1826. However, the Attorney
of the Supreme Court stated that Helguero was the rightful
owner of the property, but subject to the mining ordinances.
On October 29» 1887 f the government issued a decree—a Supreme
z
Historia de La 3rea 2 Parinas ,
11
7
Resolution, acknowledging the fact that the pitch mine had
been adjudicated to Quintana, and that through successive
transferences Genaro Helguero acquired the rights of the
original buyer. However, echoing the Attorney of the
Supreme Court and his judgement, the resolution also stipu-
lated that,
.
"while the State has the right to sell its
mining properties, it cannot exercise that right except in
accordance with the restrictions of the laws covering the
8
matter." The decree went on to order that the property
be inscribed in the official registry under the name of
Helguero, and that the property be listed as three pert en-
encias until a proper measurement could be made. This decree
had the net effect of hopelessly confusing the situation.
On the one hand, it admitted that the mine had been sold to
Helguero, and on the other hand it stated that this could
not have been done since existing regulations did not allow
such a sale. The decree ordered that the mine be registered
as belonging to Helguero and at the same time be taxed as
though it did not. The reasoning behind the decree was as
muddled as its text—the assumption was that the Spanish
ordinances covering mining had some sort of constitutional
In the press and often in conversation, Peruvians' refer
the their government as El Supremo Gobierno. Decrees are
called Supreme Resolutions officially and colloquially.
8
The entire decree is reproduced in Ibid.
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force which pre-empted parts of the 1825 law signed into
effect by Sim5n Bolfvar. More likely, the bureaucrat who
actually issued the decree assumed nothing and merely
attempted to reconcile the diametrically opposite conclusions
of the Attorney of the Supreme Court and the Department of
Mining. The result was a nonsensical decree.
Of particular concern to Helguero was the fact that
the decree ordered that the property be surveyed in order
to determine the number of pertenencias encompassed within
its limits. After all, the ordinance had a ten pertenencia
( i+00,000 square meters) limit and the property extended over
1,600 square kilometers. The problem was resolved by an
executive decree, a Resolucion Suprema dated November I6,
1887—only two weeks after the first decree. This decree,
which made no mention whatever of any property and vjas
presumably aimed at mining in general, established that in
conditions where mineral deposits extend "irregularly" through
the subsoil, a pertenencia need not be regular (200 by 200 me-
ters) but may be measured irregularly. The "irregualr"
pertenencia may be larger than the prescribed ^0,000 square
meters.
On November 15. I887, Helguero filed another petition
asking for further clarification of his property's status,
in the petition he clearly stated that he needed such a
clarification to obtain capital for the development of the
13
mine. In response, the government issued another Supreme
'
Resolution dated December 22, 188?. This new decree re-
affirmed the previous one, and in addition it granted that
"Genaro Helguero is the sole owner of the 'La Brea' mine.
.
."^
It recognized that only Helguero could exploit its mineral
wealth; however, the Law of 18?? governed the mine. Helguero
must have been quite concerned about the measurement of his
land into pertenencias and the resulting potential tax. As
a concession to this concern, the 188? decree established
that the property would be measured in accordance with Article
10, Section 8 of the Mining Ordinance and the rule set in
the Supreme Resolution of November l6, 188?, providing for
"irregular pertenencias . " It specifically instructed the
Judge of Primary Jurisdiction of Paita to "designate the
number and extension /Emphasis supplled7 of the pert enencias
10
encompassed by the property of 'La Brea', . ." In other
words, the government was willing to compromise with Helguero--
the property would be taxed as if it were a common concession,
except that since it was privately owned, the tax vrould be
far less than it would otherx^ise be, given the extent of the
property.
In late December or early January, 1888, the Judge of
Primary Jurisdiction, accompanied by Helguero and an assessor^
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
1^
inspected the property. On January 10 the judge Issued a
report which stated in part:
Taking into account the irregularity
of the above mentioned deposits and
tht; difficulties which must be en-
countered in their discovery, for in
the exploitation of oil it often
happens that great works are carried
out at great expense with no results
whatever, his honor, the Judge ordered
the assessor to divide the whole ex-
tension of the lands within the above
mentioned demarcation lines into ten
pertenencias
.
On January 26, 1888, the Lima government issued a Supreme
Resolution specifically acknox^ledging the validity of the
12
Judge's report. Given this sequence of events and the
actual texts of the two supreme resolutions and the Judge's
report, it may be surmised that this final arrangement in
fact reflected a compromise settlement between Helguero and
the Peruvian government in Lima.
Since the Mining Ordinances imposed a limit of ten
per-Q enencias for any one individual or corporation, Helguero
would have lost well over 99 •9i^ of the subsoil under his
property if the exact maximum extension had been applied.
The oil wells were widely dispersed throughout the hacienda.
11
The entire text of the Judge's reoort is reproduced in Ibid .
12
The decree stated in part: "The measurement performed and
the assessment of ten pertenencias which had been determined
by the Paita Judge are hereby approved, with the extension
which corresponds to each pertehencia according to the enclosed
topographic sketch. . . " Ibid .
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If the property had been taxed according to regular perten-
encias. the tax of well over a million soles per year would
have been burdensome even for a man of means such as Helguero.
The government taxed Helguero only 30O soles a year; how-
ever, the government actually gained in the agreement, for
since the mine had been sold to Helguero, it v^s not tech-
nically entitled to collect any mining tax geared for con-
cessions from the privately-owned mines. Helguero gained
from the agreement because he was then free to sell his mine
to the British entrepreneurs on the assumption that its
status of private ownership, as well as a favorable tax
rate, had been satisfactorally settled. The status of the
mine was in fact even more muddled— it was privately owned
but "irregularly" taxed as a concession!
On February 3» 1888 Helguero sold his property to
British oil promoter Herbert Wilkin Colguhoun Tweedle for
18,000 Pounds Sterling. Tweedle sold a one half interest
to William Keswick, and the two of them organized the London
and Pacific Petroleum Company with a capital of 250,000 Pounds
and subsequently leased La Brea y Parinas to the company
for a period of 99 years beginning July 1, I889. From that
point on, with the influx of British capital, the petroleum
operation grew by leaps and bounds.
The year after the London and Pacific Company took over
La Brea y Parinas the field produced about 8,000 barrels;
16
ten years later at the turn of the century, production had
shot up to 200,000 barrels, an average annual groxrth of
215^. The rate of growth from 1900 to 1915 slowed somewhat,
to 53^—but by 1915. the fields were producing 1,800,000
barrels per year.
By 1910 it was obvious to all observers that La Brea y
PariRas was a success. The Peruvian government realized
that the "nickels and dimes" settlement of the 1880 's had
become a multi-million dollar operation in which Peru had
virtually no part. Almost simultaneously, Rockefeller's
Standard Oil of New Jersey arrived at the same conclusion
the oil giant had no part in what promised to be a most
profitable operation.
It was during the first decade of the 20th century that
Rockefeller's oil trust was broken. By the dissolution
decree of 1911. the company lost its Ci^iifornia oil supply
and installations. Standard Oil depended on these western
installations to supply its Far Eastern market, especially
in China, which offered a vast potential profit. It was the
need for a nevj western coastal source of iDetroleum which
1^
enticed Standard Oil of New Jersey to Peru. In 1913.
13
International Petroleum Company, "100 Anos de Industria
Petrolera en al Peru," FANAL , XVIII, No. 68 (I963), p. 28.
Harvey O'Connor, V/orld Crisis in Oil (New York: Monthly
Review Press, I962), pp. 225-22o;
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Walter C. Teagle. a high company executive persuaded Standard'
president John D. Archbold to initiate negotiations for the
purchase of the London and Pacific Petroleum Company. Due
"
to the considerable bitterness which Standard's encounters
with the United States Government had generated, the company
management decided to utilize Standard's Canadian subsidiary.
Imperial Oil, to carry out the purchase. The management
felt that the British government was far more willing to
back lip British enterprises abroad than the American govern-
ment, and therefore they played it safe and arranged to
maintain their purchase under the British flag. In 191^1-,
Jersey Standard organized the International Petroleum Company
in Toronto, Canada. I.P.C., as it became knoxra, was destined
to serve as a holding company for Standard's operations in
Peru and later in Colombia and Ecuador. The purchase of
London and Pacific Petroleum Company was kept secret; that
is, there was no direct acquisition. Piather, the stock was
bought and by 191^t Standard Oil of New Jersey had a dominent
interest— it owned over ^0% of the stock.
As previously mentioned, the prosperity of La Brea
y Farinas struck the Peruvians as well as Standard Oil. In
1911, Ricardo Deustua, a Peruvian engineer -employed by the
government and a relation of the prominent Peruvian philo-
sopher Alejandro 0, Deustua, traveled to Northeastern Peru
and"discovered" that La Brea y Parinas was far larger than
18
ten regular pertenencias. After returning to Lima, Deustua
spoke before the Geographic Society and "unmasked" the
London and Pacific Petroleum Company for alleged fraud
15
against the Peruvian treasury. While there is no clear
reason why Deustua journeyed to La Brea y Parinas, there
are two logical possibilities. As an employee of the Lima
government, he might have been ordered there with specific
Instructions to inspect the land. Another alternative is
that he might have been urged to conduct his inspection by
Peruvian entrepreneurs who had become anxious to acquire
a share of the booming petroleum interest, as the fact that
he reported xhis findings to the Geographic Society seemed
16
to suggest.
As a result of Deustm's inquiry, the Ministry of
Development issued another Supreme Resolution, dated March
31, 1911, declaring that the 1888 Supreme Resolution dividing
La Brea y Parinas into ten pertenencias was an administrative
error because it failed to follow the prescribed pattern
for dividing mining concessions into regular pertenencias
.
It also ordered that the property be re-measured. Ricardo
Jose Macedo Mendoza, Nac i ona 1i cemo s el Petroleoi (Lima:
Hora del Hombre, i960), p. 22.
16
That the Geographic Society was in effect a kind of chamber
of commerce for entrepreneurs became obvious later when the
Society attempted to get exclusive privileges to explore for
certain minerals, including petroleum. See the telegram
from V/illiam Smith, Charge D'affaires ad interim in Lima to
Secreta-^y of State, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
Record Group 59, No. 823.6363/20, March 5f 1920.
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Deustua was appointed to carry out the order. William Keswick,
who by then had become the sole owner of the property, and
his leasee, the London and Pacific Petroleum Company, object-
ed to the decree and enlisted the support of the British
legation in Lima to try to stop or at least delay the appli-
cation of the decree. Due to pressure from the British,
and even more likely, due to the internal turmoil that the
Clvilista Administration of Augusto Legufa was then encoun-
tering, the Supreme Resolution was never carried out.
Augusto Leguia, the Clvilista President of Peru from I908
to 1912 and future dictator from I919 to 1930, was well
known for his rapport with foreign investors and it is
unlikely that his administration would have acted unfavorably
against as prominent a British enterprise as the London and
Pacific Petroleum Company.
There were national elections in Peru in 1912, and the
Civilistas were voted out of office. Their opposition, led
by Guillermo Billinghurst , took over. The question of La
Brea y Parinas rested unresolved, but not forgotten as the
American owners of London and Pacific might have wished.
President Billinghurst was the grandson of a British soldier
who had fought in the War of Independence—a man who had a
substantial business interest in the guano industry of Southern
Peru. While he made promises of social reform, Billinghurst
found that it was very difficult to move against the entrenched
20
Peruvian Congress. It was this Congress which finally in-
spired a coup d'etat against Billinghurst and inaugurated
a new government under the leadership of Colonel Oscar R.
Benavides in 191^.
And it was this military government which was destined
to drag La Brea y Parinas out of its splendid isolation and
into the arena of Peruvian and eventually, international
politics. Several factors contributed to the new develop-
ments. V/orld War I substantially diminished Peruvian foreign
trade, and as a result, the government's income dropped,
Benavides was forced to suspend payments on the foreign debt.
His government looked around for new sources of revenue,
and the prosperous La Brea y Parinas operation, with an
annual tax rate of about ^150.00 figured prominently as a
potential source of much-needed revenue. Another factor
which- made the move against the London and Pacific Petroleum
Company plausible vjas the harrassment which both the Americans
and the British had been carrying on against Peruvian
landlords and their labor practices. For instance, in 1912
the British and American governments carried out a Joint
investigation of slavery in Peru. This represented but the
latest chapter in what had been a continuous campaign since
the turn of the century conducted by Peru-based British and
American officials. They were trying to focus world public
21
opinion on the conditions of "virtual slavery" under which
Peruvian farm workers labored. Along with other newspapers.
the London Times deplored the "horrible evils" plaguing the
poor Indians on the haciendas of Peru/^ This ill-advised
campaign, which might have diverted attention away from
labor conditions in the sweat shops of Britain and the United
States, created a groat deal of animosity among the Peruvian
Samonales
--the landowners, who were very much in control oflo
the Congress in Lima,
The intellectual climate of opinion was not very favor-
able to Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Many wealthy Civilistas
repudiated modernization. Their chief spokesman, Alejandro
Deustua condemned the use of scientific knowledge in the
pursuit of utilitarian objectives as the lowest form of human
endeavor. Through his popular philosophy courses at the
University of San Marcos. Deustua convinced many prominent
Peruvians of the idea that man's highest endeavor was to
seek the "ideal image of God." Naturally, such a goal was
possible only for the selected few, and consequently, society
should be organized in such a way that its material benefits
1?
James C, Carey. Peru and the Unit ed States
.
I9OO-I962
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 196^),
pp. 25-27
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Fredrick B. Pike, The ffodern History of Peru (New York:
Praeger, I967). pp. 183-18^.
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would go to that tiny, but intellectually capable minority
wnich would pursue the highest of goals. At a policy level.
Deustua favored a reduction of primary and secondary
school enrollments—widespread education would only en-
19courage the materialistic appetites of the masses. While
Deustua 's ideas were not universally accepted in Peru, the
gamonales reduced his philosophy to a rationalization of
the Peruvian hierarchical society. These landlords disliked
capitalism because it represented a sort of materialistic
endeavor sprinkled with egalitarianism which they distasted.
It was in the context of this political and ideological
climate that the government of Colonel Benavides issued its
decree of April 25, 191^1 rejecting all the arguments present-
ed by the London and Pacific Petroleum Company and ordering
that the property by re-surveyed. Engineers Hector Boza and
Alberto Jochamowitz went to Northeastern Peru to survey the
property. They apparently encountered a considerable amount
of difficulty—the company refused to give them drinking
20
water. After their work was completed, they returned to
Lima and announced their findings—La Brea y Pariflas covered
not ten but ^l,6l4 regular pertenencias . By the 191^ decree
and subsequent ones issued the following year, the Peruvian
19
Ibid
. , pp. 18^-186.
20
Macedo Mendoza, p. 23
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government insisted that the company raise its tax payments
from 300 soles to 1.2i^0.000 soles per year. This would have
represented an increase from $150.00 to $600,000.00.^"^ The
new tax rate would have amounted to approximately one third
of the gross revenues and somewhere between 50^ and 6o^ of
the net gains according to calculations of Peruvians friendly
to the company. The company objected, and the Peruvian
government's answer came in the form of a decree ordering
that the property be officially registered as consisting of
pertenencias
, and that the tax be paid accordingly.
On April 12, 1915, Standard Oil of New Jersey sent an
urgent and confidential telegram to the Department of State
in Washington complaining that the Peruvian government was
"imposing and enforcing destructive and actual confiscatory
tax" on London and Pacific's operation. The telegram also
advised the State Department that Jersey Standard had a
"dorinent financial interest" in that company, and asked that
Washington intercede by asking the Peruvian government to
delay enforcement of the decree until the company had an
21
O'Connor, p. 226.
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"DiscuT*co del Doctor Manuel Vicen^p Villaran, Senador por
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La Brea ^ Farinas ; Discursos ante el Senado , ( Le.crislatura
^dinaria de 191? ) ^ Dictamenes Jurldicos (Lima; International
Petroleum Company, "Noticias de Petroleo," I963), p. ^0,
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opportunity to argue its case. Washington complied with
the request immediately; on April 14, 1915 the Department
of State sent a coded message to the American ambassador in
24Lima instructing him to do as Standard Oil suggested. This
fateful telegram signaled the beginning of what was to become
a long and for the most part acrimonious tripartite relation-
ship between Standard Oil of New Jersey, the United States
government and the Peruvian government.
At this point in the history of this controversy, however,
the partisans were not limited to the three mentioned above.
The government of Great Britain, through its legation in Lima,
also intervened on behalf of London and Pacific Petroleum
Company, which was registered as a British business even
though it was controlled by Standard Oil of New Jersey, and
on behalf of William Keswick, the British subject who' owned
La Brea y Parinas, even though the property lias leased to
London and Pacific. In a note to the Peruvian Foreign Office,
the British Ambassador wondered "how one can demand, with
justice, the claimed sum as specified in the decree. .
23
A report on this telegram appears in a dispatch, William
Libby to Secretary of State, A-oril 12, 1915» U.S. Department
of Stat3 Decimal Files, No. 823.6'^63/5.
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Secretary of State to the American Legation in Lima, April 14,
1915, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/5.
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He went on to state: "It can be expected thereby, that in
view of the above mentioned reasons and of the great and
important interests which are involved, the Government of
Peru will see to it that the Decree of March I5 be annulled.
"^^
Years later. Peruvian public leaders would bitterly remember
the imperative tone of the British note as an example of
the humiliations Peru suffered during this stage of its
26
history.
On April 1?, 1915 t American Ambassador to Peru, Benton
McMillin cabled Washington advising the Department of State
that the Peruvian government had acquiesed to the Anglo-
American demand. In a dispatch dated April 28, the ambas-
sador advised the American government that according to the
Peruvian government, Peru vras not attempting to levy a new
tax, but was merely trying to collect a general tax which
the London and Pacific Petroleum Company had not been paying.
The Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs persuaded the American
ambassador that London and Pacific had been paying taxes
for only the few acres which they were exploiting, and that
27
the law required them to pay for the complete acreage.
25
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This was an inaccurate interpretation from the company's
point of view, for the 1888 settlement made it quite clear
that the whole property was divided into ten irrep:ular
pertenencias
,
not that the company would pay taxes on only
part of its territory. The ambassador also reported
conversations with representatives of the company, who
gave him their side of the story. What is most significant
about this exchange is that up to that point the State
Department seemed to have no information whatever as to the
involvement of Standard Oil of New Jersey in the Peruvian
oil extraction business. With serious problems in the
offing, the Department began to learn from the Peruvian
government and from the company's management via the American
ambassador about a problem which had been smouldering for
several years. When taking over his duties as ambassador
in 1913t McMillin was specifically instructed "to keep a
look out for such resources in Peru as might prove pro-
28
fitable investments for Americans.
.
." It appears that
Standard Oil meant to keep its Peruvian operation secret,
even from the American government, until its hand was
2H
—
The fact is reported by McMillin himself in a memo dated
dated February 2, I916.
27
forced by the need for diplomtic pressure from Washington.
The State Department apparently did not take offense, for
it intervened on behalf of the company, and then continued
to exercise a careful viatch over the situation once the
enforcement of the I915 decree was indefinitely postponed.
1915 was an election year in Peru, and the Civilista
Party's presidential candidate was victorious. In August.
Jose Pardo began his second term as president. His admin-
istration seemed more willing to negotiate with Standard
Oil than had the administration of Benavides. No sooner was
the new government in power than negotiations were initiated
with R. V. Sueur, International Petroleum Company's chief
counsel. However, these conversations continued for several
months without achieving a conclusive settlement.
On November 7. 1915. Walter Teagle. Standard Oil's
overseas entrepreneur, reputed architect of the London and Pac
29
ific purchase. and president of International Petroleum
Company, arrived in Callao in what must have been one of
the earlie?!t corporate yachts. Teagle and his entourage
spent some time visiting La Brea y Parifias on their vray down
the coast. They declared that the Peruvian oil fields would
29
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never become "great oil producers.
. . that the deposits
are already showing signs of exhaustion.
. These state-
ments were promptly cabled to the New York press, with a
corresponding flurry of concern in Peru. Teagle conferred
with La Sueur, the company's chief negotiator in Lima,
Soon thereafter, a satisfactory agreement from the company's
30
point of view was finalized.
This agreement was presented in a bill submitted to
the Civilista-controlled Senate on December 7, 1915, As
amended by the Senate, the bill provided th^t La Brea y
Pariflas covered a territory of ^l,6l^ regular pertenencias
.
However, provisions were made for dividing the property
into two parts taxed at different rates. The pertenencias
currently exploited would be taxed at the regular rate of
30 soles per year; the remaining area would be taxed at
the special rate of one sol during the first ten years
after 1915 » tv70 soles between 1926 and 1935 1 three soles
from 1936 to 19^5, and fifteen soles from 19^6 to I965.
The bill fixed the tax rates for fifty years beginning in
1915; however, the proportion of exploited to unexploited
land ^^rould vary. It was expected that London and Pacific
30
The entire affair is covered in a memo from William Hadley,
U.S. Consul-General in Lima-Callao to the Secretary of State
November 1^, 1915, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
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would be using about 1.000 pertenenclas in the beginning.
31while the remaining area would be considered inactive.
Under this formula, the company's tax payments would in-
crease to 3.000 soles -- a considerable sum, but far short
of the previously demanded annual tax rate of 1,2^0,000
soles
.
The government's bill was debated by the Senate Legis-
lative Commission, and after much discussion lasting through
1916, a favorable report was issued by the Commission's
majority agalrst bitter opposition of the minority. From
1915 to 1918, La Brea y Parifias ceased to be a dispute
between the Peruvian government and a private enterprise
VTith occassional interference from the British and American
governments—it became a hotly contested internal political
issue in Peru.
The Pardo administration had good reason to insist that
the compromise solution reached with London and Pacific
be accepted. The Peruvian economy had overcome the financial
difficulties faced by the Benavides administration, thanks
to the booming exports of items such as petroleum. The
government's revenue, highly dependent on export taxes, went
Osores, et. al., p. H'S.
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from 28.000.000 soles in I9I5 to ^0.000,000 soles in I9I8.
In addition. Pardo wanted to enlist the aid of the United
States in the settlement of the touchy Tacna-Arica dispute
with Chile. Unfortunately, Pardo was unable to persuade
the opposition and some very prominent members of his own
party of the wisdom of his compromise solution. Many
Civilista legislators preferred to remain loyal to Alejandro
Deustua ' s philosophy—anti-capitalist.
Leading the group of twelve dissenting Senators, and
writing the minority report, was Antonio Miro Quesada, a
member of the government Civilista Party and editor of the
Influential Lima dally. El Comercio
. Miro Quesada contended
that the government's bill would "place the owners of La
Brea y Parinas in a privileged condition. , ." He argued
that the State would grant the London and Pacific Petroleum
Company a reduced tax burden and furthermore tie its hands
for fifty years. Peru would abdicate its sovereign privilege
of taxation for half a century. Basing his argument on the
fact that throughout the transactions of iBBO's, the property
had been referred to only as "La Brea." Miro Quesada and his
fellow dissenting senators insisted that the Parifias side of
32
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the property could not even discussedo No viable claim on
its subsoil could be made by any private party. He main-
tained that the mine bought by Quintana consisted of a few
wells in the Prieto Mountains with insignificant territory,
and that the c^irrent owners could not claim ownership over
the subsoil of thousands of square kilometers on the basis
of that original purchase. In any case, he argued that what
was purchased was brea (pitch) and not petroleum. The
dissenting senators inferred that an administrative error
was made in allowing such large pertenencias , and that bad
faith or corruption entered into the granting of the I889
decree. Some of their arguments vrere pragmatic; they pointed
out that with the new technology. La Brea y ParifTas would
soon become more fully exploitable and as such a very im-
portant world oil field. Finally, Iliro Quesada and his
friends appealed to the wounded Peruvian national pride:
"Peru has lost the guano and the saltpeter, but now generous
33
Nature offers it petroleum. Our duty is to conserve it,"
During the month of November, 1917* the partisans of
the compromise produced a sharp rebuttal. Senator Manuel
Vicente Villaran led the attack on the dissenters. He
33
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declared that there had been no error and that the govern-
ment knew Of the extent of La Brea y Parinas in the 1880 's.
He emphatically rejected the allegations of corruption,
noting that the government in power then was supported by
the Clvilista Party. The Pardo administration feared that
the opposition was attempting to place responsibility for
the problem at the Civllista door-step. The senators favor-
ing the compromise presented a well-researched legal case
stressing the validity of the private title to the subsoil
of La Brea y Parinas, Given the validity of the private
title, it would be logical for the government to reach a
compromise solution so that the state could receive more
income while preserving the sanctity of private property.
The supporters also had pragmatic arguments—they stated
that it ^'^ould be expedient for Peru to attract foreign
investment. Senator Villaran exhorted Peru not to look
with suspicion upon foreign enterprises and "to note that
they represent a step ahead in what is most important to
us, the industrial development of the country." Villaran
and his supporters in the Senate favored the kind of
utilitarian capitalism which had been so resoundingly
rejected by the Civilista Party's leading thinker—Alejandro
35
Deustua,
35
Osores, et. al, p. ^8,
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Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru ,
Translated by Paul Stevenson (New York: Praeger, I970),
pp. 61-62.
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The battle, with its partisan and philosophical con-
figuration well-delineated, soon grew in bitterness. During
1917, the Pardo administration published the speeches of
Senators Villaran, Arturo Osores and other pro-government
legislators in booklet form. In an acrimonious preface,
the administration charged the opposition with "pitiful
sterility for the good." and with "using subterfuge to
distort reality so as to mold passion to their ox'xn interests
A week after the speeches of Villaran and Osores were
delivered, the Senate passed the La 3rea y Parinas bill,
and it was sent on to the Chamber of Deputies, where it
soon became evident that it faced an uphill battle for
acceptance. The opposition in the Chamber of Deputies
refined some of the same arguments which had been offered
in the Senate. The possibility of defeat was very real,
and the management of the International Petroleum Company
decided to bring pressure to bear.
On January 12, I9I8, the West Coast Leader , an English
language newspaper which generally reflected the interests
of the Anglo-American entrepreneurs in Peru, published an
article declaring that "a fortnight ago the Canadian Govern-
ment requisitioned the steamer tanker Azof," one of the two
IS
Government of Peru, Guestion "Brea j Parinas , " Pi scurs
Parlamentarios (Lima: Emprenta del Estado, . 191?) f p. 3.
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carrying oil from Talara to Lima-Callao. At the time, the
Lima-Callao area needed some 6,000 metric tons of petroleum
per month. The remaining tanker, the Circassian Prince,
could carry 5.000 metric tons per month. The metropolitan
area faced a petroleum deficit of 1,000 metric tons. The
article made it clear that while the Canadian government had
allowed the two tankers to remain in service "if thereby a
a favourable settlement of the controversy could be effected
with the Peruvian government," the pressures of war and "the
failure of the Peruvian government to take definite action.
. .
h^s removed the essential cause for the Canadian Govern-
ment 's forbearance in the question of the tankers, and as a
result one of them has been withdrawn and the second will
37
probably soon follow."
The warning could not have been more explicit— either
the Peruvian government reached a compromise acceptable to
the company, or else it would face first a shortage and
possibly a complete lack of petroleum with resulting hardship
to the economy of the country.
The battle continued unabated during 1918, and it
intensified as time passed. The International Petroleum
37
A copy or the article entitled "Petroleum Famine" is in-
cluded in a memo from the American Consulate in Lima-Callao
to the Secretary of State, January 23t 1918, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823/6363/IO.
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Company, which had already stopped all new exploration and
development, leaked information to the effect that it might
stop all work at its oil fields. On September 2if. Le Sueur
publically confirmed the rumors that the company was con-
sidering a work stoppage and gave as the reason the lack of
progress in the settlement of the La Brea y Parinas tax
controversy. The Lima press widely interpreted the company's
move as an attempt to pressure the Chamber of Deputies into
passing the bill approved earlier by the Senate. Miro-Quesada'
El Comerclo demanded that the government take over the oil
fields and form a Peruvian corporation to run the operation.
Even La Prensa, Lima's other major daily newspaper, joined in
counseling tliat if I.P.C. carried out its threat, the govern-
38
ment should expropriate the fields.
The Peruvian government, which was under heavy pressure
from the United States and the oil company then faced the
acute displeasure of the oil workers at Talara, vxho appealed
for an early settlement of the controversy. The government's
response was to confidentially agree to submit the dispute
to arbitration, perhaps to the Hague Tribunal. This agree-
ment appeared to have been reached at the urging of the
American ambassador in Lima, although the evidence is not
3^
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entirely clear. October brought no relief in Congress.
The opposition vigorously argued against any compromise on
the grounds that the original sale to Quintana was null,
and that the concession was given subject to the general
mining laws. The sale of a mine of pitch could not be turned
into the sale of a petroleum field, and since the surface
property was separate from the subsoil there was no reason
to assume that the subsoil sold to Quintana corresponded to
the entire hacienda, M^ncora. When word of the government's
proposal to submit the question to international arbitration
was made public, the opposition countered with demands that
the International Petroleum Company should pay back taxes
amounting to some $l6 million dollars. The inflexibility
Of their argument was well illustrated by the statement of
one of the outspoken opposition leaders.
Now,- even assuming that it would be
possible to submit our sovereign rights
to arbitration in a conflict vrith a
private party which should disappear
as a pigmy, as a germ before the mag-
nificance and greatness of a State, it
turns out that we have always arrived at
solutions which were prejudicial to Peru.^^Q
With hindsight, it is simple to recognize that Oscar Barros's
premonitions about an internationa.l arbitrary award were
3?
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quite correct; however, his assessment of I.P.C. and its
parent company, Standard Oil of New Jersey, was very un-
realistic. The "pigmy" prevailed for many years.
It was Standard Oil and not the Canadian government
which withdrew the steamship Azof from its Peruvian route.
By October the second ship was also put out of service, thus
4-1
effectively cutting Peru off from its petroleum supply.
The American, British and Canadian embassies in Lima kept
quiet about the ship requisition scheme and played Standard
Oil's game—effectively pulling the rug out from under Peru.
Joining in this concerted effort was the only other sig-
nificant oil producer in Peru, the Lobitos Oil-Fields Co., Ltd
Realizing that without oil Peru's railroads and electric
power plants would come to a grinding halt, the Peruvian
government ordered the Lobitos Oil-Fields Company to trans-
port 20% of .the oil it usually exported to Canada to Callao.
TTT"
Earlier in 1918, U.S. Secretary of State Franlc Polk inquired
whether the Canadian government was requisitioning the two
ships serving Peru. The Canadian reply left no doubt:
"Neither the Azof nor the Prince have been requisitioned
by the Canadian Government." .ii chard Crawford to Frank
Polk, January 20, 1918, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/9¥.
The Unit*^.:! States, Britain and Canada may have decided to
support Standard Oil due to hard feelings in the State Depar
ment over Peru's refusal to allow the Allies to use certain
German ships which were interned in Peruvian harbors. At
one point, ^ the Secretary of State reminded the Peruvian
governjnent that such hesitation "has produced an unfortunate
impression upon the American people." Carey, pp. 29-31*
38
The British company refused vrith the backing of the
British ambassador; the company argued that the ships
used by the Lobitos company were under the control of the
Canadian government.
By October 28, the situation became untenable for the
Peruvian government. In a final effort, the Pardo admin-
istration, through its ambassador in v;ashington, requested
"that the government of the United States kindly use its
good offices to the effect that the British Government
liO
The relationship hetvieen the Lobitos Oil-Fields, Ltd. andthe International Petroleum Company has been complex and
somewhat obscure. The Lobitos com-oany began operationsin Ijorthern Peru in 1902. During the first two decades
of the century, both I.P.C. and Lobitos were representedby the same managing firm in Lima. Furthermore, a State
Department memo dated December 30, 1918 stated that "both
the Lobitos Oil-Fields Company and the London and Pacific
Petroleum Company are now owned by the International Petroleum
Company," A check with docujTients subpoenaed during U.S.
Congressional Investigations during the 1940 's showed that
Lobitos was not listed as a subsidiary of Standard Oil of
'
New Jersey. Company officials of I.P.C. expressed bewilder-
ment when presented with the document and em.phatically denied
that Lobitos had ever been owned by I.P.C. The State Department
memo identifies the source of the information as V/alter
Penfield, counsel for the London and Pacific Petroleum Com-
pany. The scholar is left with two alternative interpre-
tations: either the two companies were owned by I.P.C.
and that fact became one of the best kept secrets in Amer-
ican corporate history, or else, the memo was in error.
-If the former conclusion is correct, then I.P.C. operated
a virtual petroleum monopoly in Peru that has not to this
date been discovered. However, the fact that the Information
was only mentioned in two memoranda in 1918 and 1919, and
not dealt with in diplomatic correspondence through 1939
would seem to indicate that the Information was a' mistake.
The evidence is inconclusive. U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363.12, December 30, 1918;- No. 823.6363/II,
February 10, 1919.
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reconmend the afore-raentioned Oil Companies to observe the
laws of Peru." The Pardo government was brought to its
knees-Peru begged Washington to intercede with London so
that a private company would obey its laws. The American
government, however, was an accomplice to the oil company
maneuver, and the State Department merely shuffled papers
without taking any action. The Department forwarded the
Peruvian request to the War Trade Board, which had already
obtained the German ships which Peru had held. Peru had
nothing further to bargain with, and the War Trade Board
responded that it "would be reluctant to take any action
in this matter, except upon the express request of the
Department of State." No such request was forthcoming,
and Pardo was left to fend for himself against the recalci-
trant and pro-confiscatory forces in the Peruvian Congress
and press.
During the early weeks of November I9I8, the Peruvian
Congress debated the question of La Brea y Parifias,' apparently
unconvinced that the battle was lost. The Lima press, with
Antonio Hiro-Quesada and SI Comercio in the lead, recommended
that the legislators consult Mexican laws dealing with oil.
M. de Freyre, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States, to
the Secretary of State, October 28, I9I8, U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/I2.
See the memorandum from the War Trade Board to the Department
of State, November 2, I9I8, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/13.
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At last, V/ashlngton showed some concern; the Department
of State feared that "General Carranza vjlll seize this
opportunity to.
. . induce the Peruvian Government to adopt
a policy similar to that of the Mexican Government." The
American ambassador in Lima was ordered to watch the situa-
tion closely, and "to report to the Department any evidence
of Mexican influence."
This concern proved unfounded, for on December 2^, I9I8
the Peruvian Congress passed Law 3OI6, which proclaimed in
its single article:
The Executive Power is authorized to
come to an agreement with the Government
of His Britannic Majesty for submission
of the controversy pending between the
State and the mining enterprise "Brea y
Parinas" to the final decision of an in-
ternational arbitration,
Representing the legislative branch, Antonio Miro-Quesada,
President of the Senate, editor of El Gomercio and arch foe
of the International Petroleum Company, signed the bill and
forwarded it to President Pardo.
The Civilistas were once described by an American
ambassador to Peru as:
ITS
See note?: from the Department of State to Benton McHillir,
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The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy , Vol . 1 (International
Petroleum Company, February, 1969) * Exhibit 1,
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the reactionary, ultra-conservative
faction of Peru, corresponding to thegroup of large landowners so powerfulin Mexico in the days of President Dias.They are anti-foreign, anti-industrial
and wish Peru to be solely an agricul-
tural country without development out-
side their own haciendas,—with the
country administered entirely for their
own benefit.^g
The question of La 3rea y PariHas proved a watershed in the
history of Pardo's Civilista Party—the oil issue divided
the party hopelessly. Pardo and his supporters x^anted to
reach an expedient compromise with American capitalism and
one of its foremost representatives in Peru, the Interna-
tional Petroleum Company. Opposing him were men of consi-
derable prominance, led by Amtonio Hire ^^uesada, who so
bitterly contested the government's action that the Civilistas
could not heal their wounds nor face the challenges of
the election year 1919.
Widespread strikes in Lima-Callao, an untimely reduction
of the military budget, and an over-anxious opposition can-
didate for the presidency provided the ingredients for a
coup d'etat in July 1919. Before the year was over, most
important Civilista leaders, including Pardo and Miro Quesada
were exiled—the golden age of oligarchy in Peru had come to
an end. Henceforth:
TTB
American Ambassador to Peru Miles Poindexter to the
Department of State, April 23, 1925. U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A9I.
The wealthy families would continue tobe a force in politics.
. . but from now
onwards the oligarchy would not have it
all its own way. A new force had begun
to play its part in Peruvian politics—
the urban working and middle classes.
Their growing influence could no longer
safely be ignored either by the men of
wealth or the soldiers.
. , Peru by I919
had already taken a first important step
into the modern age.,
M'9
According to Francois
. Bourricaud, the Coup of I919 ended
the Civilista dream of "an aristocratic republic," under the
tutelage of the great Lima families, and initiated for the
first time in the 20th century, a "duality between the
governing /or rather dominating? and the political class.
.
With the ant i-foreign and ant i-industrial oligarchy
shocked and in disarray, the Peruvian scene looked more
promising than ever to American capital in general and to
Standard Oil's Latin American subsidiary, the International
Petroleum Company in particular. In August, I919, the
Department of State sent a circular to all American embassies
and consular offices impressing upon the personnel "the
vital importance of securing adequate supplies of mineral
oil both for present and future needs of the United States.
.
They vrere inatructed to obtain and forward information
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regarding the discovery of oil. the granting of concessions
and the "change of ownership of oil property or important
changes in ownership or control of corporate companies con-
cerned with oil production or distribution."^''' The American
diplomatic personnel in Peru took the message to heart, for
during the 1920 's American diplomatic channels were saturated
with information concerning the moves of American and
European petroleum interests in that country.
The key to the new American optimism rested not only
on the broken back of the oligarchy, but on the personal
background of the new strong man—August© Leguia. The new
president of Peru learned fluent English early in his life—
an important asset in his very successful business career.
Prior to his entrance into politics, Leguia served as the
general manager of the Peruvian, Bolivian and Ecuadorian
operations of the New York Life Insurance Company. After
a trip to London, he became manager of the British Sugar
Company in addition to his duties as president of the
52
National Bank of Peru. He served as Minister of the
Treasury in the first Pardo administration from 190^ to I908.
At that point he became the presidential candidate of the
51
See the circular from Alvey Adee, August 16, 1919, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/23,
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Civilista Party and won the election. His term in office
was marred by Congressional stalling on his legislative
program and even a theatrical uprising in which he was
actually captured by his adversaries and marched through
the streets of Lima, An unperceptive American attache \iho
witnessed the event reported that Leguia had gone mad and
53joined in a demonstration against himself
j
As time passed, Legufa grew more bitter and suspicious
of democratic institutions. He plotted to rig the congressional
elections and when his machinations were discovered, he
found himself in opposition to his own party's congressional
delegation, Legufa remained in office—a prisoner of the
circumstances of his own creation. However, he learned a
valuable lesson, "Never again would the future dictator of
Peru allow himself to be pushed around by the oligarchy, or
54
indeed by politicians of any political creed,"
Following the expiration of his term in 1912, Legufa
went abroad. He spent most of that time between the end of
his first term and the 1919 coup d'etat in London, apparently
selling British businessmen on the idea that he would be the
future leader of Peru, In exchange for an unspecified sum
which he pla'ined to use in the finr.ncing of his coup, Legu^?.
Ibid , , p. i960
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promised the Royal Dutch Shell Company that once he was in
power, he would grant that company exclusive exploration
rights in Peru. The international oil giant fell for Legufa's
proposition. On his way from London to Lima. Legufa stop-
ped in New York and in Washington during the spring of I919.
He held conversations with important American businessmen,
and while the nature of these conversations and even the
identity of the businessmen remains unclear to this date,
chances are that Legufa tried to strike deals similar to
the one he reached with Royal Dutch Shell. It is known that
Legula talked with the president of the National City Bank
of New York about his desire to "consolidate the various
government agencies and monopolies operating in Peru.
.
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and about refinancing the Peruvian public debt.
In the words of James Carey,
There is no evidence to conclude that
the prospective president of Peru and
the head of the National City Bank
entertained other than honorable inten-
tions. V/hen it is noted, however, that
the conversations took place before
the elections were held in Peru, it is
evident that some presumptuous planning
was done with a man who had not yet
returned from a five-year absence. ^r,
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Legufa proved to be a more skillful politician than his
British and American promoters might have suspected. He
refused to honor or even acknowledge his commitments to
Hoyal Dutch Shell. Instead, he began to bargain with
British and American businessmen to see who would offer the
most for the favors of his government.
V/hen vrord of his dealings with some British promoters
leaked out, the Department of State instructed its Lima
embassy to make it known to Legufa that Washington would
not look favorably upon any Peruvian oil concessions to
any oil concerns reflecting any future exclusion of American
oil companies. Legula promptly responded "that Americans
would be given equal or preferential opportunities for
59
Investment and development in Peru." However, in spite
of Legufa's pledges, V/ashington remained skeptical. The
American Embassy in Lima carefully monitored everything
fioing on in the country. Even a Swedish scientific expedi-
tion was suspected as a cover operation for the exploratory
activities of Royal Dutch Shell, the worldvride arch enemy
of Standard Oil of New Jersey. The American charge d'affaires
Telegram from the Department of State to the American Legation
in Lim-^.j February 10, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/17a.
William 'Walker Smith, Charge D'affaires ad interim to the
Secretary of State, February 19 t 1920, U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/2I.
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talked with Legufa regularly, yet he commented in a dispatch
to Washington dated March 5. 1920 that he would be "obliged
to discount his statements as I do not believe he is giving
60
out full information."
By the middle of March. William Walker Smith reported
that "the President again brought up the question of finan-
cial assistance to the country." Noting that Peru was hard
pressed for capital and that Leguia's success depended on
aid from abroad, Smith went on to conclude: "Whoever can
come to the financial assistance of Peru at this time vfill
61
gain a great commercial advantage." With a clearer
understanding of Legufa's strategy, the United States
government and the International Petroleum Company moved;
the first to promote the entry of American mining enter-
prises in Peru, and the second to consolidate its very
profitable operations by settling the still-pending La Brea
y Parinas issue. In late March, 1920, a memorandum from
Alvey Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of State, went to
the Department of Commerce, advising that:
there is great activity for the
development of oil at the present
time in Peru, and I earnestly
William Walker Smith to the Secretary of State, March 5, 1920,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/2O.
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recommend that the Department so
place the matter before American
interests that they may enter this
field with the least possible delay,
62
In accordance with this recommendation, the Department of
Commerce issued a confidential three page report entitled
"Peruvian Oil Development" to major American oil companies.
A covering letter from Philip B. Kennedy. Director of the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, informed the companies
that "siace so much interest is now being displayed by European
companies in Peru, it behooves American oil interests to
look carefully into the possibilities of the Peruvian fields.
The United States government, knovring that the Royal Dutch
Shell Company was attempting to gain a foothold in Peru, viarned
the American giant Standard Oil to engage in counter-maneuvers.^
^27
Memorandum from Alvey Adee to the Department of Coimnerce,
March 25, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
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Report and letter from Philip Kennedy, May 7, 1920, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/24.
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Official concern with American oil interests was at one point
interpreted as favoring the entry of any American company into
Peru. Ho^rever, when Standard Oil of Indiana attempted to
negotiate with Leguia to secure an oil monopoly, the State
Department instructed its ambassador in Lima not to introduce
the company's representative because it would be "tantamount,
to favoring said businessman's proposals, • ." in the eyes of
the Peruvian president. The question was long debated. The
Departmant justified its position on the grounds that an oil
monopoly for Indiana Standard would damage the "established"
interests of Jersey Standard, and furthermore would errode the
open door policy the Department sought to establish in Peru,
The fact is that Standard Oil of New Jersey also attempted to
establish oil monopolies without incurring the disfavor of the
State Department, Standard Oil of Indiana's proposed oil mono
poly did not necessarily threaten I,P,C.'s holdings. See the
diplomatic correspondence from May to August, 1930*
^9
The messase was not wasted, for in April I920, Walter
Teagle called on the governiaent to give his company "all
possible and proper assistance. "^^ "The company needed to
~
settle the La Brea y Parinas question; however, such a
settlement might have to be reached in the context of a
larger package deal. During the Spring or Sumner of I920,
the International Petroleum Company offered the Peruvian
government $10,000,000.00 in exchange for an oil monopoly
in that country—the compensation would cover the La Brea
y Parinas problem as well. Leguia neither accepted nor
rejected the offer—he merely kept everyone in suspense,
pending counter offers from Royal Dutch Shell, British Oil
Fields, Sinclair Oil, or from promoter Lewis Emery, Jr.
Leguia wanted a .^25,000,000.00 loan, and he wanted
Standard Oil of New Jersey to finance "the civic and general
sanitary improvements" which he had plaiined for Peru. Since
the company was paying taxes of about 11,000,000.00 per year,
Legufa proposed to pledge that annual tax to service the
loan. He also proposed. . ."to settle in the company's favor
certain long-continued disputes with the government over the
67
titles of certain oil-lands in the Talara district. The
^^As report 3d in an inter-office me.T-oranduii, April 8, 1920,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/23.
^^James Roth, Vice-Consul at Lima-Callao to Secretary of State,
August 3, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/29
^"^Carleton Jackson, American Trade Commissioner in Lima to
Department of State, August 5, 1920, U.S. Department of State
Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/32.
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executives of Standard Oil well understood their predicament—
the Peruvian Congress authorized the president to settle
the La Brea y Parinas controversy by international arbitra-
tion, but as of 1919 it was up to Leguia to initiate this
action. He was not willing to do so unless Standard Oil
was willing to underwrite his public works program. The
company rejected Leguja's proposal, and its relations with
the Peruvian strongman began to corrode rapidly. Legufa
continued his coy strategy during the first half of 1921,
keeping the American ambassador partially informed of loan
offers by the representatives of the Shell Company and the
serious consideration they were being given. At the same
time he earnestly declared his almost passionate partisan-
ship for American capital.
You know, he was quoted as saying
by the American Ambassador, that if
I could have my way, Peru would be
practically American within ten or
fifteen years. But, Mr, Ambassador,
what can I do when the business inter-
ests of the United States refuse to
take advantage of the opportunities
given to come into Peru and lay the
foundation for such conditions
i
Leguia 's strategy x^^as clear. He sought to pressure Standard
Oil of New Jersey into underwriting his government while
hinting that he had other bidders whom he would have taken
Augusto Leguia, as quoted by American Ambassador to Peru
William E, Gonzales in a dispatch to the Secretary of State,
July 26, 1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No,
823.6363A8.
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up long ago had it not been for his love for American business.
The company resented Legufa's attitude. From the
middle Of 1920 to the fall of I92I. International Petroleum's
manager in Lima. William Montavon-a former representative
of the U.S Department of Commerce in that city, openly
attacked the administration of Augusto Legufa. Ambassador
Gonzales reported to Washington that Hontavon was "favorable
to any revolutionary movement that might cause an overthrow
Of the present government . "^^ The ambassador admonished
Montavon against further public comment, but Hontavon. upon
departing for a trip to the United States, promptly declared
that an insurrection by one Captain Cervantes then in progress
in Iquitos signaled "the beginning of the end of Legufa."
This was particularly distressing to the ambassador, since
American military intelligence received reports that oil
70interests were financing the insurrection. Another
would-be anti-Leguia revolutionary, Augusto Duran, also
approached American oil companies seeking a llOO.OOO.OO loan
71in exchange for future concessions of oil lands in Peru.
While there is no evidence of whether or not the loan was
made, it was apparent that Standard Oil of New Jersey wanted
"^9 :
William E, Gonzales to the Secretary of State, September 26,
1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A8.
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71Henry S. Waterman, American Consul in San Jose, Costa Rica to
the Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/407.
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to depose Legufa. or at least frighten him into a compromise.
Standard Oil's "get tough" policy was deeply disturbing
to the American diplomatic personnel in Lima. William-
Gonzales, the U.S. Ambassador, noted that the manager of
International Petroleum Company was "one of the most prominent
Americans in Peru." and poignantly concluded that "any
tendency of American businessmen in foreign countries to
become 'King makers,' should be discouraged if for no better
reason than in behalf of the sound general business interests
.•72
of the United States. Unfortunately, Standard Oil's influence
in VJashington was great, and Gonzales's assignment was cut
short. Even so, the logic of his statement would live to
haunt the company's Peruvian operation to the end of its
days.
With Gonzales replaced and Standard Oil threatening to
finance a new revolution, Leguia opted for settlement with
the company. On August 27, 1921 Leguia 's Minister of Foreign
Affairs and a representative from Britain signed an Agreement
for Arbitration in Lima, This agreement signaled the begin-
ning of the diplomatic phase of the La Brea y Parihas
controversy.
72
William E. Gonzales to the Secretary of State, September 26,
1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A05.
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CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAUDO OF 1922
Any settlement of the La Brea y Parinas controversy
necessarily had to involve several parties: the formal
owners of the property—the British heirs of the Keswick
estate, the London and Pacific Petroleum Company—the
British firm which held a 99 year lease on the petroleum
fields. International Petroleum Company--Gan^dian owner of
the London and Pacific Petroleum Company, Imperial Oil
Company—Canadian owner of International Petroleum Company,
and finally. Standard Oil of New Jersey—American owner of
Imperial Oil Company, and thus International Petroleum
Company and London and Pacific Petroleum Company. Stripped
of corporate complexities, Standard Oil of New Jersey con-
trolled and operated through its Canadian and British sub-
sidiaries the la Brea y Parinas property. The heirs of the
Keswick estate had a stake in the form of the royalties due
them from the production of the Peruvian fields. It was
the fact of British "ownership" however, which made an agree-
ment between the Peruvian and British governments diploma-
tically plausible.
The Agreement for Arbitration contained a statement of
the respective positions of the Peruvian and British govern-
ments:
The Government of the Republic of
Peru contends that the Supreme
5^
Resolutions or Decrees of the 31st
March, I911, 15th March and 22nd May,
1915, relating to the Mineral Pro-
,perty of "La Brea y Parinas" are
valid and legal and should be enforced,
and that the said Mineral Property is
subject to the general body of mining
laws vrhich may be in force in Peru
now or in the future.
The Government of His Britannic
Majesty, on the oi:her hand, contends
that the said Mineral Property has a
legal status distinct from that of
mineral property acquired and held in
the usual manner under the Mining
Ordinances or the Mining Code of Peru;
that the said Mineral Property is not
subject to the general body of raining
laws or to legislation inconsistant
with such distinct status, and that the
Supreme Resolutions or Decrees above
mentioned are invalid and cannot legally
be enforced.^
This document also stipulated that the Tribunal would be
composed in the following manner: Peru and Great Britain
would each appoint an arbitrator, and the third jurist would
be the President of the Federal Court of the Republic of
Switzerland. The subsequent articles of the Agreement
for Arbitration set forth the task of the Tribunal. However,
in Article X, Paragraph II, was the key provision of the
agreement.
In case the Tribunal should, before
rendering its ax\^ard, suggest terms
which the two Governments may accept
The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy , Vol . I_ (International
Petroleum Company, February, 19^9 )t i^xhibit 2, p. 2.
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as satisfactory, or in case the twoGoveraments should th^jr{^-^e~rr—
Shall. In either case
. incorpo^Tti|U£h settlement in an Award, vrhich
f^^lf treated as the Award^^h^iil£unal./iimpahsis supplied/^
In other words, the Agreement provided that should the
Peruvian sovernment and the British government reach a
conpromise outside the auspices of the Tribunal, the compro-
mise itself would not suffice-it would have to be incor-
porated into the award of the international tribunal. What
was the reason for this peculiar requirement?
The Leguia administration was willing to settle for
a compromise even more favorable to the company than the
agreement worked out in I915 and eventually rejected by the
Peruvian Chamber of Deputies. Since the President had no
legal power to reach a settlement without getting it approved
by Congress, and since any compromise he forced down the
throat of Peru would only last as long as his stay in
power, the solution
-'/as simple. He would legitimize any
compromise he reached by transforming it into the award
of an international tribunal.
The compromise took the form of a bilateral treaty
between the governments of Peru and Great Britain. It was
2
Ibid
. , p. 7.
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was
signed in Lima, rather than in Paris where the Tribunal
meeting. On March 2. I922. the British representative. Arth-
ur Grand Duff and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs. ^
Alberto Salomon signed the compromise agreement, and on
April 2k, the Tribunal in Paris issued the Lima agreement
as its award, over the signatures of the presiding officer.
Fritz Ostertag. President of the Federal Courts of Switzer-
land, the British arbitrator Robert Laird Borden and his
Peruvian counterpart, Jose Varela Orbegoso,
In its first article, "the High Contracting Parties"
agreed that the property comprised ^l,6l4 claims of ^0,000
square meters each as the Peruvian government had claimed
all along. In the most important article, it stipulated that
for a period of fifty years, beginning January 1. 1922, the
company would be liable for annual taxes of 30 soles per
pertenencia under exploitation and one sol per un-exploited
3pertenencia
. T-his settlement was far more advantageous to
the company than the earlier compromise which had been
defeated by the Civilista-controlled Congress. In the
earlier proposal, there was a graduated tax on the unexploited
pertenencias which started at one sol during the first ten
years and escalated to fifteen soles during the last twenty
years of the fifty year period covered by the agreement.
^Ibid.. pp. 9-10.
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The Avrard of I922 also provided that at the end of the
fifty year period for which there was fixed taxation, the
property would "be subject to the tax base on surface, tax
on production, royalties, and all other contributions and
taxes which may be established by the laws then in force.
Article V stipulated that:-
From the aforesaid consideration the
owners of "La Brea y Parifias" willpay the Government of Peru the sum
of one million dollars (-?1, 000, 000)
American gold, which will include
the payment of all contributions
accrued up to December 31st, I92I,
and every other claim which may existin relation to the property "La Brea
y Parinas.
"^
For one million dollars. La Brea y Parinas was granted a
clean slate so far as all possible claims to back taxes
were concerned. But why should the British owners pay Peru
a million dollars U.S. currency?
Perhaps the British played only a formal and symbolic
role in all the negotiations. When an irate member of Par-
liament in London inquired who was going to pay for the
arbitration, the British Under-secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs replied that "the International Petroleum Company
have undertaken in writing, through their solicitors to
^Ibid
.
^Ibid,, p. 11.
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indemnify His Majesty's Government against any renumeration
of the arbitrator and agent respectively."^ In fact, the
London and Pacific Petroleum Conpany-of British registry,
had been under liquidation since I916. It was under the
direct control of International Petroleum Company, and its
board of directors was dissolved in I9I6. The real bene-
ficiaries of the Award of 1922 or Laudo as it became known
in Spanish was the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
through its subsidiary International Petroleum Company.
The profits of I.P.C. in Peru are confidential, and
buried in a consolidated statement of the company's
profits throughout Latin America. However, an economic
study by J. Fred Hippy originally published in I959 was
most revealing. After noting that most British investments
in Peru were disastrous,, the author noted the exceptions --
Lobitos Oil-Fields Ltd., and.
. .
More remarkable still vias the financial
record of International Petroleum Company,
Limited.
. . For three decades beginning
in 1921, International Petroleum paid
an average annual dividend of ^-0 percent
on a nominal capital of approximately
$36 miHi on i No year passed without a
reward to its shareholders; the return
was no less than 100 percent annually
for four consecutive years (1935-1938)
J
But English investors probably did not
As quoted in a dispatch from Robert T. Kennedy, American
Consul General in London to the Department of State,
February 15, 1922, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/59.
59
own more than a fourth of its
securities, perhaps not more thanan equivalent of 2 million.^
While some Peruvians were aware that the London and Pacific
Company had a tremendously profitable operation,^ and
while they must have suspected that I.P.c. was not any
less lucrative, they did not have proof. Secrecy on the
part Of the company and partial knowledge and suspicion
on the part of the Peruvian government henceforth created
an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Peruvians imagined the
company profits as astronomical.
With renewed confidence, Standard Oil moved to simplify
the complex legal status quo of La Brea y Parihas. In 1924-
it acquired title to that property and thus terminated the
lease arrangement which had prevailed up to that point. By
acquiring La Brea y Parihas after the Laudo of 1922,' Standard
Oil's International Petroleum Company hoped to have a clean
slate. The company maintained that the arbitral award took
place betvjeen Peru and the British and that since the company
did not acquire the property until 192^, it had nothing to
7"
James Fred Rippy, British Investment in Latin America
, 1822 -
^9^9—A Case Study in the Operations of Private ii:ntGrprise "
in Retarded lie.-ions (2nd. ed. ; riamden, Comiecticut : .-ircron
Books, 1966), pp. 131-132.
Ricardo A. Deustua showed data that London and Pacific Petro-
leum paid dividends of 37h'/^ and 20:^' of capital investment
in 191^1- and 1915. Ricardo A. Deustua, El Petroleo en el
Peru (Lima: Imprenta Americana, 1921), p."""6'8".
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to do with the agreement.^
Internatioml Petroleum Company ^med only time with
the 1922 settlement, m 192^. Royal Dutch Shell took action
Signaling "the commencement of a new campaign between the
European and the A..erican oil concerns for the domination
Of the Oil ^.,et... The new offensive was to center on
Standard's Peruvian production and its distribution in
Canada. It did not take long for Peru's President. Augusto
Legufa. to realize that the rivalry would mean new oppor-
tunities for his regime.
In the Fall of I926, President Legufa's son Juan departed
for Europe with the task of selling the Roj^l Dutch Shell
Company a monopoly on the distribution of gasoline in Peru.
Ample opportunity was given for American interests to learn
of his intention, and I.P.C..S general manager in Lima even
managed to acquire a copy of the proposed contract. In the
newest of Legufa's schemes, I.P.C. would be allowed to con-
tinue its operations; however, it would have to sell enough
petroleum products to supply Shell's monopoly at specified
rates, and under penalty of confiscation, I.P.C. would be
banned from marketing any gasoline in Peru. The company
9
J
"El Laudo de La 3rea y Parinas y la posicion de la International
^Petroleum," iToticias de Pctroleo
. XIII. Mo. 11? (Hay. i960).
Report from the Dutch press sent from the American Legationin The Hague to the Department of State, September 24, 1924,U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, IIo.' 823.6363/67,
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would remain free^to export whatever oil surplus Peru-s
fields produced.
Legufa's plan became a casualty of the dictator's
failing health. When, in 1927. it became known that he
would need surgery, foreign capital became fearful that
Legufa would die or be overthrown. This fear was replaced
by the economic catastrophe in 1929-the Great Crash-as
the major cause of lagging dollar inflow into Peru. "When
the inflow of capital stopped.
. . Legula's downfall was
not long coming." ^ Leguia's demise in power ended a sort
of carnival for foreign capital which he and his son had
been running. Juan Legufa would travel to New York and
arrange loans of up to fifty million dollars; the banks
would charge exhorbitant commissions and then sell the bonds
to the American public. Juan Legufa usually got a percentage
of the proceeds and everyone benefited except the Peruvian
nation and the Americans who bought the default bound
securities. Six months after the end of Leguia's Onccnio,
Peru began to default its sizeable foreign debt. The Sdnchez
Cerro administration indignantly pointed out that as of
January 1932, servicing the foreign debt would h^ve amounted
13to 3^.3/i' of the national revenues.
^-^Hemorandum from Leland Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State
to Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, December 1^, 192(
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.0363/91.
^^James C. Carey, Peru and the United States, I90O - I962 (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 196^1), p. 62.
-'•^Ibid ., p. 78.
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International Petroleum Company fared well during
the cataclysmic events of the early 1930- s. The Peruvian
populace, which had a vague understanding of Legufa's
pro-foreign business policy, struck back by attacking American
businesses. The Cerro de Pasco Corporation suffered heavy
damage from riots; however, in contrast. l.P.c.'s installations
in Peru's distant Northeast corner remained undisturbed.
The International Petrolei^ Company moved cautiously to
protect its k5 million dollar investment. The new nationalism
prevalent in Lima, with its xenophobic connotations, was
very dangerous, but at the same time. Peru's precarious
financial position presented many opportunities.
The government of Sanchez Cerro wished to institute a
tough policy towards foreign companies and I.P.C. in parti-
cular. In the minds of most Peruvians, foreign companies
had a long and guilty partnership with Augusto Legufa— it
was thus politically attractive to hit these companies hard.
On the other hand, Legufa left the country bankrupt and
badly in need of funds—only the American capitalists had
the cash to save the situation. As a result of this dilemma,
the government followed a two-faced policy. For public con-
consumption, the Sanchez Cerro Administration mc^de dramatic
moves to invalidate the 1922 Award. But in secret, his
government continued Legufa's policy in an attempt to persuade
cajole and even blaclaaail I.P.C. into giving Peru financial
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support. Sanchez Cerro had two weapons: diplomatic assaults
on the Award, and a law passed by the Legufa sovernment in
February I930 which authorized the creation of a petroleum
marketing monopoly. Ironically, that law was passed in anti-
cipation of such an arrangement between Peru and I.P.C. in
spite of its pious anti-monopolist platitudes, the U.S.
Department of State gave its blessing to that proposed mono-
poly, and it even went so far as to torpedo an attempt by
another American company. Standard Oil of Indiana, to outbid
Jersey Standard's International Petroleum Company.
Reflecting its public policy, in April I93I the Peruvian
government announced that it considered the 1922 Laudo non-
binding since it had never been ratified by the Peruvian
Congress, and that it intended to collect 22,000 soles
in back taxes beginning with 1924, the year in which I.P.C,
formally purchased La Brea y Parinas,"^^ This action by the
government triggered a new offensive against I.P.C. by its
traditional Peruvian enemies, who once more had the virulent
backing of Antonio Hiro Quesada and his newspaper El Comerci o
.
As is often the case in Peruvian politics, appearances did
not tell the whole story. For months prior to the new
TIi
See the diplomatic corresDondenc * from Hay 2 to September
1930. U.S. Department of' State Decimal Files, Nos. 823,6363/
111, 117, 120. 122. 125, 126. 127. 128,
^^Fred Morris Doaring, American Ambassador to Peru, to the
Department of State, April 7. 1931. U-S* Depajftment of
State Decimal Files, Wo. 823. 6363/133
/
Official pseudo-offensive a^inst the company, the Peruvian
government reached what can only be described as a cozy
modus Vivendi with International Petroleum Company. Shortly
after the Sa^nchez Cerro government took power, funds dried
up and the government found that it could not pay its army,
navy or police. As a career military officer. Sanchez Cerro
knew that a sovernment which cannot pay the Armed Forces
does not endure. His solution was simple-get the money
from a party you can trust and pay off those you cannot.
In late November or early December I930, the "revolutionary-
government sent its Minister of Finance to confer with a
most important American in Peru, the general manager of
International Petroleum. The minister pleaded for the
company to secretly advance the Peruvian government one
and a half million soles. After urgent consultations with
the company's high command, the loan was granted and the
government saved.
Unaware of the company's financing of the Peruvian
government, many of Peru's political leaders hastened to
the attack against I.P.C. A Constituent Assembly was called
to draft a new constitution, and it took up the question of
La Brea y Parinas. The same topic V7as simultaneously being
Fred Morris Dearing to the Department of State, December
19 and 26, 1930, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
Nos. 823.6363/131 and 132.
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considered by the Peruvian Congress. Fearing that the situa-
tion would get out of hand, the Sanchez Cerro government
anticipated the Assembly and the Congress by a few days and
cabled its representative in Geneva to request the Permanent
Court of International Justice to revise the I922 Award.
Subsequently, the Peruvian Congress passed a law authorizing
the executive to do what he had already done. The Congress
explicitly outlined the reasons why the Award should be
revised. First, the Award did not settle the classification
of property to which the subsoil of La Brea y Parinas be-
longed. Second, it did not have provisions for Congressional
approval of the arrangement. Third, the Award legislated
on matters of taxation, and hence impinged upon the powers
of the Peruvian Congress, and finally, it exceeded the
17limits set out by the Law of I9I8 authorizing the arbitration.
Of course, the Permanent Court of International Justice
had no jurisdiction over the decision of another International
Tribunal, or for that matter over any dispute unless both
parties to the dispute would be willing to submit to its
judgement. Great Britain was not about to reopen the question,
and thus this move by the Peruvian government was purely
political. If anything it undermined its previous position,
^''h.P. Starrett, American Charge d 'Affaires ad interim in Lima
to the Department of State, April 25 1 1932, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823. 6363/I5I.
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for if Peru did not consider the Award binding in I93I. how
could it now ask that it be revised in I932? Diplomatic
moves notwithstanding. Peruvian politicians in the Constituent
Assembly now competed with each other to see who would
champion the anti-I.P.c. crusade. On March 21. the Assembly
approved appointments to a special committee on the revision
of petroleum laws. Eight days later Congressman Calmell del
Solar introduced a bill which provided for the construction
of ^.000 schools to be financed through the profits of a
18petroleum monopoly. Through all of this stormy political
situation. I.P.C.'s management remained notably calm. While
at times they wondered whether the situation would snowball
out of control, for the most part they knew that the Executive
branch was in their pocket. In fact, while the pseudo-
diplomatic offensive x^^as going full steam ahead, the Peruvian
Minister of Foreign Affairs privately assured the company's
manager, Walter Reed, that "so far as he. . . was concerned,
the matter of altering the treaty between Peru and Great
Britain was a closed issue. "'''^
Not only did the company save the day for Peru's govern-
ment in December 1931. from that point on I.P-C. began to
regularly ?.dvance the Sanchez Cerro administration from 25,000
^°Fred Morris Dearing to the Department of State, Ilarch 21 and
31, 1932, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/
1^6 and 1^8.
-'^Ibid.
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to 30.000 Peruvian Pounds a month through an Italian banl.
in consideration of furure export taxes. When this advance
allowance did not suffice, the Minister of Finance pleaded
for larger advances from International Petroleum and went
so far as to suggest that I.P.C.'s Lima manager Walter Reed
deceive the company's home office by stating that the
Peruvian government was forcing I.P.C. to make larger advance
payments. Walter Reed refused, not for ethical but for poli-
tical reasons. He explained to Ambassador Bearing that "in
view of the precarious nature of the Government, the fact
that it might be forced out of office, and that its successor
may not take it kindly that a foreign corporation assisted
to prolong its existence by conniving with it to deceive the
public.
.
."^^ the International Petroleum Company would
not advance the Sanchez Cerro government additional funds.
International Petroleum's involvement in Peruvian
politics reached even further than this incident indicated.
Sometime during the first half of 1932. the Minister of
Development and President of the Council of Ministers,
Francisco Lanatta, approached I.P.C. 's manager and asked
for an advance on the customs pajnnents at a 1^% discount
to I.P.C. The money was needed to get the Peruvian Navy's
20
Fred Morris Bearing to the Department of State. November 1^.
1932, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 721.23/511,
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Ship bottoms scraped. I^natta enbezzeled the money. m
a confrontation involving several government ministers, and
the President of Peru. Walter Reed unmasked the corrupt
lanatta. was instrumental in getting him fired, and estab-
lished "very friendly contact with the President . "^^ It
appears that during this stage of Peruvian history, many
members of the Council of Hinisters consulted individually
with I.P.C.'s general manager about their efforts to meet
the payroll, carry out their programs and even secure
personal wealth.
International Petroleujn Company was also involved in
Peru's foreign affairs. During the latter part of I932.
Peru's border dispute with Colombia flared up. and when war
became a distinct possibility, the Peruvian government began
to seek weapons purchase money so it could fight the impendin
war. V/ashington imposed an arms embargo on both Peru and
Colombia; therefore, the Japanese and French arms dealers
were quite active. In January 1933. the Peruvian government
asked I.P.C. for 3800,000 worth of petroleum, the value of
future export duties, so that Peru could use the oil to
buy French weapons. The company ballsed, but the Peruvian
government pressed its request. I-P.C. claimed that it
___
See ^^nclosure No. 1 in a dispatch from Fred Horris Bearing
to the Department of State. April 6, 1932, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823. 51/821.
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had already. advanced the government the equivalent of one
year's worth of taxes and export duties, and the requested
sum of ^800.000 would pay in advance all taxes for three
and a half years. While the company's financial allegations
were technically correct, the foremost reasons for its
refusal were political and diplomatic. First, the American
Embassy made it known that "approval of the proposal would
annul the effect of the Department's embargo on arms plan. "^^
Also of great concern to the company was the fact that it
had operations both in Peru and Colombia, and it did not
want to imperil its position in either country by aiding the
23
other.
By the end of the Sanchez Cerro administration in 1933,
the pattern of interaction betiNreen the Peruvian government
and International Petroleum Company was established. Unlike
during its relationship with Augusto Le^uia, the company
was not celebrated as the foremost foreign benefactor of
Peru. Rather, I.P.G. was regarded as a kind of necessary
nuisance. Privately, the government knew it could count
on the company for advance taxes with discretion. In a
22
In a telegram to the Department of State, Ambassador Dearing
suggested that Standard Oil of New Jersey be informed of
the conseqaences of accepting Peru's proposals. Fred Men is
Dearing to the Department of State, January 13. 1933, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 721. 23/729.
23I.P.C.'s management expressed preoccupation with this point
to Ambassador Dearing, who in turn reported it to V/ashington.
Ibid.
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financially troubled nation such as Peru this was an
important consideration.
International Petroleum Company entered into similar
arrangements with succeeding governments of Peru not be-
cause it was corrupt, but because in a world of unmitigated
commercial competition it had to adapt to the Peruvian rules
of the game or risk being dislodged bu its arch competitor,
Royal Dutch Shell. The operations in Peru were extremely
profitable, but profit alone was not necessarily the primary
motivating force behind corporate behavior. Rather, there
existed a kind of corporate nationalism or "corporatism"—
devotion to the growth and well-being of the corporation.
This force drove the management of the company into what
can best be described as an extra-legal relationship—
a relationship which was doomed from the start, and would
eventually lead to a confrontation between Peru and Standard
Oil's International Petroleum Company.
Peru was a sovereign state, but within its borders
there existed another state—not necessarily an American
colony, but part of a multinational concern vrith supra-
national loj'alties. To Standard Oil of New Jersey, the
United States was not necessarily the object of supreme
loyalty. More often than not the company kept the Department
of State in the dark about its activities. Corporate memory
is long, and the dismemberment order of I9II was a very
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painful blow to the international giant of oil. The company
informed the American embassy of its activities only when
it was expediant for it to do so.
Peru's problems with the International Petroleum
Company stemmed not from the fact that it was an American
company somehow geared to exploit Peru on behalf of the
United States, but rather from the fact that its parent
company. Standard Oil of New Jersey, was a far larger organ-
ization, and commanded more resources than the Peruvian
state. The United States broke up Rockefeller's oil trust
when the corporate giant seemed to be getting out of hand
domestically. When Standard Oil, through I.P.C., moved into
Peru, the company was already too large and too powerful
for the Peruvian state to do the same. For example, it
would be inconceivable for an American company to refuse
cooperation with the U.S. government during V/orld War II
because it might have had interests in Germany or Japan.
But it was possible, and actually happened that the Inter-
national Petroleum Company refused to cooperate with the
Peruvian government v:hen it anticipated a war with Colombia
because the company had interests there as well.
In theory, for Peruvians the state was majestic and
sovereign--the state was the supremo gobierno . In practice
the Peruvian government was a x^eakling in comparison with
one of its corporate citizens. The incompatibility of this
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theoretical conception with practical conditions made it dif-
ficult for both parties to function. Peruvian nationalists
from the "right" and 'left" never forgave I.P.c. for operating
in their country as if it were a banana republic-buying off
cabinet members and even total administrations, blackmailing
duly constituted legislatures into submission to company
demands. I.P.C. for its part, could not very well accept
the constant threat of fleecing promoted by corrupt Peruvian
politicians. After all, it was company expertise and capital
which transformed La 3rea y Parinas from a barren desert
into a boom town employing thousands of Peruvians and indirectl
providing a decent living for many more. The company attempt-
ed to bargain in good faith, only to discover that its con-
cessions merely incited Peruvian chauvenisra to ever more
preposterous demands. What was originally a difference over
taxes grew Into a giant of mistrust and hatred bridging two
generations of Peruvian political leaders. As time passed,
this bitterness grew and the principal contending parties
froze their minds against compromise.
Who were there parties, and why did they act as they
did? Besides the company and its constant ally, the American
embassy, there were three distinct croups in Peruvian politics
actively participating in the controversy: first, the lilvo-
Quesada family and its Journalist friends, the traditionalists-
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nationalistic people with a long-standing enmity for the
company, who seized every opportunity to attack and embarrass
the company; second, the Peruvian leftist radicals, who
naturally singled out I.P.C. as the most prominent member
of what they considered the exploitative club of American
capitalists in Peru; finally, Peru's industrial and com-
mercial elite in Lima, which could and apparently did profit
from the activities of International Petroleum Company—
the group which comprised the company's most important Peru-
vian allies.
7^
CHAPTER III
FROM POWER BROKER TO BELEAGUHED
UTILITY: THE REVENGE OF THE INCA
The influence of the International Petroleum Company
on Peruvian politics reached its peak during the I930.3.
Due to improved technology such as deeper drilling and arti-
ficial stimulation of oil flow from the ground, the pro-
duction of Brea y Parinas grew from a daily average of
26.800 barrels to an all-time high of ^1.300 barrels daily
in 1936. From then on. the production began a slow descent
to about 1^.000 barrels a day in I968. the year the pro-
perty was finally nationalized.^ Though internal oil prices
were artificially low due to government price controls, large
exports combined with a niniscule domestic consumption managed
to produce huge profits for International Petroleum.
"
On the average Peru consumed less than 10.000 barrels
dai]y, and thus the company exported three-fourths of the
total oil produced during the 1930 's. In 1937. for instance,
I.P.C. exported a total of 13-5 million barrels of oil from
Peru. Given the relatively low labor costs, proximity of
"^Max E. Crawford. "Los Problemas de la Industria Petrolera
^en el Peru." FANAL
.
VIII. No. 37 (1953). pp. 21-22.
Calculated from date in: U.S., Department of State. Annual
Petroleum Report— 1 967—Peru , Department of State Document
No. A-592 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. I969).
Enclosure No. 1.
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the Oil fields to port facilities and high quality of the
crude Oil. as well as the minimal taxes set by the Laudo
of 1922, the company managed to turn profits which amounted
to a 100^ return on the investment for four consecutive
years (1935-1938).^ The I930 • s represented a golden era
for International Petroleum Company-an era soon to disappear
under the stress of an antagonistic landed oligarchy. Tr.e
factors contributing to this erosion of the company's poorer
were varied, but the most important was the willingness of
the Peruvian government to make concessions to the lower
classes at the expense of I.P.C.'s profit margin.
In 1939. shortly after the beginning of World War II,
the Peruvian government imposed a price freeze on most con-
sumer items. After the war, the government hesitated to
lift the price controls for political reasons, but finally
in 194-9 it yielded to economic pressure and eliminated the
price controls on most items with two exceptions, bread
and petroleum products. The government simply figured that
International Petroleum Company, the country's major petrcle--ni
producer, did not wield voting power, and that in a country
where the populace had grown accustomed to low fuel prices,
these prions could not be raised without political repercvs^ ' ons
James Fred Hippy, British Investment in I^tin America
,
1-22 -
19^9 ~-'A Case Study in the Operations of Private Enternri ze in
Retarded Regions (2nd, ed. ; Hamden, Connecticut: Archcn
Books. 1966), pp. 131-132.
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While the fact of frozen domestic prices was not too
important at first since Peru consumed a relatively small
proportion of the oil it produced and the rest was sold
abroad at world markets, internal consumption increased
dramatically during the 19^0
' s and continued to increase to
the present—in part as a result of artificially low prices.
International Petroleum Company operated under two laws which
had a pincer effect on its profits. Law ^i^52, passed in
1922, at the instigation of the Leguia government, provided
that I.P.C. would have to satisfy Peru's internal markets
before selling abroad. While this provision had little
Importance in 1922, by the middle 1950's Peru was consuming
as much as La Brea y Parinas could produce, and by the early
1960's the country had a petroleum "deficit"— it actually
had to import some oil. The second government action
affecting profits was the previously mentioned price freeze
and subsequent government price control. As a result,
petroleum derivatives in Peru remained at their 1939 level
until 19^8. During that year, the prices of diesel fuel
and residual oil were raised, and in the following year the
price of kerosene was increased. In 1953. the price of kero-
sene was a.f^ain increased and for the first time since the
1930 ' s the price of gasoline was raised. Since the prices
were fixed in Peruvian soles , inflation had the net effect
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of actually reducing the price of gas over the years. Thus,
while the price of gasoline remained at 1^2 Peruvian cents
per gallon from 1934 to 1953. in U.S. currency the price
went from ten cents a gallon in 193^ to about three cents
a gallon in 1953-
As a result of the artificially low prices imposed by
the government, the consumption of kerosene—a petroleum
derivative--rose steadily over the years. In the 1960's,
it was claculated that 90% of the homes in the Lima-Callao
area used kerosene as a cooking fuel. People also used
kerosene throughout Peru for illumination, refrigeration,
heating, as a cleaning fluid, and finally, as a substitute
for more expensive fuels or as a cheaper additive. About
1Q% of the 8,500 barrels of kerosene used per day in Peru
served as a substitute for more expensive fuels. ^ The
price of kerosene during the 1953 to 1959 period was 0.95
sol^s per gallon, or the equivalent of seven cents in U.S.
6
currency. Even after the prices were raised in 1959, "the
Peruvian kerosene at S. l.io per gallon /was7 extraordinarily
cheap.
. . The prices in the world market /yieve/ two or
7
three times higher. . .
"
Harries C. Peterson and Tomas Ungcr. Petroleo : Hora Cero
(Lima: n.p.. 1964), p. 301.
^Ibid.
, pp. 126-146. Ibid . , p. 305- "^Ibid.
. p. 130.
78
Prices were deliberately kept low because the govern-
ment knew that the lower classes, particularly those living
in Lima-Callao, Cuzco and other urban centers, relied on
these low prices, and any substantial alteration could create
Civil unrest. Tha oil companies were required by Laws ^^152
and 11780 to provide kerosene for Peruvian consumption. F^d
it not been for this legal requirement, the oil companies
would have used the petroleum to produce gasoline, and diesel
fuels, and not kerosene. Because the Laudo of 1922 set forth
the operating procedures of La Erea y Parinas. these laws
had no technical application to the I.P.C. property. However,
for political reasons and to its financial disadvantage, the
company produced G6% of all kerosene in Peru, and the Talara
8
refinery processed over SQ% of it.
During most of the 1950' s the prices for gasoline, diesel
fuel and residual oil were not much higher than kerosene.
With the exception of premium gasoline which sold for S. 5. 20
per gallon, all other fuels sold at prices ranging from S.
1.05 to S. 1.17 per gallon. Not only were prices kept low
by decree, but the companies were forced to have the same
prices throughout Peru, regardless of varying costs for
transporta t i on
.
Ibid . , pp. 137-1'^!.
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These laws and regulations had the effect of turning
the International Petroleum Company and the British-owned
Petrolera Lobitos. the major private concerns in the Peruvian
petroleum business, into virtual utilities. Like an Ameri-
can electric or telephone company, I.P.G. had to constantly
haggle over the price of its products and over what would
be a reasonable return for its parent company; but unlike
the American utilities which can count on stockholder support
in their communities, I.P.C. had virtually no constituency
of its own other than the workers in Talara and their dependents
who proved to be more of an impediment than a help to the
company.
Beginning the the late 19^0 's, International Petroleum
Company actively campaigned to get legislative changes intro-
duced. With alarm, the company pointed out that the petro-
leum legislation governing concessions in Peru was unattrac-
tive to foreign capital, and therefore no new companies had
explored for Peruvian oil since the administration of Augusto
Legufa. Actually, Peruvians hoped that a government enter-
prise, founded during the administration of Oscar Benavides.
would carry out exploration and development of a state-owned
petroleum industry. To begin this enterprise, the Benavides
government bought out several small petroleum companies with
dubious petroleum reserves. In part, this move by Peru was
80
prompted by the diplomatic proddings of the Mexican legation.
Which was actively advocating the emulation of Mexican nation-
alization elsewhere in Latin America.^ The Peruvian company,
the Empresa Petrolera Fiscal, became a viable entity, but
by the middle 19^0 's it was evident that even when heavily
favored by the government's fiscal and regulatory policies,
the company could not. really take on the task of rapidly
expanding Peru's oil industry.
The controversy over the concessions of the Sechura
Desert, an area thought to contain rich petroleum deposits
and contiguous to the La BreayParinas fields well illustrated
Peru's dilemma vis a vis economic development and the role
of foreign capital in the economic progress of a nation.
During the 19^0 's. this Sechura concession came to the fore-
front of Peruvian politics. The government decided to develop
the deposits, for it was increasingly clear that with the
rapidly expanding Peruvian consumption, the day when Peru
would be forced to import oil was not far off. The govern-
ment's first step was to order a feasibility study to find
out if the state-owned company could develop the field, or
if other Peruvian capitalists could do it. When the study
Q
^Laurence A. Steinhardt, American Ambassador to Lima to the
Department of State, March 28, 1938, U.S. Department of State
Decimal Files, No. 812.6363/3380; February 2, 1939, I^o.
823.6363/196; March 20, 1939. No. 823. 6363/200.
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wa s reported, it placed a price tag of S. 100.000.000 for
exploration alone. Neither the Peruvian treasury nor the
Peruvian private capitalists could possibly raise such a
sum of money. Since International Petroleum Company had
the drilling equipemnt and personnel in a location close
to Sechura. it soon became obvious that if any foreign
company became involved, it would be I.P.C.-no other company
could afford to imderbid it.
The question became hov: to strike a deal with the
alleged "thief" responsible for the 1922 Laudo. how to
develop the Sechura field vfhile protecting Peru's interests
from possible I. P.O. infringement. President of Peru Jose
Luis 3ustamente y Rivero reached an agreement with I.P.C.
in 19^6—the Sechura Contract. The contract became a sub-
ject for discussion first in the Aprista-dominated Peruvian
Congress, but in a matter of days, the discussion became a
cg^^^e celebre
,
with every political group and both major
Lima newspapers jumping into the fray to guard the national
interest
.
Luis Miro ^uesada, chief editor of El Comercio
. took
up the cause of his fallen brother Antonio, who led the
10
For reports of parliamentary action on this matter, see
"Camara de Senadores," El ComGrcio , December 27, 1946, p. 2.
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11
Civilista schism in 1Q18 ^in^ ^a-xy±o. The contract came under scrutiny.
With perhaps more pomp and circumstance than the occasion
merited. El Comerciq reminded its readers that "after the
age of iron and coal, which were the determining factors
of material power in the last century, in our time the basic
factor of that power is petroleum.
. .
"^^
Hiro Quesada at
first simply demanded that Peruvians give a great deal of
attention to the matter of this oil concession. He asked
that final consideration be postponed pending this further
discussion. The Peruvian Senate concurred, and within a
week of his first editorial, Hiro Quesada produced a list
of specific objections. Recounting the fact that the pro-
posed contract involved six provinces, tv7o departments, two
cities, several roads, etc., Kiro Quesada demanded caution-
as if Peru was about to relinquish part of its territory.
He exhorted the citizenry to exercise "patriotic care,"
for the new concessions could affect Peru's commitments to
Hemispheric defense. Finally, he specifically demanded that
Luis's brother, Antonio Miro Quesada and his wife were
assassinated by Carlos Steer, an Aprista fanatic on Hay
15. 1935' Luis rliro Quesada then became family mtriarch
and editor of El Comercio . naturally, the ideological ani-
mosity the Hiro Quesadas felt for APRA before the crime xfas
afterwards magnified a thousand fold into a feud which knew
no truce.
12
Luis Hiro Quesada, "El Contrato sobro la zona Dctrolifera
de Sechura," 21 Gomercio, December 27, 19^6, p'. 7. This
quotation and all others taken from Spanish materials in
this thesis were translated by this author unless otherwise
noted.
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the contract be limited to a certain time period, after which
the Peruvian government or local capitalists x^ould step in
and continue the development of these new oil fields/"^
Miro Quesada rationally admitted that Sechura should
be developed, and that only the International Petroleum
Company had the economic and technological resources to do so;
however, he could not emotionally accept an agreement which
delivered what he imagined to be Peru's 2Q'th century version
of the ancient Potosf mine to his hated enemy, the Interna-
tional Petroleum Company. I.P.C. was needed for the initial
development but Peru deserved the fruits. Noting these
objections raised against the contract, I.p.G.'s general
manager H.A. Grimes forwarded a proposal to the Peruvian
government declaring that I.P.C. would be willing to accept
a time limit on the concession of no less than forty years,
with a possible twenty year extension. However, in exchange
for this concession, the company demanded that the tax rate
1^
be fixed for the duration of the contract
--a provision
which Miro Quesada and other critics of I.P.C. interpreted
as an attempt to usurp the taxation powers of the Peruvian
Congre s s
,
13See the editorial "El contrato sobre el petroleo de Sechura,"
El Comercio , December 30, 19^6, d. 2.
The text of this company demand is reproduced in: "Documentos
Parlamentarios, " El Comercio. January '-r^ 19^7, p. ^.
8^
;s
As the battle over Sechura progressed, certain fact
became clear. Echoing objections raised during the second
decade of the century, Peruvian conservatives opposed the
agreement even while recognizing that there x^ras no viable
alternative to an I.P.C. concession. At the same time, the
government was in no position to stall in developing addi-
tional oil sources in Peru, for ignoring Sechura would only
cause an eventual energy crisis. This battle of the 19^10 ' s
was not a carbon copy of the previous controversy during
the Pardo administration. One new factor was the Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria Americana, a political party and
movement which did not exist in the early 20th century
but by the 19^0
' s loomed as Peru's dominant political force.
APRA was founded in 192^ by a young Peruvian student leader,
Vfctor Raul Haya de la Torre. At its inception it was a
radical movement—aiming for social reform in Latin America;
hovrcver, its true strength was in Peru. By 19^0. Apristas
had eschewed their early radicalism, and developed a gradual-
ist progressive political party. In addition to this new
factor of Aprista political pressure, the Peruvian Armed Forces
viere invited to study the Sechura Contract and issue an
opinion. Their report was confid<=ntial, but the word soon
leaked out that the Armed Forces were not favorably disposed
tovrards International Petroleum Company or the proposed contract
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No sooner had the question of Sechura and its potential
exploitation by the International Petroleum Company come
to the fore as a clear political issue than the Apristas
and the oligarchy began to maneuver to place responsibility
for what was to be a necessary but unpopular political act.
the Sechura Contract, in each other's lap. Hiro Quesada,
who hated the Apristas for ideological and personal reasons,
presented an ambivalent position. On the one hand he stated
that the contract was of the gravest importance and should
be given utmost consideration. On the other hand, he Imew
that if A-PRA used its congressional majority to railroad
the contract through, El Comercio would acquire a major
weapon against the then radical party-
-alleged collusion
with Peru's number one public ''enemy" and foremost repre-
sentative of Yanl^ee ''imperialism," the International Petroleum
Company.
Manuel Seoane, the leader of APRA's congressional forces,
was far too wise to make such a mistake. Besides, the Apristas
enemies jumped the gun by accusing the party of collusion
before the Sechura Contract was even approved. An opposition
senator argued that I-P.C. had "no moral responsibility what-
soever, " and therefore any agreement with such a company
would be immoral regardless of the conditions. Another
senator ventured to recount previously disproved charges
that I.P.C. had been defrauding Peru by carting off more
8.6
oil than it declared and even put a price ta^ on the alleged
fraud. S. 5.000.000.000. Still another critic of the agree-
ment declared that "it reminded one of the contract between
Mephistopheles and Faust, in which the devil wanted to take
the soul of the contracting party by all means.
""^^
Takin-^ note of the maneuvering of his enemies, and
speaking for AFRA's senatorial delegation. Hanuel Seoane
went on record stating that even though ^PRA could simply
vote the Sechura Contract into law. it would not do so;
rather, it would vote for tabling the contract as a sign of
respect for public opinion and democratic procedures. Seoane
also attempted to disassociate his party from the contract
and from I.P.G.. but with little success, for the opposition,
now angered by APHA • s tactical withdrawal, zeroed in on
the party.
The political forces opposed to the contract noted that
APPJi had three cabinet members in the government including
Minister of Development Cesar Ellas, the public official res-
ponsible for negotiating^- the contract. Time and again.
APRA was pinned with "moral responsibility" for the contract;
both conservative and leftist critics joined ihands in an
^^See the record of the Congressional debates as reproduced in
"Camara de Senadores," El Comercio
.
January 3. 19^-7, p. 4.
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effort to embarrass the party. The attacks of course cen-
tered on I.P.C. and "yankee imperialism." though some of
the conservative spokesmen carefully distinguished between
the North American people and their political leaders on
the one hand, and the imperialist trusts on the other hand/^
The intensive criticism carried on by both major Lima
newspapers, El Conercio and la Prensa
. as well as the nega-
tive attitude of the Armed Forces convinced the Apristas
that the issue should be allowed to rest and perhaps to die
in the forseeable future. The coujd de ^race came when the
editor of Prensa. Francisco Grana Garland, a prominent
critic of the Sechura Contract and a relation of Don Luis
Hiro Quesada was assassinated on January 7, 19^7, barely
three days after the bitter parliamentary debate over the
17
contract. The crime v:as eventually traced to APRA,' but
shortly after it occured. several political figures implied
that the assassination X':as the result of Graha Garland's
opposition to the contract.
The controversy over the Sechura Contract had several
unforseen effects. According to Fredrick Pike. APPJi's friendly ^
attitude towards International Petroleuni Company brought
Ibid.
17
Sir Robert I-Iarett. Peru (New York: Praeger, I969), pp. 172-173;
See the editorial in El Comercio
.
January 8, 19^7, p. 2.
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about a change of attitude at the Department of State. From
that point on. the United States regarded that party as its
^ 18favorite Peruvian political group. Furthermore, the issue
of Peru's need for increased petroleum productivity got lost
in the fray. When all was said and done, the Sechura Desert
remained as forlorn as it had been since Oscar Benavides
declared it a national reserve during the previous decade.
Domestic oil consumption continued to rise, while pro-
duction continued its slow but consistent drop—forewhadowing
the impending energy crisis all responsible Peruvians know
was inevitable.
APiiA made its friends in the Department of State, but
it abandoned the cause of I.P.G. vjhen the political price
rose to prohibitive levels. Peruvian conservatives and
leftists alike counted the whole affair as a victory against
APRA and I.P.C. The Armed Forces, for the first time, showed
their hand, and it was commonly knovrn that they did not
approve of I.P.C.'s presence in Peru. Not all developments
were equally as bad for I.P.C. for the assassination of
Graria Garland brought a new editor to _La Prensa , Pedro Beltran.
a man who charted a course for his nevjspaper which vras dia-
metrically opposed to Hiro Quesada's El Comcrcio . La Prensa
TS
Fredrick B. Pike, The Ilodern History of Peru (New York:
Praeger. I967). P- 285.
beoame^lnternatlonal Petroleum's friend and Mlro Quesad.
enemy.
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a ' s
The matter of petroleum development rested during the
remainder of Bustamente's term in office. Having gauged
the depth of animosity which many Peruvian harbored against
I.P.C., the company once again attempted to project a low
profile in Peru, hoping that better times would come again.
The fate of the Sechura Contract illustrated the inability
of the Peruvian Congress to reach a decision on the oil
problem. While APIM had a clear majority, it hesitated to
use its power in regards to the contract. Consequently.
APRA's power was negated by a small aristocratic group in
the Senate under the leadership of Hector 3oza, who had the
help of El Comerclo. for a time la, Frensa
. and the political
groups to the left of APRA.
After the assassination of Grana Garland, APIiA's
opposition became even more bitter. Knowing that the Senate
could not function without an executive committee and that
in order to elect the coramittee two-thirds of the senators
had to be present, the anti-APRA mlnority--amountlng to
slightly over one-third of the Senate, did not attend the
19 I
Mlro Quesada's feud with Pedro Beltrsln reportedly originated
shortly after the latter assu-tned the editorship of La'Prenca
,
and publically favored an end to price controls. iiiro Quesada.
whose ne^Tspaper benefited from such controls, opposed elim-
inating this system. Beltv^n, on the other hand, was a
businessman viith varied financial interests, and he considered
price controls detrimental to business. Confidential Interview
with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables, Florida, Hay 26, 19V 1.
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session on the constitutionally appointed day. July 28, and
consequently, the Senate was forced to suspend its session.
Since the Chamber of Deputies could not function unless the
Senate did. the entire Congress was effectively de-activated,
thus cancelling APP.V s solid congressional majority and
leaving Bustamente to rule by decree. AniA reacted to this
situation by preparing a coup d'etat with the aid of sone
Junior military officers—an unsuccessful coup which took
place October 3, 19^8. In response, the Bustamente govern-
ment repressed APRA and this action in turn created further
unrest. Before the month was over, the military, under the
leadership of General Hanuel Odria, took over the government
of Peru. Justifying this action by declaring that Bustamerte
20
had been unable to deal effectively with APR.^.
Since Congress had effectively destroyed itself •
the year before the coup, Odrfa did not even have to go
through the motions of dismissing it. He ruled by decree,
and once more, Peru moved ahead. The price controls which
had divided Don Luis Miro Quesada were eliminated. El Comercio
had to buy its newsprint at the unregulated higher price,
21
improtected by an artificially low rate of exchange.
Pike, pr). 286-290.
21
Since the official rate of exchange was S. 6.50 to the dollar
and the unofficial rate was S. 13-00 to the dollar, this
single act of the Odria regime caused the price of newsprint
to double, a change which ^ Conercio felt severely and Beltran
in contrast applauded. Confidential Interview \Jith I. PC.
executive, Coral Gables, Florida. Hay 26, 1971'
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Manuel Odr£a. who ruled as dictator of Peru from
19^8 to 1956 had much in common with August o Legufa. and
hie regime was dubbed the Ochenio (a period of eight years)
in a manner reminiscent of the Oncenio
. Legufa's eleven
year rule. Like Legufa. Odrfa had a middle class background,
and was a firm believer in the laissez-faire principle.
He succeeded where other men failed-he gained the confidence
of foreign investors and the economic results of this con-
fidence were impressive for Peru. The flow of capital
from abroad quickly increased, and by the end of the Ochenio
.
foreign investment in Peru doubled. Industrial productivity
grew between 1950 and 1955- As with the rest of the
economy, petroleum exploration and production also boomed.
While the Korean War was partially responsible for Peru's
groTrth, the Odrfa regime did take decisive action to en-
courage foreign investors to come to Peru.
Probably with the technical advice of International
Petroleum Company, the Odrfa government passed a new pet-
roleum law, No, 11780 in 1952. Odria had himself elected
President within the constitutional framework in 1950, but
APRA—Peru's m.ajor political party, was outlawed. This fact,
combined with Odria's military base of power, made it
22
Pike, p. 176.
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impossible for the sort of paralyzing obstructionism which
had plagued prior administrations in their attempts to
deal With the question of oil. However, the regime did
embark on an after-the-fact public relations campaign which
set out to make the new law acceptable to the country.'^
I.P.C. seconded this campaign with a public relations effort
of its own. In one of its most influential publications,
a magazine entitled FA^L, the company published several
articles explaining and justifying the new legislation.
General Odrfa and his closest advisors, including
the Minister of Development Carlos Salazar. accepted the
arguments which I.P.C. had long pressed on the Peruvian
government. The official administration argument was that
while petroleum production had remained static at best, and
had even declined since its peak during the 1930 's. domestic
consumption had greatly increased. Thus, while in 19kO
domestic consumption amounted to only 27.770 of production,
in 1952 the level was raised to 58.8,^ of production. The
government noted that while in 191^ Peru accounted for 35%
of all petroleum exports from the South American continent,
in 1952, Peru only exported 2% of the total continental expor
In 195^. ior example, the government published a colorful
pamphlet with the caption "deeds, not words" across the
cover. It included several tables of facts and figures.
Peru, Direcci5n General de Informacion del Peru, Petroleo
(Lima: n.p., 1955).
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of oil. The consequences of this stagnation were obvlcus-
Peru would soon need to i„ oil. In addition, the company
iras losing out on much needed tax revenues by leaving poten-
tial oil lands unexploited. The Odrfa administration Informed
the Peruvian Congress that a "modest daily production of
2.000.000 barrels" would net the treasury between 500 and
1,000,000 soles per year in taxes.
The facts were clear and International Petroleum Company
and the Peruvian sovernment concluded that Peru should enact
legislation which would make exploration, development and
exploitation more attractive to foreign capital. This action
would bring about a reversal on the petroleum scene. Odrfa
was quoted as saying:
The new law is inspired with the pur-
pose of converting Peru into a great
petroleum exporter. . . V/e need to be
exporters, so that great amounts of
dollars will come into our country,
dollars which will improve our currency
X. on account of the abimdance of foreign
exchange in our markets; thus the wages
of the worker and the salaries of the
clerks will have greater purchasing
power, and the governm.ent will be able
to deal with the great national pro-
blems which up to this time have been
put off.
2^
Jose Parn.^a Paz Soldan, "Nacionali smo Constructive ,
"
FAIIAL
.
VII, No. 35 (1953). p. 30.
25
Odria's remarks are extensively quoted in: International
Petroleum Company, "Petroleo en el Peru," FANAL, VII, No.
35 (1953).
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Manuel Odrfa whose style of populist authoritarian rule
has been compared to that of Juan Domingo Per5n of Argentina.
definitely wanted to help the laboring classes. He was a
firm believer in the role of the state as a stimulator of
the economy-but not as a direct participator. He needed tax
revenues to carry out his costly programs of public works.
So, it did not take much effort on the part of the always
influential management of I.P.C. to persuade Odr£a that a
new promotional petroleum law was all that x\ras needed to
bring growth and tax money to Peru.
The law which was proclaimed on March 18, I952 was
indeed a piece of far-reaching and comprehensive legislation.
Peru abandoned the system of royalties which had been the
cornerstone of previous petroleum development. Instead,
the state became a partner in all future petroleum develop-
ment,- with a 50% share of all profits. The law assured the
state a minimum of 22;^' of the value of all petroleum exports,
whether or not there was a profit. Peru also received a
surface tax which varied with the extension of the land
under exploitation. A depletion allowance of 2^% was estab-
lished for domestic companies; foreign companies received
Pike, pp. 291-292; Torcuato S. EiTella, "Populism and
Reform in I^tin America," Obstacles to Chanr^o In Latin
Am.eri ca
, ed. Glaudio Veliz (Kew I'ork: Oxford University
Press. 1965), p. 67.
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one Of 15%. The law provided that concessions in the
coastal area of Peru were to be granted for a period of
forty years, with a possible twenty year extension-a pro-
Vision which closely paralleled the I . P. C,
-proposed time
limit during the Sechura Contract dispute.
Of course, the law had no immediate effect on La 3rea
y Parinas, x-Jhich continued to operate under the rules
set by the laudo of 1922. Why then was International
Petroleum Company so interested in a law which it knew
would have no effect on its holdings? The answer was two-
fold. First, the company wanted more favorable petroleum
legislation in Peru so that the Sechura Desert would be
opened to all bidders, including I. P.C—not under the
provisions of a particular contract, such as the one which
aroused so much controversy in 19^6. but under a general
law applicable to everyone. I.P.C. hoped to have an edge
27
The depletion allowance is a tax deduction which oil com-
panies are commonly granted to permit them to build up cash
reserves which offset their diminishing oil supplies." If
company "X" makes a net profit of .;j!l. 000 , 000 , it will be
taxed on a net profit of ;?750,000 assuming a 25,^ depletion
allowance. In the U.S., the depletion allowance for oil
companies was 27/^ ^for many years, and in recent years it
was reduced to 2^v%. In Canada, the allowance has tradition-
ally been 25%, but the government, anxious to promote oil
development, is planning to increase the allowance to 33 1/3;^.
In corapaiison. then, the Peruvian law vras not particularly
generous vrith domestic companies and rather conservative with
foreign enterprises.
28
For a detailed description of the la.\i, see: Soldan,
FANAL
,
VII, No. 35. PP. 30-35-
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on its competition by virtue of its established position,
and the company's critics could not very well argue against
its entry into the development of the Sechura Desert as long
as this was done under general law. I.p.c. also hoped that
its special status under the Laudo of 1922 could eventually
be eliminated by "adapting" the company to the general pet-
roleum laws of Peru. Originally, the Laudo was quite profitable
for the company, but as time passed, I.P.C. became a semi-
utility, supplying the domestic market at fixed prices. The
Laudo was a guilded cage from which I.P.C. was anxious to escape,
The Odria plan worked as expected: several oil companies
applied for and obtained exploratory concessions in the
Sechura Desert and in other parts of Peru. I.P.C. got sizeable
rights in the Sechura Desert, and during 195^, the company
feverishly drilled in the promising fields. However, an un-
pleasant surprise awaited I.P.C. and the Odrfa administration--
the Sechura Desert was a barren wasteland for oil. I.P.C. spent
over 120 million soles drilling six wells, and Lobitos Oil
29
poured in substantial sums of money with no positive results.
The unforseeable futility of this venture had a number
of very drastic effects. First, it dealt a severe blovj to
the rapport between I.P.C. and the Odria administration, fo"^
after all, I.P.C, the technical wizzard of petroleum, had
2Q
''^Peterson and Unger, p. 1?; "100 Anos de Industria Petrolera
en el Peru," FAHAL, XVIII, No. 68 (I963). p. 29.
9?
assured Odrfa that if certain legislation was enacted, ex-
ploration and development would make Peru a second Venezuela.
The first installment on that promise went on as expected,
but the second proved impossible. Certainly. I.p.c. could
-not rationally be blamed for the lack of oil. but then. Mother
Nature was not readily accessible for reproach. Consequently,
many Peruvians who had been already predisposed to believe
the worst of I.P.C. for historical reasons saw the latest
development as one more trick foisted on Peru by the clever
yankee capitalists.
Economically undermined, the Odria regime lost ground.
Without new sources of revenues, the far-fetched public
works program which had created a somewhat superficial sense
of prosperity in the capital could not be continued. In
1956, Odria had to m.ake good on his promise to hold elections.
His own support dwindled, and a conservative former president.
Mantiol Prado, was elected to office.
Not only did the Sechura fiasco contribute to Odria 's
demise, it also forced I.P.G. and the Compania Petrolera
Lobitos into a merger which would prove as economically
successful as politically disa,sterouSc As stated earlier,
Compania Petrolera Lobitos was a x-rholly-owned subsidiary
of Lobitos Oil-Fields, Ltd. , a London-based holding company.
This company entered Peruvian business in 1902, and operated
under the Petroleum Law 4^52 of 1922—the company had a
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concession to exploit oil in exchange for a 10% royalty
of its crude oil production.
From the beginning, the Lobitos company had an inter-
esting relationship with International Petroleum Company.
For instance, both firms were represented by the same agent
in Lima—Hilne and Cia.
,
3, A. Lobitos Oil-Fields exploited
what became known as Concesiones Lima, a property conti-
guous to Brea y Parinas. Even though Law required
Lobitos to satisfy the internal needs of the Peruvian market
before exporting any oil, the company exported its oil
anyway, and left I.P.G. to deal with the domestic market.
In 1950, Lobitos reversed its position and began marketing
operations in Peru. It is possible that I.P.C. pressured
that company into carrying its share of the unprofitable
domestic market. Since Gompania Petrolera Lobitos (G.P.L.)
never had a refinery in Peru, all of its products for domestic
consumption had to be refined by I.P.G. at the Talara re-
finery. And since at the beginning of its domestic operations
Lobitos Oil had no service stations of its o\m, I.P.G.
agreed to let that company use its own network of "Esso"
30
stations to market its products. For a pair of competitors,
International Petroleum Company and GompafTia Petrolera Lobitos
^^
Ibid . , pp. 5^-^3«
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certainly behaved in a surprisingly cooperative manner.
The cooperation of the two companies took a decisive
turn, when in Hay 1957 the two consolidated operations.
Companfa Petrolera Lobitos was badly hurt by the Sechura
disaster, and diminishing returns in a market of frozen
prices made it plausible for the two companies to con-
solidate to the point that Lobitos Oil itself became a
holding company with a 50% interest in the Lima Concessions.
I.P.C. acquired the other 50% interest, and assumed res-
ponsibility for the operations of the field. The working
force of C.P.L. was simply absorbed by I.P.G. The two
companies divided the crude oil coming from the Lima Con-
cessions in half, but since C.P.L. did not have a refinery,
all of the oil was refined by I.P.C.'s Talara plant. liilne
and Cia. marketed Lobitos Oil products, and when all was
said and done, Compania Petrolera Lobitos was little more
than a trade name—it had no personnel in Peru.
One of the immediate effects of the consolidation of
International Petroleum Company and Compahia Petrolera Lobitos
was that I.P.C.|s share of the petroleum business, which
had been a substantial 65%, suddenly increased to approxi-
mately 90t. The irritation which Peruvian nationalists felt
for I.P.C. increased commonsurately. This deepening resent-
ment had immediate and concrete consequences for International
Petroleum.
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In August 1957. I.P.C. applied to the Peruvian
Ministry of Development for an "adaptation" of La Brea y
Parinas to the Petroleum Law of 1952 (Ho. II78O). In its
formal petition, the company stated.
.
It is our belief that we should seekto exchange the special regime deriv-ing from the.
. . ^Arbitration i'mard forthat of the
. . . Law. . . . Apart fromthe several inconveniences which derivefrom operating under a special regime,
the functioning of two different legal
systems,—that of the Arbitration Awardfor La Brea y Parinas and that of the
Petroleum Law for concessions obtained
under that I^w.—will generate, as is
evident, confusion and TDroblems of a
practical nature, both for the officials
of the Government and for the Company.
In a covering letter, Jack Ashworth, I.P.C. 's general manager,
pointed out that the petition was accompanied by a tax com-
parison illustrating the differences between the old laudo
system and that of the new proposal. The company would pay
slightly higher taxes under the new system, at least as of '
1956. After nearly two months, the company received an
answer in the form of a "Supreme Resolution:" it is not
in the best interest of the Nation to permit the adaptation
requested.
. . it is therefore resolved: To reject the
"^2
petition presented by International Petroleum Co. , Ltd. . . ""
^^The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy, Vol. 1 (International
Petroleum Company, February, I969), jJxhibit 3.
32ibid.
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After Its great efforts promotins a new petroleum law,
I.P.C. was denied "adaptation" of its property to the new
system.
The Significance of this event cannot be exaggerated.
For decades, the company fought to maintain its special
status under the provisions of tha 1922 Award and the ori-
ginal sale; now the company pleaded to leave the arbitration
cocoon-to come out under Peru's general petroleum law.
However, the Peruvian government denied this request, thus
condemning the company to a languishing death under the
Laudo. I.P.C.
-s economic vitality was nullified by price
controls, and the Peruvian government was not about to
allow the company to rise like the mythical phoenix out
of its own ashes.
Obviously, the political situation had changed con-
siderably. In another day, the company would have enlisted
the. support of the Department of State and the American press
to condemn these "confiscatory" policies. Or it might
have gone farther--pulling its ships out of service between
Talara and Callao. Perhaps I.P.C. might have Influenced
the New York financial circles, asking them to demand prompt
payment on Peru's eternal foreign debt. The company did
none of these things—the late 1950's were very different
from the 1920's. For one reason. Standard Oil of New Jersey,
while still the giant of international oils, did not loom
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as large in American political circles as it once had. The
oil trusts, which durins the 1920's were among the three or
four major industrial concerns in the United States, had
become only one of the twenty or thirty major industries
in the United States. Now the petroleum industry competed
^•lith the auto makers, retailers, electronics firms and many
more in their demands for governmental attention. The
growth and diversification of American industry dwarfed the
importance of the international oils such as Standard Oil of
New Jersey. Like the railroads which x^ere once a dominent
factor in the political economy of America and today are
only a sub-group on the Dow Jones transportation index, so
the international oils have become merely a part of the
"oil group," sharing their influence with domestic oils and
many other industries.
Another factor which diminished the bargaining power
of international Petroleum Company in Peru was its conversion
from an exporting industry to a supplier of domestic needs.
Obviously, the international oil companies derive their
bargaining strength from the fact that they are the inter-
mediaries betvreen oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.
For example, if Venezuela nationa:! izes its oil industry, vrho
will buy its oil? The Venezuelans can take over the wells,
the pipes, the tanks, and even the refineries; but the
10 3
tankers, gas stations and allied facilities which constitute
the marketing end of the oil business are primarily on
foreign soil and not subject to nationalization. The Vene-
zuelans can and have pressured the oil companies with very
good results without using their trump card—nationalization.
Nationalization would be disastrous for the oil companies,
but it would be even more disastrous for Venezuela. The
oil companies derive a great deal of strength from the
knowledge that nationalization would be mutually destructive.
When International Petroleum Company changed from an
exporting to a domestic operation, it lost its most impor-
tant lever. By the late 1950' s and early 1960's. I.P.C.'s
operations in Peru were self-contained. Oil was piMped out
of Brea y Parinas and Lobitos, refined in Talara, and
marketed throughout the coujitry. The Peruvian government
was in a position to take over the operations by merely
severing the umbilical cord x^hich connected I. P.O. to its
parent company. Standard Oil—via Toronto and Esso Inter-
America in Coral Gables. The Peruvians x^^ere not quick to
grasp this radical alteration of the balance of power
in their favor. However, it was only a matter of time before
I.P.C. would be once more dragged out into the spotlight
—
this time nude of its traditional power.
International Petroleum Company did not stumble into
the 1960's vreakened by ignorance or self-abandon. The
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company was aware of Its precarious position and took steps
to counteract its unhealthy po^^erlessness
. These steps
were in two directions; the development of I.P.C. as a
model employer, and the efforts by the company to win
acceptance in the Peruvian oligarchy via a wide-ranging public
relations program.
The beginning of I.P.G.'s effort to become the model
employer reached back to 193?. In that year. Nelson Rocke-
feller visited Venezuela and went on an inspection of the
properties of Creole Petroleum Corporation, a company vrhich
like I.P.C. was owned by Standard Oil and operated in Vene-
zuela. Apparently appalled by the working conditions exist-
ing in Creole Petroleum's work camps. Rockefeller prodded
Standard Oil and its subsidiaries into a policy of broader
social responsibility. Out of his visit to Venezuela and
he consequent social awakening, Rockefeller eventually
founded the International Basic Economy Corporation, v:ith
the goal of bringing socio-economic progress to the under-
developed nations and additional profits to the family
33
corporation.-^-^
The company still exists and in 1971 it had assets of
nearly :,;200 million dollars. The Rockefeller family still
holds a oO/o interest in the enterpi^ise, and its present
chief is Rodman C. Rockefeller, reputed top businessman
among Jolin D. Rockefeller's seven great-grandsons. See:
Joseph Engelhof, "Profit Necessary in Social Activity Too:
Rockefeller," Chica.-^o Tribune , October 4, 1971, Section 3,
p. 7.
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Hockefeller's new social awareneess filtered mto
Peru, and signaled a turnaround In the personnel management
at Talara. Up to the early igtto's the «ork force of La
Brea y Parinas had. for the most part, been housed In
barracks. North American employees, mostly Canadian, had
separate Quarters. Native Peruvian workers led a generally
bleak life of common meals in mess halls and little privacy
in the terracks. There ,ras little opportunity for advance-
ment
.
In 19^0. John Oldfield—the man now in charge of I.P.C.'j
headquarters in Coral Gables, and Mike Roycko-now president
of Humble Oil Company, Standard Oil's marketing arm. went
to Peru to construct a new town in Talara. They brought in
town planners, anthropologists, and other specialists.
Streets were laid, and houses, hospitals, schools and parks
were constructed. To avoid the creation of a "company
toT^nl" in the more narrow sense of the term, I.P.C. added vfhat
it called a "free enterprise area" where Peruvian merchants
were invited to set up shop. The company went beyond con-
struction of a new town; I.P.C. improved its treatment
of the Peruvian workers. Free nursing and medical care
were extended to the working force
. generous pension plans
were established, salaries were raised to the point that
they were the highest in Peru. For the first time in Peruvian
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history, collective bargaining was introduced. The company
also made a conscious effort to diminish anti-foreign sen-
timents by reducing foreign personnel to a minimum.
By the early I960 • s there were if, 990 workers in Talara.
Their basic hourly wage was 6.12 soles
, but with indirect
payments such as overtime included, the average wage was
7.89 soles per hour. Industrial workers in Lima-Callao
earned an average of 5.68 soles ; therefore. I.P.C. workers
received wages which were 2>9% higher than those of the
best paid workers in Peru—those in the Lima-Callao area.
According to the company, the workers received other benefits
amounting to between 205%' and 2k6% of their basic wages—
a
credible assertion considering that the company gave free
benefits to virtually all of the relatives living with any
Talara worker. The I^tin American extended family frequently
includes not only wives and children, but grandparents,
brothers and sisters, and aunts and uncles. With ^,990
workers in Talara. there x^^ere 29,50^1- such relatives, making
a total of Peruvians receiving such benefits as free
medical attention and medicines, and heavily subsidized
housing. V/orkers in Talara paid 6.50 soles a month for a
two bedroom house, the equivalent of less than one hour's
3^5
Interview with John Oldfield at Esso Inter-America, Coral
Gables, Florida, May 2k, 1971.
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wages, and 10.00 soles per month for a three bedroom house-
about one and a half hours' wages. The company provided
generous pensions and sickness compensation, and it built
twelve schools for the children of its workers. I.P.c. paid
the salaries of the teachers, vjho were supervised by the
Peruvian Ministry of Education. The company even paid these
35
teachers bonuses for their work in Talara. The company's
policy vras clearly to go well beyond the benefits which,
in theory, the Peruvian government required all employers
to provide for their workers, and therefore by Peruvian
standards, the workers of I.P.C. were a pampered elite.
Pampering, hovjever, did not necessarily render the
I.P.C. work force into a mindless and grateful herd. Approxi
mately 85;o of the x^^orkers belonged to one of two unions
operating in Talara. One of the unions reflected the Aprista
philosophy and was affiliated vxith the Confederation of
Workers of Peru, the International Workers of Mexico, and
the International Union of Petroleum Workers, a United States
based organization. This Aprista union had traditionally
been strongest among the more educated refinery workers
living in Talara. The other ujiion, claiming a "socialist"
35This information was supplied by an issue of the company's
newsletter dealing x-Jith its working force. International
Petroleum Company, Noticias de Petroleo, XII, No. 115
(February, I96O).
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Philosophy although it opposed nationalization of the pet:
leum industry, originated with the field workers who were
stationed at the various wells and supporting installations
throughout La Brea y Parinas. After World War II. the
company was able to purchase vehicles and tires, and the
field workers were gradually brought to Talara
; however,
they continued to support their separate union. Until I957.
the Aprista union was the largest, but in that year I.P.c.
incorporated Lobitos into its operations, and these additional
workers swung the balance and the "socialist" union became
the largest. During the early 1960's, the Aprista union
counted about I.300 members, while the "socialist" union
had a membership of 2.^00. These unions often competed
with each other in degree of militancy. Since I.P.C. was
the largest petroleum producer in Peru, the company endured
every strike which took place in the oil industry. The
other petroleum companies merely followed the general out-
lines of the I.P.C. settlements. From the middle 19^0 's to
1968, I.P.C. was struck four times, for an average of eight
-
36
een days each time.
3^
This information vras provided in a confidential interview
with an I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables. Florida, Hay 25, 2971,
See also: Peterson and linger, pp. 230-232.
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The good treatment International Petroleum Company
accorded its employees paid off. for during the times of
crisis from 1959 to I968. the working force supported the
company's position and consistently opposed nationalization.
However, the fact that the Peruvians who derived such great
benefits were relatively few in number— less than 35.000.
and lived in isolation at Talara. minimized their effect on
the controversy. Therefore, the price which the company
paid for its happy workers was high—its cash outlay was
considerable. For instance, from 1952 to I962. the cost
of living went up by 100;^ in Peru^ productivity in La Brea
y Parinas increased by 3O70. However, salaries for white
collar employees went up 300^^ and for the workers, the
increase vias about 250^. Since the I.P.C. personnel had
excellent conditions and wages, they tended to stay with
the company;, but the early 1960's the company had 1,450
retired employees collecting the equivalent of 10/6 of thei^
37
active payroll.
In a broad political sense, the town of Talara was
to Peru what West Berlin in to East Germany and the Soviet
Bloc—a living reminder within their own borders vrhich il-
luminates by contrast their own poverty and under-developraent
37
Peterson and Unger, pp. 234-235.
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Talara was a slaring example to the poorly paid su^ar workers
and even the workers m Lima, of how it would be possible
to live if the affairs of Peru were administered as were
the affairs at La Brea y Parinas. To add insult to injury,
the employees of the state-owned Empresa Petrolera Fiscal
lived under far inferior standard conditions in the state
oil fields right next door to La Brea y Parinas.
To Don Luis Hiro Quesada, who wrote his doctoral dis-
sertation on labor at the University of San Marcos at the
turn of the century—a nan who considered himself an authority
on labor. International Petroleum Company's labor policies
38
must have seemed nothing short of blasphemy. The same
was true for many upper class employers in Peru, who saw
I.P.C. as a dangerous spoiler of their labor supply. In
time the company's management realized that they had gone
"too fast, too soon" in improving the lot of their workers.
John Oldfield confessed that the labor policies of I.P.C.
lost it friends in the oligarchy, to the point that the 10;^
of the population which comprised the social and political
39
power base in Peru decidedly opposed the company.
_ _
Luis Niro Quesada considered himself a pioneer in the field of
labor, but his attitude was extremely paternalistic. Until
the military junta headed by currciit Peruvian President Juan
Velasco Alvarado ordered a union for the workers of Zl Conerci o,
they had been unable to form one. Hiro Quesada 's dissertation
and other philosophical writings appear in: Luis Miro Quesada,
Albores de la Re forma Social en el Peru {Lima: Talleres Graf i cos
P.L. Villanuevai I965 )
•
39
Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida, May 2?, 1971.
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In public relations the company proved to be quite
proficient. Its efforts ran the gamut of Madison Avenue
advertising techniques adapted to suit the particular cir-
cuinstances in Peru. International Petroleum published a
hefty magazine and a v:idely-circulated newsletter. The
magazine. FAKAL. was an expensive, high quality and fairly
large publication devised to appeal to Peru's intellectual
elite. The articles in FAIJAL were timely and of high
literary quality; the subjects were of historic or liter-
ary importance and usually stressed Peruvian themes. Oc-
casionally, the company did press its point of view in an
article; even then, the article was well informed and v^ell
written. Through FAMAL
.
I.P.C. tried to reach the influential
elements of Peruvian society. In 195^, for example, on
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Superior
War College, FAMAL carried an article tracing the history
of the institution, listing its contributions to the Peruvian
nation, and relating the merits of various directors of the
^0
college and distinguished alumni.
FAMAL was not merely a vehicle for the company to
praise military institutions and leaders. Given the difficulties
"La Sscuela Superior de Guerra— Cincuenta anos al servicio
del Ejercito." FAMAL
.
VIII, Mo. 38 (195^), pp. 36-38.
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Which Peruvian intellectuals faced in getting their work
published in a country of limited resources. FANAL provided
a place for Peru's most distinguished writers to appear in
print, and to do so at a profit. Articles by Peru's leading
intellectuals appeared in this publication during the I950 '
s
and into the 1960's. In fact, in 1955. zhe publication
carried articles by two members of the Miro Quesada family—
their more serious work did not fit into the casual format
^1
of El Comerclo's Sunday supplement. The anniversary of
FANAL' s publication prompted I.P.C. to collect testimonials
for its publication. The list was most impressi ve--the head
of the Lima Bar Association, a prominent Army general, the
Chief librarian at the Lima National Library, the senior
professor of the Liberal Arts Faculty at the University of
San Marcos, publisher Pedro Beltran—the editor of la Prensa,
Aurelio Hiro Quesada, Raul Porras Earrenechea, President of
the Peruvian Senate, and a score of prominent writers,
poets and clergy. In short, the intellectual elite of
Peru was called upon to express in writing its gratitude
for a publication dedicated to them and SDonsored by I.P.C
they responded generously.
iTi ,
Aurelio uiro Quesada, "El Inca Garcilaso, ejemplo de sintccis,"
FANAL, X, No. 43 (1955). PP- 28-31; Luis Niro Quesada Garland,
"ii^volucion de la Arquitectura Peruana." FANAL
,
X, No. 45 (1955).
pp. 28-31.
^^•"Fanal' Alcanza Cincuenta Ediclones," FANAL. XII, No. 50
(1957).
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Less than ten years later the company was badly in need
of support, and called for similar testimonials. This time
there were none from the Hiro Quesada family or from Pedro
Beltran. and while prominent Peruvians still lavished their
praises on FAHAL. the truly influential testimonials of
1957 were missing. However, the company gained considerable
support from an intellectual elite which v^ould otherwise hav
been at the forefront of the anti-I.P.C. campaigns. In-
stead of the customary acrimony with which Latin American
intellectuals often shower American companies, a Peruvian
Journalist vias moved to write; "If other povrerful enter-
prises did what I.P.G. does, editing magazines v;ithout
aim of profit, the Peruvian culture would be greatly bene-
fited. " ^
International Petroleum Company also published a
monthly nexfsletter, Hoticias de Petr<5leo . The purpose of
this more widely circulated publication v;as to inform the
public about technical developments in the oil industry
and more importantly, to promote relentlessly I.P.C.'s point
of view regarding the role of private companies in the oil
industry and more specifically its own role in the Peruvian
econoiay. The publication reminded its readers that the
^^Elsa Arana Freire, "Testimonio sobre FANAL, " FANAL , .CX,
No. 26 (1965). pp. 22-25.
Ilk
Russians, for Instance, paid three times as much for their
gasoline as did the Peruvians. i.p.c. made it a policy
to harp constantly on the shortcominss of state-owned petro-
leum enterprises in Mexico. Bolivia. Brazil, and Argentina.
For example. Noticias de Petr6leo reported that "under the
state monopoly" Mexico produced half as much petroleum in
1959 as it had back in I921 and 1922 under private initiative.''^
Positive news dealing with private enterprises always appeared
in Noticias. as if such reports tended to prove the conten-
tion that state-owned companies were failures by contrast.
On at least one occasion. Noticias de Petroleo carred a
reprint of an article which was extremely critical of Petro-
bras. the Brazilian oil enterprise, accusing it of gross
mismanagement and of pro- communist dealings.
One constant theme in both of International Petroleum's
publications, as well as in coujitless special editions
ranging from pamphlets to book length treatises was the
justice of the company's position vis-a-vis ownership of
La Brea y Parinas, petroleum prices, and other touchy sub-
jects.
il.il, ;._
'Los sovGitcos pagan por la gasolina mas del triple que los
peruanos,'^ Noticias de Petr6leo
,
XII, No. II3 (September, 1959)
^^"Bajo el Monopolio estatal Mexico produce hoy solo la mitad
del petroleo que producia en I921 y 1922," Noticias de
Petr6leo, XIII, Mo. II7 (May, 196O}.
^^The article was originally published by 0 Globo . Eugenie Gudin
"Petrobras: desperdicio e incamcidad," Noticias de Petroleo
,
XIV, No. 123 (August, 1961).
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International Petroleum Company did not limit itself
to publishing in its attempt to influence that powerful lo;^
Of the Peruvian populace. Periodically, the company spon-
sored literary competitions, providing prizes for the
best compositions on a certain theme. The company sponsored
one such competition in 1953. when Peruvians were invited
to compose a poem extolling Ramon Castilla, a 19th century
military hero and former president of Peru. Presiding
over the selection jury was Aurelio Miro Quesada. In I955.
I.P.C. sponsored a similar contest—this time with the
objective to write an essay on "the independence of Peru
and the Peruvian contribution to the freedom of the Spanish
colonies in America." In I965. the "Esso competition of
young artists" was held. All painters and sculpturers
under forty were invited to participate.
International Petroleum Company also aided the
Peru'^ian government in its quest for international prestige
and recognition by providing financial support for the
Peruvian exhibition in Paris in 195B. In recognition for
that help, the Prado administration bestowed the Order of
Merit for Distinguished Service on Jack Ashvrorth, I.P.C. 's
general manager.
57See "El Gerente de International Petroleum Co. condecorado
con la orden 'Al Merito por Servicios Distinguidos
FANAL
.
XIV, No. 55 (1959).
1 1I
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.ons.
The company was sensitive to Peru's Catholic traditi,
All religious holidays were observed in Talara, where the
company had built the churches. Management saw to it that
every new I.P.C. facility, including every gas station in
the country, was duly blessed by the competent ecclesiastical
authority in the community.
I.P.C. provided speakers for groups such as the chamber
of commerce and labor unions, for these meetings provided
a forum for the company to explain its position on various
issues. The importance of these efforts was clear, con-
sidering that the lecturers were often the company's highest
executives in Peru, including the general manager. One
particularly important group to which these lectures were
given regularly was the student body and staff of the Center
for Higher Military Studies (C.A.E.K.).
.This military
school eventually proved very important in reshaping the
social philosophy of the Peruvian armed forces.
Evaluating the effectiveness of I.P.C. 's public relations
efforts and more particularly its courting of the Peruvian
intellectual elite is difficult, for it is impossible to
know how the population at large and the intellectuals in
particular would have acted had there been no FAWAL, Notic:"' as
de Petroleo
.
and no literary and artistic competitions. How-
ever, it does seem fair to state that the company succeeded in
11?
at least blunting a potentially leading adversary, a fact
which might help to account for the prolonged stay of I.P.c.
in Peru throughout the 196o«s. in spite of official and
popular hostility.
International Petroleum Company did not play the role
of "ugly American" in Peru. Quite the contrary, while the
company made tactical errors such as its radical labor
policies, beginning with the 1950 ' s it showed a great deal
of sensitivity to Peru's customs, institutions and national
pride. If anything, the company can be criticized for going
too far in its efforts to cater to Peruvian nationalism,
as for example, when I.P.C. decided to change its name to
Petroleos Viru—Viru was the Inca word from which the name
"Peru" is presLimed to have evolved. Harries Peterson and
Tomas Unger put it well when they remarked:
In spite that in recent years I.P.C.
has carried out an impressive job of
public relations, we feel they have
omitted giving the country a true image
of itself. La Brea y Parifias. the low
export prices, the high taxes, the
price controls, the grox^ing costs of
production, etc many of these factors
beyond the control of the Company
—
have led I.P.C. to take an apologetic
position, frequently giving irritating
apologies which were never requested.^
The new name was actually put on some products, but the
project was dropped when El Comercio got wind of the story
and ridiculed it. Interview vjith John Oldfield. Coral Gables
Florida, Hay 2?. 1971.
^Peterson and Unger, pp. 5^-55.
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Would it have been better for T P r -.ucuo l i.i^.L. to clearly state that
its reason for existence was to produce profits for its
parent company. Standard Oil of New Jersey? By portraying
itself as a sort of philanthropic organization with a. side
Interest in the production and distribution of oil. the
company generated more mistrust then it really deserved..
However, while the company engaged in wide-ranging efforts
to soothe Peruvian nationalism. I.P.C. stubbornly held on
to its own form of nationalism— corporatism, in areas which
would eventually render compromise an unreachable goal.
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CHAPTER IV
A MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
PLAYS LATIN AMERICAN POLITICIAN
since
Three candidates presented themselves to the peopl,
during the Peruvian presidential election of 1956, and
President Odrfa outlawed the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA). all of the candidates were drawn from
either the more traditional political elements of Peru or
from a new breed of young, moderate reformers, usually Catholic
inspired by the liberal Papal Encyclicals of John XXIII call-
ing for social justice. In Peru, these reformers organized
a party, the National Front for Democratic Youth, which was
led by a Texas educated architect, Fernando Belailnde Terry.
The other candidates for election in I956 were Manuel Prado.
a former president (1939-191^5) who appeared as the standard
bearer for a hastily organized political party called the
National Coalition, and Hernando de Lavalle. President Odrfa 's
personal choice, leading the Union Nacional.
Prado and Lavalle had no substantial political organi-
zation, and the recently formed National Front of Democratic
Youth had not been tested in a national election. The un-
known election factor was the only Peruvian mass political
party, APRA, and its leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.
The Apristas v/anted to play a legal role in Peruvian politics,
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can-
.ons
and the party leaders contacted all the presidential
didates in order to discern their post-election intenti<
towards ATRA. Prado promised to legalize A^RA as his first
Official act, and he subsequently won the election by a
substantial margin. He immediately carried out his promise.
What won Prado his election-the deal with APRA-also
won him a most persistant enemy. Don Luis Hiro Quesada and
his newspaper El Comercio.
' Mir6 Quesada. whose personal
feud With AFRA was a notorious factor in Peruvian politics,
considered any compromise with that party immoral-a personal
affront to his dignity. Henceforth, the Prado administration
did nothing well in the eyes of El Comercio. and even further.
Prado soon became the primary target of the old Lima sage.
Manuel Prado inherited Odrfa's Peru, but without Odrfa's
good fortune. The Korean War and its consequent boom for
Peruvian exports had long since been terminated; the Sechura
Desert had proved an economic fiasco. The International
I
Confidential sources familiar with the inner workings of
the oligarchy maintain that Luis Hiro Quesada had a grudge
against Prado for personal reasons. According to this source
Prado married one of the Garland girls. Mlro Quesada 's sisterl
in-law. The marriage did not work out, and Prado is said to
have had a well laiown extra -marital affair with a woman high in
Lima society. In tine the marriage was annulled, but not before
the Hiro Quosadas added another enemy to their list. Sinc^ the
Peruvian oligarchy is relatively small, and inter-marriages
abound, personal problems tend to play a far greater role than
it might be assumed. While it is difficult to deal with this
kind of information, it should not be ignored. Confidential
interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables. Florida,
May 25, 1971.
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Petroleum Company, which had given advance money to the
government of Peru in consideration for future taxes begin-
ning during the Sanchez Cerro administration, discontinued
this practice during Odrfa's rule.^ Manuel Prado faced a
shortage of government revenues and deteriorating economic
conditions; many difficult decisions confronted him. Prado'
first Minister of Finance. Jose Pardo y Sarreda. the grandson
of Peru's first Civilista president, insisted on sustaining
the sol at a fixed rate of exchange, I9 soles to one dollar.
Since this rate was quite unrealistic given the actual
economic condition of Peru, this policy caused a run on
the sol, and consequently a sharp drop in Peru's foreign
exchange reserves. By early I958 the situation was desperate
for the Central Bank was nearing the end of its dollar
reserves, and the government was under daily attack not only
3by El. Comercio
.
but by Pedro Beltran's Prensa . Both
of Lima's prominent newspapers criticized Manuel Prado.
Once m.ore, the old arguments concerning price controls
which had first been taken up during the Bustamente admin-
istration were dusted off and brought to the fore. Miro
According to a company executive, the last loan advanced
to the Peruvian government was made in 1953. Confidential
intervisT". , Coral Gables, Florida, May 25. I97I.
Pedro Beltr^n received his training at the London School of
Economics. He is reportedly a firm follower of Adam Smith,
and consequently a strong upholder of sound finances and
laissez-faire. Sir Robert Marett. Peru (New York: Praeger,
1969). pp. 181-182.
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Quesada benefited from a fixed exchange rate-he could pur-
chase dollars to buy newsprint abroad, and he opposed devalua-
tion. Pedro Beltran. with his multiple business interests
involving exports, favored a more realistic rate of exchange.
On January 22. 1958. the Prado government suspended the sale
of foreign exchange by the Central Bank, in effect, floating
the sol. During the month of January. El Comercio published
several editorials attacking the Prado government for its
failure to "defend" the currency. El Comercio also attacked
"the official organ of the exporters," la Prensa .
Not only were the old arguments on government controls
revived, but the problems of the petroleum industry once
again haunted the Peruvian president. During the twenty
years preceding 1958, production of crude petroleum had
grown 10% while consumption had groxm ^00;^. Petroleum and
it derivatives accounted for 75% of the energy consumed in
Peru, and given the government -imposed lox-J prices for oil
products, there was virtually no chance of altering this
6
proportion. International Petroleum Company obtained and
Tf
"hi Banco Central de Reserva suspende la Venta de Certificado
de Divisas," El Comercio
.
January 23, 1958, p. 3.
5
See El Comercio articles entitled "Defender nuestra moneda,"
and "Nueva maniobra del organo ae ±os exportadores , " January
24, 1958 and February 2, 1958 respectively.
^"El Petroleo : o alza de precios o crisis," Noticias de
Petrdleo. XI, No. 10? (1958).
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published testimonies from coal industry executives and
technicians stating that the artificially low prices of
petroleum derivatives precluded any meaningful growth of
the coal industry, for the latter could not compete with
the controlled prices of petroleum.*^ Low prices. I.P.c.
maintained, prevented the company from making heavy invest-
ments in development and improvements, thus guaranteeing
a rapid decline in productivity at La Brea y PariHas.
Mindful of the critical situation, Prado devised a
clever scheme to raise the price of gas and also to raise
taxes. Knovjing that an increase in the cost of petroleum
derivatives would be hard to sell to the Peruvian people,
the Ministry of Development started a publicity campaign
aimed at explaining the reasons for the hike well in advance
of the actual increases. The advertisement placed in
various Lima newspapers attempted to explain how the new
prices would affect transportation. For example, the
increases in the bus fare from Lima to Trujillo were ten-
tatively posted. The increase was justified in terms of
the highway construction program. This advertisement
specifically promised the construction of nine highways in
"La industna carbonara del pafs no puede progresar— so lo
implden los ba.jos Drecios artiflcales de los productes de
petr(5leo." FANAL
,
XIV, No. 5^ (1958), p. 22.
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the easternmost Selva section of the country, ten In the
Sierra, and the completion of the Pan-American highway,
which ran down the coast of Peru. It ended with a patriotic
plea: "the progress of Peru is well worth a few pennies."^
Within one ;^eek following the opening of the publicity
campaign, people began to hoard gasoline in anticipation
of the price increase; long lines were reported at gas
stations. By January 1^, there was a severe scarcity of
gasoline in the city of Cuzco, and I.P.C. was reported to
be speeding shipments to the area.
Organized opposition to the gasoline price hike, and
the gasoline tax increase, was quick to react. The Teamsters
Union met January 13. 1958. and their first meeting ended
in a brawl when a delegate from Chulucanas accused the more
moderate Union of Public Service Drivers of Lima of being
9
an institution in the service of Standard Oil. With
the teamsters apparently divided, the administration moved
quickly. On January 23, the Chamber of Deputies passed the
gasoline price increase, with only the Christian Democrats
making a significant effort to stop it. However, the Teamsters
_
El Comercio
.
January 10, 1958, p. 9.
9
"En gran <iesorden termino la Premera Reunion Nacional de
Sindicatos de Choferes," El Comercio
,
January 15. 1958. p. 3-
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Union managed to pull together and publish a paid announce-
ment carried by the Lima dailies, denouncing the price in-
crease on gasoline.
The Teamsters argued that since 1^% of all passengers
and cargo were carried by car. bus or truck in Peru, a gaso-
line price increase would have a very deleterious effect
on the general welfare of the population. More specifically,
the union noted that while the Prado administration was
asking the Congress for an increase in taxes amounting to
between 25 and 30 cents per gallon, the Ministry of Develop-
ment was announcing price increases of 65 to 70 cents per
gallon. To whom was the difference going? The union argued
that the petroleum companies, primarily I.p.C, would
pocket the difference, and in passing they charged I.P.C.
with being a "virtual monopoly" since its acquisition of
the Lobitos fields. "^^
Miro Quesada immediately recognized the union's argument
as a potential source of embarrassment for the Prado admin-
istration. In the afternoon edition of El Comercio that
same day, the gasoline issue was moved to the first page
—
with a prominent headline: "Increases of taxes and prices
of gasoline." The follovring day, January 26. El Comercio
See the paid advertisement. "La Federacion de choferes
del Peru, a todo el Gremio y al Pueblo." El Comercio .
January 26, 1958, p. 2.
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carried an editorial which to a large extent incorporated
the arguments put forth by the union. It also added its
own interpretation—the government's proposal would in
effect open the doors to price increases at I.P.C. discre-
tion. This was an inaccurate interpretation unless the
assumption was made that the government would order higher
prices as per I.P.C. demand. The editorial also emphasized
that I.P.C. 's profits vrere re-invested not in Peru but in
distant lands and that the price increase of gasoline x^rould
have a drastic effect on the cost of living index in so
far as food and clothing prices would reflect the new in-
11
crease.
By now in hot pursuit of what was shaping up as a major
weakness in the Prado administration, El Comercio dug
deeper into the government's argument that a tax hike was
necessary to carry on the construction of highways. In the
January 2? editorial, Miro Quesada noted that since the
Peruvian government had previously borrowed large amounts
of money, including ten million dollars from I.P.C, and
had pledged the revenues from the gasoline tax to serve this
debt, the future gasoline tax revenues would have to be used
for the most part for debt payments. More specifically,
"^"^"El proyecto sobre el alza del precio de la gasoline,"
El Comercio
.
January 26, 1958, p- 2.
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out of one and a half billion soles in estimated gasoline
tax revenues, over 800 million soles would have to be used
to serve the pre-existing debt, thus leaving some 722 million
soles to be used in the highway construction program/^
In a succeeding editorial, Mir6 Quesada warned the Senate
against passing the government's bill.
With the intensified heat generated by the opposition,
APRA did what it had done before—the party attempted to
disassociate itself from the price increase. Almost as a
test of APRA's intention, the Christian Democrats tried to
resurrect the issue in the Chamber of Deputies, only to
be rebuffed by the APRA majority. In spite of its verbal
retreat, APRA wanted to stick by Prado on the gasoline issue.
On January 28, the Senate passed the government's bill,
and almost immediately, Hiro Quesada lambasted the govern-
13
ment editorially.
But Miro Quesada was merely playing the issue; the
real confrontation came between the government and the
Teamsters Union. On January 30, after the government's bill
had been passed by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
the Federacion de Chcferes del Peru (Teamsters Union)
12
"El Plan Jacional de Carreteras
,
El Gomorcio
,
January 27,
1958, p. 2.
13^See the articles: "Despues de agit lo decate se aprobo alza
de la gasolina." SI Comercio
.
January 29, 1958, p. ^; "Alza
lesiva para nuestro pueblo, " El Comerclo , January 30, 1958,
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published a communique calling for a meeting to consider
the
-grave situation" created by the passage of the bill.
With the absence of the more moderate Drivers of the Public
Service of Lima, the Teamsters Union issued an ultimatum
stating that they would go on an indefinite strike the day
after the price increase was promulgated into law.^^
The threat of a strike XNras enough to cause the Prado
government to delay proclamation of the price increases.
Prado opted for a cooling off period hoping to diffuse
unionist anger. But El Comercio kept up its campaign. In
articles and editorials, the paper denoLinced the impending
price increase. Tx^ro months went by from the time the bill
was approved by Congress and its promulgation. In early
April the price increase was finally officially approved
by Prado, and as announced, the Teamsters Union began a
15
strike.
The strike was particularly effective in the south of
Peru, especially in Arequipa and Cuzco, that area's two major
cities. It soon became clear that the severity of the
teamsters' walkout would complicate the lives of Peruvians,
for other workers joined the boycott. On April 9, the
vendors of the Central Market of Curco held a rally to
15
"Choferes de todo el pais senalan plazo de huelga,
"
El Comercio
.
January 31. 1958f 3-
-^"Choferes inician huelga manana por alto de gasolina, "
El Comercio
,
April 10, 1958, p. i.
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decide whether to go on strike in support of the Teamst
Union. The local police attempted to disperse the rally
and violence errupted. A twelve year old boy was killed,
and the ominious threat of widespread rioting was in the
air. The army and the police began patrolling the streets.
In Arequipa, the strike spread to blue and x^rhite collar
workers, but order was maintained.
In Cuzco the situation was different—conditions
worsened to a point little understood in Peru, and for the
most part unreported anywhere else. Of all the recent works
on Peruvian history or politics, the 1958 events at Cuzco
remain unmentioned with the exception of a book by British
scholar and former British Ambassador to Peru Sir Robert
17Marett, who dedicates a whole sentence to the crisis.
The management of International Petroleum Company and the
Prado administration, however, recoa:nized the significance .
18
of the crisis. According to I.P.G. management personnel,
the city of Cuzco was in the hands of rebel militia composed
of Teamster Union members and other radicals for three days;
the Peruvian government was able to re-take the city only
•^^Ilarett stated: "In April 1953 the city of Cuzco, in the heart
of the Northern Andes, was taken over by what were probably
communist-inspired rebels, their cause being supported by
Belaunde's Accion Popular, as also by the normally right-wing
El Comercio . " Marett, p. 181.
^^I.P.C. management brought these events to the attention of
this researcher. Virtually nothing vxas xiritten at the time
of the uprising, but it is not clear whether the Peruvian
government intended to keep this crisis out of the public eye.
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because the rebels failed to occupy the airport, and loyal
troops were rushed in by air/^ Even Miro Quesada must have
become alarmed by the events, for El Comercio failed to
carry news stories on the Cuzco uprising. Only in an edi-
torial published days later did that paper hint at the
urgency of the Cuzco events. According to El Comercio
. the
Cuzco rebels formed a "popular Committee" to rule the city.
and only the desperate appeals from high clerics and other
20
respected leaders prevented a bloody confrontation. The
Prado government strengthened its hand when troops arrived
in Cuzco, and consequently the government was able to bargain
successfully for an end to the revolt. However, the rebels
won concessions. Teamster Union leaders were granted safe
conduct to fly to Lima to negotiate with the government on
the price increase. The end result of the uprising was that
Prado' backed down. Gasoline taxes were increased by 25 cents
for regular and 30 cents for premium; but the ^0 cents per
gallon price increase for the companies vias cancelled, thus
creating a critical situation for International Petroleum
Company.
19
Confidential interview with I.P.G. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida. May 26. 1971-
20
"El deber del Gobierno en hora actual, " El Comercio
,
April 13. 1958, p. 2.
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This brief uprising in Cuzco is of utmost significance,
for it tends to undermine a whole body of scholarly liter-
ature about Peru and about Latin America in general. First
there is a common notion that Latin American oligarchies
function as the agents of international capitalism. A
good example of this thesis comes from Irving Louis Horowitz.
In terms of an international stra-
tification system the masses are
those portions of the underdeveloped
society that are exploited by the
very national classes—the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat alike—that are inturn subject to the severe pressures
from an international cosmopolitan
"center.
" The Decking order enriches
the national "class" sectors at the
expense of the internal "mass" sectors,
while it weakens the nationalist's re-
solve to seek revolutionary methods
for pressing economic and social demands.
21
How does this statement apply to Peru? Peru is a rather
"typical" latin American nation— it has a large concentration
of Indians, high illiteracy, and a low participation ratio
in politics. The International Petroleum Company is a sub-
sidiary of the actual prototype of international capitalist
institutions—Standard Oil of New Jersey. According to
Horowitz's thesis, the organized vforkers of Peru should have
supported or at least acquiesed to the price increase in
21
Horowitz writes this in his own introductory chapter of his
edited work. Irving Louis Horowitz, ed. , Masses ' In Latin
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 13.
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deference to the "cosmopolitan center" (Standard Oil). In
the "pecking order," the unions enriched themselves at the
expense of the "internal 'mass' sector." Yet in Peru it
was a labor union which disregarded this "pecking order"
and nearly unseated the government of the "national 'class'
sector." pressures from the "cosmopolitan center" notwith-
standing.
Scholar Julio Gotler notes that labor unions "have
fallen into new patterns of dependence as their demands for
improvement and benefits are directed exclusively toward
the unionized--without taking into consideration the national
22
context." However, the Teamsters Union in Peru opposed
the price increase and had a rather sophisticated and well-
developed argument which involved a definite conception
of the national interest. Both the opinions of Horowitz
and Cotler do not fit the context of Peru.
Of the Prado administration, John Gerassi said that
for six years they "ruled the country as they wanted because
23
the Apristas in Congress backed them. " However, the
supposed Aprista influence on labor must have fizzled out;
the Prado government was powerless to finalize a gasoline
22
Julio Cotler, "Internal Domination and Social Change in Pjiu
Horowitz, p. ^-29.
23
John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (London:
Colli er-HacHillan, Ltd. .~19^5T7 p. 136.
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price increase-an Aprista-backed prosram. Even moderate
students of Peruvian politics are prone to refer to the
"forty families" which ruled Peru, and which presumably
in 1958 were still in charge even if that country was in
a "transitional"' stage.
The management of International Petroleum Company
paralleled scholarly opinion by continuing to think in
terms of the fallacy that it was the upper 10% imioh "counted."
Yet, the evidence suggests that in the 1950 's, Peru was not
a country where a tiny oligarchy ruled; the oligarchy was
in fact a deeply divided group--it vras deeply divided in
1918, and it was divided forty years later over the policies
which Peru should follow regarding foreign, particularly
American, capital. To advance the notion that the oligarchy
ruled disallovrs the veto power which organized labor by now
had achieved over certain policies, unless the definition
of the oligarchy included truck drivers and market vendors.'
Although the rebellion in Cuzco was hushed up with a
surprising degree of effectiveness, the fact that the government
was forced to back down, and perhaps of equal importance,
the fact that the military vjas forced to bargain with rebel
leaders was deeply humiliating for both the Prado administration
2^
Rosendo A. Gomez, "Peru: The Politics of Military Guardianship,"
Political Systems of I^atin America , ed. Martin iMeedler
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van No strand, 196^), pp. 29I-.316.
13^
and for the military. El Comercio could draw only limited
comfort from the knowledge that I.P.c. had been foiled.
The lessons of Cuzco went unheeded, and neither the pro-
I.P.C. factions nor the anti-I.P.c. factions of the old
oligarchy realized that a protracted struggle over the
petroleum issue endangered the structure of Peruvian society.
The International Petroleum Company's position, which
had been until then very difficult, became critical during
1958. Costs rose while prices remained fixed in soles
,
which meant that prices actually declined rapidly. The
company reversed its tactics from quiet persuasion of the
government's top executives to a broad campaign aimed at
influencing Peruvian public opinion. Both FANAL c\nd Noticias
de Petroleo. the two company publications, began to carry
articles which clearly and unequivocally had one message:
prices must ,be raised or the Peruvian petroleum industry
would collapse. The facts were the same—the rapid rise
in domestic consumption and stagnant production—but the
arguments were strengthened. Since the 190I discovery of
the Lobitos fields, no significant new oil fields had been
developed in Peru. To liope for new fields in eastern
Peru as a solution to the immediate supply problems was
unrealistic, for a trans-Andean oil pipeline would cost at
least 100 million dollars—money which Peru did not have.
The only vjay to keep production from falling at La Brea
135
y Farinas was to employ costly methods of "secondary
recovery." paced with low prices, the company found it
increasingly difficult to justify the investments required
in order to keep up production. In the past, petroleum
exports had in effect subsidized domestic consumption, but
in 1957 I.P.G. was able to export only one third the oil it
exported in 193?. With Chile. Bolivia and Ecuador developing
oil of their own, the company's profitable exports to these
countries were doomed in any case, and I.P.C. would now have
to compete in distant markets, where transportation costs
diminished their profit margins. The company argued that
since the last price increase in 195^. the costs of its
operations had gone up 60%. The sol drifted lower and lower
in relation to the dollar, and nearly all of their equipment
had to be purchased in dollars.
-According to the company,
I.P.C. received only 93 cents of the 2.23 soles per gallon
of regular gasoline--the price people paid at the stations.
Ninety-six cents went toward payment of various taxes, Ik-
cents paid for transportation from Talara to Callao. and 20
cents went to the local gasoline dealer. International
25
"Secondary recovery" or "technical rejuvenation" of an oil
field involves artificial stimulation of the oil flow. Various
means can be used to accomplish chis end: water flooding,
gas injection or repressurization, steam stimulation, or "in
situ combustion"— fire flooding. Repressurization with water
or gas involves a fairly simple but costly process whereby
vrater or gas is forced into the underground deposits so as to
force the oil out, much like liquids are forced out of an aerosol
can. Steam or fire flooding involves heating the oil-saturated
rock so that oil will flow out and into underground reservoirs
from where it can be piped. The latter is the most costly method,
136
Petroleum argued that it could not produce, refine, store
and distribute gasoline at the rate of 93 cents per gallon.'^
One of I.P.G.'s worst years was I958. By early Fall
it was evident that the company would be able to export
only 2.5 million barrels of oil. in contrast to the well-
over four million barrels it exported in 1957. With rapidly
dropping profit margins, the company was ever more anxious
to Impress its point of view on the Peruvian public. During
the previous five years (1953-1957). I.P.C. invested 6k million
dollars on new drilling and secondary recovery just to main-
tain production levels. I.P.C. argued that it would have
to invest ^;;8,600,000 in production; since the company could
allocate only $6,000,000 in its budget, the difference would
have to come from ;?3. 300,000 of the year's estimated profits-
leaving only ^151.200,000 profit. This sum represented a re-
turn of less than one percent on the company's 180 million
27
dollar investment. Thus. I.P.C. laid its cards on the
table. Even questioning various aspects of I.P.C. 's argument,
the fact remains clear. Peruvians paid the lowest prices
in the world for gasoline; even Venezuelans paid the equi-
valent of 3-00 soles per gallon while Peruvians paid only
2^~~
"La verdad sobre la situacion de la industria petrolera
peruana," FANAL
.
XIV. No. 5^ (1958), pp. 17-21.
27
"La industria petrolera necesita un sistema de precios
adecuado." FANAL
.
XIV, No. 55 (1958), pp. 19-22. This same
article was reproduced in Noticias de Petroleo
,
XI, No. 107
(October, 1958).
137
2.23 soles. North Mericans and Chileans paid the equivalent
Of 7.50 and 8.10 soles respectively.^^ Furthermore, the
company calculated that the small profit of I958 would turn
into a deficit within the next two years. By I961, l.p.c.
anticipated an annual loss of two million dollars per year-
a loss which would grow rapidly if a price increase was not
allowed. To deal with this situation, the company adopted
a new policy. Beginning in 1959. I.P.G. ceased all new
drilling, and relied on the output of La Brea y Parinas and
Lobitos regardless of the total production-consumption ratio.
Manuel Prado's second term in office reached its lowest
level of political credibility in late I958 and early I959.
Numerous labor strikes
.
an economic crisis of major proportions,
and attacks by both major Lima newspapers were more than
the government could endure. Boxed in by the Teamsters
Union' on the one hand and I.P.C.'s no drilling policy on
the other hand, Prado desperately searched for an imaginative
solution to his multiple political woes. In the middle of
1959 he struck upon i-ihat must be considered a most innovative
course of action: he invited Pedro Beltran, the editor of
La Prensa and an arch-critic of his administration, to take
2B
Ibid .
, p. 20.
29
Ibid .
. p. 22.
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the reins of government as Prime Minister of Peru. At
first Beltran balked at the offer, but assured by Prado of
a free hand in dealing with the problems of Peru, he yielded
and became Prime Minister in July I959. It was as if Lyndon
Johnson had picked the editor of The New York Times or the
Washington Post or .J. B.C. News to become his Chief of Staff
at the height o.^ the Vietnam War protests. Now Beltran
had to cease attacking the government
-this in itself was
a Significant relief to the beleagured Prado. and begin to
think in more positive terms about possible and practical
solutions to Peru's problems.
Since the petroleum controversy had a very high priority
on the list of problems faced by the government, one of the
first official acts of Prime Minister Beltran was to order
a committee to study the petroleum crisis. Article 2"o8R of
the Petroleum law of I952 (No. II78O) established that the
government would determine petroleum prices by adding up
the costs of production, transportation, storage, refining,
distribution, sales and taxes, plus "adequate" profit margins
30
commensurate with the investment. The International Petroleum
Company had long ago ceased to receive an "adequate" return
on its investment, but neither El Comercio nor the Teamster.^
30
Harries Peterson and Tomas linger, Petroleo : Hora Cero
(Lima: n.p.
,
196'-^-), pp. 301-302.
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Union were sympathetic to the plight of the American company.
Their ability to veto any up.^rd price adjustments in favor
of the company had been demonstrated as recently as I958.
Pedro Beltran proved as imaginative in dealing with
the problem as his nominal boss Manuel Prado had been in
making him Prime Minister. In consultation with the committe
Beltran determined that an
-adequate" return for the company
would have to be in the area of 6.6% even though in most
countries the oil industry had yields closer to twice that
rate. However, even instituting a 6.6% return for I.P.C.
would require a very substantial price increase. How could
this be made acceptable to the Peruvian x-;orkers, especially
the teamsters, a consideration which obviated the thesis
that the workers do not "count" or participate in the poli-
tical process of Peru.
Beltran decided to destroy the traditional hierarchy .
of prices for petroleum products; prices were not to be
raised across the board, but selectively so as to minimize
the impact on the neediest Peruvians. By a decree dated
July 25, 1959. Beltran dramatically increased the prices of
petroleum products. The price of regular gasoline vjas in-
creased by I'lD/o; premium gasoline was raised 205/^« Kerosene
was to be distributed under two prices. Domestic kerosene,
the important source of energy in cooking and heating for
1^0
the lower classes of Peru vras raised only 15;^. On the other
hand, kerosene used in industry was increased a large 2i,Qi?'^
Reaction to the price increase was swift. As they had done
in 1958. the teamsters went on strike. El Comercio once
more could be counted on to attack Beltran's decision.
However, unlike the strike in 1958. this one in I959 failed
to arouse widespread sympathies. Beltran suspended consti-
tutional guarantees and arrested several labor union leaders.
In a matter of days, the situation was completely under
control, and the price increases were an accepted fact of
daily life in Peru.
Beltran 's ability to deal with the petroleum crisis
stabilized the political situation considerably, but it also
angered the government's opposition, which had grown accus-
tomed to using the petroleum issue as a major source of
embarassment to the government. Furthermore, the price
increase provided ammunition for Miro Quesada, vfho now em-
barked on a crusade against what he perceived as an unholy
alliance of Manuel Prado, -APRA, I.P.C., and El Comercio '
s
prime competitor, la Prensa . To the aging Don Luis, it must
have seemed as if all of his enemies had joined hands to
ruin him ar.n Peru.
^"^Ibid.
, p. 305.
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One Of the developments which most angered the oppositi
was Beltran's effort to open up the door of "adaptation- for
I.P.C. In 1957. the company petitioned the Odrfa admi
tration for "adaptation" or inclusion of La Brea y PariHa
under the general Petroleum Law of 1952; that petition
denied. In Article 6 of the July 25. 1959 decree, Pri
Minister Beltran established his intention of granting I.P.C.
adaptation, for he was not satisfied with a mere solution
to the immediate crisis. Beltran wanted to solve the pro-
blem of La Brea y Parinas once and for all. Accordingly,
on August 8. 1959. I.P.C. >s general manager Jack Ashworth
submitted a formal document to the Ministry of Development
agreeing to pass its rights over the subsoil of La Brea y
Parinas to the Peruvian state, as soon as the law authorizing
the adaptation of the property had been promulgated."^^
In the opinion of Augusto Zimmermann. a protege of
Don Luis i4ir6 Quesada and the only non-member of the family
to hold an important position with El Comercio
, the Decree
of July 25 signaled the beginning of the final battle over
La Brea y Parinas. He stated:
At the instant in which the Decree
was first known by the public, the
on
32
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La Historia Secreta del Petroleo
(Lima: Editorial Grafica Labor, I968), p. 22.
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act of recuperation of La 3rea v
Farinas comenced. Without surmis-ing the consequences, vrithout ima^-inxng the long chain of
-vents which
would follow, the President of theCouncil of Ministers opened the door
so that the country would begin toform a clear consciousness of the
Importance and significance of La Brea
y Parinas.
33
That July 25 Decree brought together an unlikely coalition
of radical leftists, conservative nationalists, and the
armed forces.
The leftists were members of several parties, including
some radicals from within the ranks of Fernando Belaunde's
Accion Popular. In fact, the initial offensive in the
Peruvian Congress was carried out by an Acci6n Popular senator
from Bela{mde's home tom of Arequipa, Alfonso Montesinos.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the anbi-I.P.C. campaign was
spearheaded by a Deputy from Lima, Alfonso Benavides Correa.
The July 25 Decree prompted Benavides Correa to take the
floor of the Chamber of Deputies and recount the long history
of I.P.C. 's activities in Peru. As might be expected, he
projected I.P.C. in the worst possible light. However, the
company's detractors really presented no factual information
concerning I.P.C. 's actions from I917 to 1939.
33
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.
, p. 21.
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On August 27. Alfonso Montesinos initiated a similar
campaign in the Peruvian Senate, recounting the diplomatic
interventions of Britain and the United States in Peru's
affairs. He questioned the company's presentation of. the
facts, and alledged that the value of I.P.C.'s investment
in Peru was between 98 and 103 million dollars and not 21?
million dollars, as I.P.C. had claimed of late."^^ According
to his calculation, the company would be receiving a return
a 26.?^ profit over the value of the investment under the
35
Decree of July 25. Clearly, Hontesinos hoped to confuse
the issue as far as possible. By using the "book value"
of the company's investment, he hoped to create the impression
that the company vjas doing in 1959 what in fact it had done
during the 1920's and 1930
' s—squeezing a very large profit
out of Peru. Montesinos availed himself of the company's
past record in hopes of demolishing I.P.C.'s arguments one
by one. from the most technical figures on the cost of
drilling wells to the more general matters of return on an
investment. More importantly, citing a forum on petroleum
^^Montesinos claimed that his figures came out of U.S. Department
of Commerce publications. His opponents noted that these
figures reflected the value of the property and equipment vrhen
purchased and did not take into account the current values or
costs. The refinery might have cost 5 million dollars to juild
early in the century; in 1959 it would have cost several times
that. In figuring the value of the investment Hontesinos used
the first figure, and the company used the second. For a
transcript of Montesinos ' s congressional presentation and the
various interruptions, see: Ibid . , pp. 5o-59'
^^Ibid.
, p. 66.
1^4
held at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Montesinos
Claimed that I.P.C. took one thousand million soles out of
Peru under the aegis of an illegal international award, and
that by "adapting- the company to the general petroleum law.
the Prado administration wanted to grant the company the
right to take sixty billion soles more.^^ Both Montesinos
and Benavides Correa contended that the reason I.P.C. and
the government were in a hurry to reach an "adaptation"
agreement was that the 1922 Laudo had a fifty year life
span set to expire in 1972. At that point, ownership of
La Brea y Parinas would revert back to the Peruvian state.
Soon after the initial congressional offensives of August
1959. the price issue was dropped as the primary point of
the dispute and the legitimacy of the company's title over
La Brea y Parinas became the target of the anti-I.P.C.
campaign.
On September 7. 1959, Beltran sent his Minister of
Foreign Affairs to face a parliamentary interpellation.
Minister Raul Porras Barrenechea, in an effort to placate
the opposition, made a statement which would henceforth
represent the position of the Prado-Beltran government:
Although Peru has vigorous moral reasons
which we all know and share to invoke
the intrinsic invalidity of acts vjhich
have affected the national interest, the
•^^ Ibid .
, pp. 7^-76.
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acts precisely for their international
character are of a definitive nature.International life would be unstable andhazardous if unilateral action in inter-
national matters were to be permitted
In his own obscure way. Porras Barrenechea meant to state
that the 1922 Award was invalid but that its unilateral
abrogation would set a dangerous precedent. Instead of
calming the opposition, the government's statement merely
encouraged it to intensify the assault. Answering the
arguments of Porras Barrenechea, Benavides Gorrea stated
that the 1922 Award was null i£so ,1ure. and hence did not
bind the Peruvian state. Taking off on a very imaginative
tangent, the deputy for Lima surprised the government and
I.P.C. by stating that the Laudo did not in fact exist,
wherexnth he challenged the government to come up vrith a
copy of the agreement. Upon a search of its archives, the
Peruvian government found no trace of the celebrated document
Concerned with the absence of the Laudo of 1922, personnel
from the International Petroleum Company travelled to London.
They contacted the appropriate officials at the British
Foreign Office and they produced the originals of the signed
documents. The Peruvian Consul v;as asked to verify the
authenticity of the documents and copies were promptly for-
warded to Lima. However, this clarification came weeks after
^"^Ibid.
, p. 78.
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the orlsir^l allegation had taken its toll m public distrust
Porras Barreneohea
• s statement Illustrated serious weaknesses
m the government's position, and Benavides Correa's attack
Showed the ability of I.P.c. opponents to capitalize on thos
weaknesses and to go further in their attempts to shook
Peru into a drastic solution to the La Brea y Parinas con-
troversy.
During the remaining months of 1959 and In early i960
the battle raged. El Comercio magnified every attack on
I.P.C, and the government and La Prensa counter-attacked,
suggesting that Benavides Correa should have failed his
first year of law school If he could not recognize the
validity of the Laudo. I.P.C. was quick to react to these
attacks. Responding to Benavides Correa 's charge that the
company had taken one thousand million soles out of Peru.
I.P.C. suggested that "the fantastic figure" "was born of
some heated mind; that It had sprouted, like Minerva from
the head of Jupiter, definitive and round." But, after
ridiculing the charge, I.P.C. presented a detailed argument
loaded with facts and figures and stated that the company
had taken only 1^5 million soles , an amount which it believed
quite reasonable considering the investment it had in
33
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Peru. I.P.C. was very disturbed by the assertion that in
1972 La Brea y Parinas would revert back to the state, and
it began a public relations campaign designed to counteract
this assertion. In articles and pamphlets, the company
contended that the Laudo of 1922 merely covered the matter
of taxes, and that after 1972. if no adaptation had taken
place. I.P.C. would continue to own both the subsoil and
the surface property of la Brea y Parinas. and would con-
tinue extracting oil subject to whatever general legislation
in effect at that time.
In a way the company over-reacted to the attack. The
publicity campaign stating that the end of the Laudo would
have virtually no effect on its ownership or modus operandi
was a tactical error of major proportions, for its was un-
doubtedly interpreted as a hardening of the company's position,
and a blatant statement of its intention of continuing oper-
ations regardless of the Laudo 's termination. Peruvians
who might have hoped to avoid a confrontation mth the
company during the 1960's on the assumption that I972 would
bring an automatic solution to their problems, had those
39
"El Ilito de los Mil Hillones." Noticias de Petroleo
.
XII,
Wo. 113 (September. 1959).
"La Brea y Parinas revertira al estado en I972?" Noticias
de Petroleo
.
XII. No. 11^ (November, 1959).
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hopes dashed. International Petroleum Co:„pany was not merely
a fifty year guest, It was a self-proclaimed permanent
resident.'
During January i960, the acrimony rose to unbelievable
levels. The more radical parliamentarians, particularly
those belonging to the small but militant Hovimiento Social
Progresista joined hands with Benavides Correa and Montesinos
in their attacks on I.P.C. and the government. In late
January, Benavides Correa introduced a bill declaring the
1922 Laudo invalid, and therefore not binding on Peru. This
was but the first of a series of ten similar bills submitted
by various combinations of radicals with the same intent.
At first the Prado-Beltran government remained calm.
After all, these were the desperate efforts of radicals
who were a very small minority in a parliament dominated
by what they called the apro-praGismo -beltranismo--a coalition
of APRA, Prado's supporters and Beltran's friends. However.
Beltran's calm came to a sudden end on February 2, i960,
when a commission of Army chiefs issued a document stating
that the 1922 Laudo was null and void on various legal
grounds, principally that Law 3016 had not authorized the
Laudo of 19?2, and that no Peruvian representative had been
instructed to cede rights over the subsoil to I.P.C. There-
fore, the Army officers recommended that the Laudo be
1^9
excluded from the Peruvian registry, and that "international
Petroleum Company pay the exact total of taxes due from
the 1st of January of 1915."'^'''
The Army's stand came as a shock to all involved in
the controversy except the Social Progresistas and some of
the more radical members of Accion Popular; both parties
had been courting the military during the preceding years.
On the day folloxfing the army announcement, Prime Minister
Beltran went to Array headquarters to request an interview
with the commanding general. Alfredo Rodriguez Martinez.
He tried to persuade the general that Benavides Correa and
his allies were political agitators in the service of the
international Communist movement; however, he failed to do
so. He then sent various Cabinet members on the same
mission on several occasions during early February. Feb-
ruary' 5, General Rodriguez Martinez issued a second com-
munique, this time in the name of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, condemning the 1922 Laudo as injurious to the national
sovereignty^. This communique ominously demanded that in
keeping with Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution, the
Joint Chiefs expected to have any proposed solutions to the
La Brea y Parinas controversy submitted to them for study
¥1
The text of this "internal" coromunication is reproduced by
August© Zimmermann. See: Zimmermann, pp. 81-82.
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so that they could issue an opinion on the matter.
Prado and Beltfan needed no further word.; the hand-
writing was on the wall. Obviously the Army would veto
"adaptation- unless the International Petroleum Company paid
the back taxes which Benavides Correa and Montesinos claimed
the company owed Peru. Furthermore, a mere continuation
of the laudo wa^ not acceptable to the Army chiefs, for
they conceived of it as injurious to the national interest.
Clearly then, Beltran had over-reached himself. While
his attempt to put through a price increase was clever
enough, the Army simply would not tolerate any further
concessions to I.P.C. However. Pedro Beltran had an amazing
capacity to find his way out of bli id alleys. His first
step was to effect a tactical withdrawal from the planned
adaptation, thus avoiding a confrontation with the Army.
He then embarked on a two fold policy designed to produce
a compromise acceptable to the Army, and also to discredit
Miro Quesada, El Comercio and its radical allies. The war
between la Prensa and El Comercio v;as destined to escalate
to previously unimagined levels.
On January 21, just prior to the Army communique on
the Laudo, the Chamber of Deputiec called for yet another
1^2
For a photostatic copy of the document, see: Ibid . , p. 85-
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study of the Brea y Parinas controversy, this time by
the Advisory Commission of Foreign Affairs-a group composed
Of distinguished Peruvians, former presidents and ministers
of foreign affairs. On Hay 10 the commission issued its
report, and concluded that even though the Laudo i.as essen-
tially defective, it could not be ignored after it had been
in effect for thirty-eight years. The commissions rejected
the possibility of taking the matter to some international
judicial body, and instead suggested that the President
should study the matter and then propose a new law to the
legislature x-xhich "would establish a new regime in replacement
of the present one." The commission also rejected the
alternative of nationalization, but it specifically said
that whatever the solution arrived at, Peru should contem-
plate "obtaining compensation for the small yield the country
has received." The idea of compensation— first suggested
by the radicals—began to gain respectability in Peruvian
circles.
On August 30, Prime Minister Beltran sent a bill to
Congress incorporating the recommendation of the Advisory
Commission. In essence, the bill proposed that from that
point on, I.P.C. would hold Brea y Parinas as a concession
^-^The full report is included in" The La Brea y Parinas
ControvGrG\% Vol . !_ (International Petroleum Company,
February, I969) , iixhibit ^.
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for thirty years, extendable to forty. A complicated
system of taxes and royalties was set forth. In practice,
the company would be subject to a regime very similar to
that established by the General Petroleum Law of I952
;
however, the taxes would be higher, and certain annual
bonuses would be paid by the company. Ho doubt these pro-
visions were designed, to comply with the judgement of the
Army and the Advisory Commission, stating that I.P.C. should
make restitution to Peru for their previous oil exploitation
under the "defective" Laudo.
The reactions to Beltran's proposals were predictable,
the Prime Minister's own newspaper la Prensa greeted the
bill with jubilant front page headlines: "Government sends
to Parliament bill which puts an end to the Laudo: Immediate
vindication of the subsoil of Brea, Parinas and Lobitos
;
Concession to I.P.G. for 30 years and nationalization with-
out payment at the end; I.P.C. will pay the State 300
million in cash imjnediately and 950 on term; the State to
receive 6C70 of the profits; Concessions limited to 100,000
hectares; 66.000 will go, without payment to Petrolera Fiscal
/Peru's state-ovrned oil entcrprise7 "-Tith its wells and in-
^5
stallations. " This headline was in itself a good summary
Ibid. , jjxhibit 5*
^La Prensa
.
September 1. i960, p. 1.
153
of the contents of the government's bill, except for the
fact that the bill refered to "nationalization" only m
the loosest sense of the word. Extensive articles elsewhere
in that same issue of La Prensa argued in detail that indeed
this was a solution highly favorable to Peru; that it went
beyond what the Advisory Commission had recommended in its
Hay 10 report, and that I.P.C. would be paying some of the
highest oil industry taxes in the world. The editorial
from the following day's issue further emphasized that
I.P.C. 's profits would be split on a 60-^0 basis, with
Peru receiving 60;^ of the profits. La Prensa stated that
nationalization was inevitable and in short, the proposal
was highly favorable to Peru.
The reaction of the congressional opposition was as
predictable as that of la Prensa
; furthermore, it x^as as
negative as l& Prensa 's was positive. Once again. Deputy
Alfcnso Benavides Correa led the anti-I.F.C. campaign.
He charged that the Beltran bill V7as nothing more than
"covert adaptation," He based his allegation on the fact
that the bill merely outlined a contract to be concluded
between the goveriiment and the company. In other words,
w> ^
"^1 Proyecto va a un mas Lejos de lo que Planteo la Consultiva,"
and "Ahora IPA Pagara Una de la Tributaciones m.as altas del
mundo," l£ Prensa , September 1, i960, pp. 6,7.
'"La Revindicacion del Petroleo, " La Prensa , September 2,
i960, p. 2.
15^
passage of the bill did not nean that its provisions were
automatically put into effect, but that they awaited I.P.C.'s
approval. Benavides Correa went on to state that the govern-
ment put forth the proposal because I.P.C. had already
agreed to the terms of the contract, and that the bill repre-
sented nothing but a "bilateral" contract. In addition,
he argued that the proposal merely brought I.P.C. under the
provisions of the General Petroleum Law of 1952-action which
I.P.C. had long sought. He noted:
it turns out that the great conquest,
the extraordinary conquest of Sr.
Beltran of vindicating for Peru its
unalienable, imprescriptable and sover-
eign right to the mineral subsoil of
La Brea y Parinas. was already a propo-
sal which, before Sr. Beltran. the
Ministry of 'Development and Commerce
and the Premiership, International
Petroleum had offered in August of 195?.^^
For Benavides Correa and his allies in Congress, the
real dilemma was simple: "to collect, or not to collect
the debt" which I.P.C. owed Peru for all past exploitation
^ 50
of La Brea y Parinas. Benavides Correa did not limit
himself to an attack on I.P.C. alone; he identified the
culprits as a clan, which was "the union of banking capital
Host of Benavides Correa ' s speech is reproduced in Zimmermann,
pp. 110-135.
^''^
Ibid .
,
^. 12^.
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With industrial and commercial capital, and union of both
parties with the country's government." And. as the axis of
this clan, the radical deputy identified Felipe Thorndike
Beltran. nephew of the Prime Hinister-a man with multiple
interests in the petroleum business and in the newspaper
business. More specifically. Beanvides Gorrea identified
Felipe Thorndike Beltran as a first cousin of the editor
of Ultima Hora—a Lima newspaper which like la Frensa
supported the government, as a former manager of Petrolera
Peruana— an oil company recently purchased by American
interests, as a member of the Board of Directors of the
Compania Petrolera Lobitos, and as a member of the Superior
Council of Petroleum--a private group of oil entrepreneurs.
Benavides Correa charged that Thorndike Beltran acted as a
link betxfeen all these organizations and Prime Minister
Beltran, and since he was the Prime Minister's only nephew
and Beltran had no children of his ov7n, he ciiarged that
Felipe was Beltran' s heir apparent. In a book which ho
published after the congressional debates, Benavides Correa
expanded his charges, and included long lists of the enter-
51
prises to which Beltran 's neiDhew was connected.
Ibid .
, pp. I29-I3I; Alfonso Bena^/ydes Correa, 21 Petroleo'
Peruano, 5"la autopsia de un clan " (Lima: Papel Grafica
Editora, 190T) , pp. I52-I65.
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Similar charges were made in the Senate by Acci5n
Popular Senator Alfonso Hontesinos, and of course, El
^^"^^^^^^ counted on to provide a forum for opposi-
tion to the sovermnent
• s policy. In sharp contrast to
La Prensa's headlines for September 1st. El Comercio 's
front page proclaimed: "Senator Hontesinos accused the.
Beltran Cabinet of plotting with International Petroleum;
the Cabinet is made responsible for recognizing 100 million
dollars more than I.P.C. had invested in the country."
Another headline read: "The Executive proposes that I.P.C.
continue to exploit La Brea y Parinas for ^0 more years."
In the editorial section, El Comercio argued that in order
for a monopoly to exist, a company did not have to control
100^ of the business. 3y virtue of its 90/0 control of the
crude oil production in the country, International Petroleum
Company was a monopoly. It charged that I.P.C. illegally
exploited the fields while paying miniscule taxes, that the
company threatened and coerced Peru in order to obtain
price increases, that I.P.C. spent millions in public rela-
tions
—
purposefully trying to confuse public opinion, and that
53
the company threatened the security and sovereignty of Peru.
52
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This September 1st attack merely presaged what was to be a
constant dally barrage during the following months. In a
subsequent editorial, Kl Comercio
-s battle cry centered on
the point that even If the state were to gam control of
la 3rea y Parlnas In forty years, by then there would be
no petroleum left.^ As a policy, El Comerclo identified
antl-I.P.C. forces as "patriotic"—those who deviated from
the Mlro Quesada hard line were dubbed the "entregulstas.
"
In an attempt to secure the balance of power in their
favor, the antl-I.P.C. parliamentarians and El Comcrcio
deliberately attempted once more to Involve the Army in the
dispute. On September 2, Benavldes Correa stated that the '
Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the Beltran bill.
The Army, which had experienced some changes in command since
the Incident in February i960 vrhen it had first Issued a
statement on the matter, denied having any opinion on
the controversy. However, El Comerclo knew that the Armed
Forces were generally sympathetic to its position in spite
of the changes in top leadership, and played the Army officers
to its advantage. The paper reminded the Army of the
"elevated mission" assigned to it by the Peruvian constitution
That "elevated mission" required tho Army to stand in eternal
574
"Proyccto entreguista sobre el Petr61eo," El ConGrcio
,
September 4, i960, p. 2.
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Vigilance protecting the country from a bill which "seriously
compromised the sovereignty and security of the Fatherland."
El Comercio warned that the "Armed Forces will not permit
the progress of bills which are damaging to the Country
and threatening to its rights and high national interests , "^^
Here again was an interesting twist; the radical left
and a conservative newspaper joined their voices to call
for an unconstitutional military intervention necessary
to save Peru from what they interpreted as a treacherous
coalition of foreign and domestic capitalists bent on defraud-
ing the country. Obviously, El Comercio and its radical
allies were engaged in a "no holds barred" offensive designed
to ruin Prime Minister Beltran and International PetroleiJim
Company. Hovrever, their goals were not identical, a con-
clusion xfhich will be examined later.
Recognizing the attack on the jugular vein of his
government, Pedro Beltran reacted immediately. As a con-
noisseur of Peruvian oligarchical intrigue, he had several
dramatic options which he could play against his enemies.
The first such move came on September 6 during a television
appearance by Eudocio Ravines, an associate of Beltran and
a vrrlter for La Prensa . Ravines had been a Communist in
"La Fuerza Armada y la reivindicacion del Petroleo,
"
El Comercio
.
September ^, I96O, p. 2.
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the 1920 's. an associate of Haya de la Torre-APRA founder,
and of Jose Carlos Mariategui-Peru
• s foremost Marxist
intellectual. Ravines stayed on good terms with Moscox.
until the Nazi-Soviet pact; he then abandoned international
Communism and became an outspoken critic of the Communist
movement in Peru. This background as a former high Communist
Party official m Peru promised to be useful to Pedro Beltran.
Ravines put his knowledge to use during the television
broadcast--he declared that Senator Alfonso I-Iontesinos
was a Communist. V/hen the surprised interviewer asked how
he knew, Ravines stated that he had personally issued Monte-
sinos his membership years ago. Montesinos, who was watching
the live television broadcast, marched over to the studio
56
and tried to attack Ravines.
During the momentous first week of September, events
moved quickly. Senator Carlos A. Minao, a former Army general,
introduced legislation calling for the nationalization of
La Brea y Farinas. Instead of taking any action, the Chamber
of Deputies once more dumped the issue in the lap of another
study group, but the Special Commission of the Chamber of
Deputies in turn passed the problem on to the Array by formally
56
Information from: Confidential interview with I.P.C.
executive. Coral Gables, Florida, Hay 26, 1971; "Veneno
de Ravines causo indignacion general, " _il Comercio . September
6, i960, p. 1 (Afternoon edition).
l6o
requesting its opinion on the matter of Brea y Parinas.
The Social Progressist Party issued a statement calling on
the Peruvian people and the Army to stand united, and
warning the Army against becoming involved to aid the
government
.
El Comercio played up statements by retired general
Alejandro Barco L5pez
.
Senator from Lima, who sided with
Senator Hontesinos. The paper published a series of articles
by another retired general, Cesar A. Pando who wrote very
decidedly against I.P.C. In a September 8 editorial. El
Comercio took note of the position of the three retired
generals, stating that their point of view reflected well
upon the Armed Forces. Once m.ore. El Gom.ercio encouraged
57the Army to overthrow the government. In fact, it seemed
as if the paper vjould stop short of nothing in its effort
to discredit Beltran and I.P.C. For example, when a mis-
fortunate young boy fell into a service station underground
tank and died, El Comercio mentioned that it was an Esso
station connected with I.P.C, as if the company were res-
58
sponsible, and not the local dealer.
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It was durins this period of confrontation that an
organization was formed with the specific purpose of battling
International Petroleum Company-the National Front for the
Defense of Petroleuin. The Front's president was retired
general Cesar A. Pando
; its executive vice-president was
Alberto Rufz Eldredge. a Castro sympathizer and Political
Secretary of the Movimiento Social Progresista. Other
members included Senator Alfonso Hontesinos and Deputies
Alfonso Benavides Correa and Fernando Noriega Calmet. an
59avowed enemy of I.P.C. The Front organized anti-I.P.C.
demonstrations and published a series of public statements
in several Lima newspapers denouncing the company. The
Front for the Defense of Petroleum also published a pamphlet
attacking I.P.G. Most importantly, this group sought the
backing of individuals and other groups in its anti-I.P.C.
crusade. While it got support from the Society of Retired
Personnel of the Armed Forces of Peru, and did manage to
get several labor leaders to a meeting, the Front failed
to gather support from any major group or organization.
International Petroleum Company attempted to coimter
the Front's efforts by gathering its own allies. The
company d^ d get the backing of a group of forty retired
^^Frente Nacional de Defensa del Petr(5leo, Declaracion de
Prlncipios Exposicion de Motives (Lima: Technograf , S.A.
,
i960) , p. 199.
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military officers, but in general, most Peruvians were
unwilling to become involved in the controversy, let alone
in the "entreguista" cause which had been so maligned by
El Comercio. l.P.c. 's most significant support came from
its own workers, who in early October travelled in great
numbers to Lima to protest the attacks on the company. Even
though El Comeroiq tried to discredit these workers by
suggesting that they had been sent by the company, the facts
seem clear that they came on their own. out of genuine con-
cern for their own future should nationalization take place.
The La Brea y Parinas controversy, which had virtually
destroyed the Civilista Party and made possible the I919
Leguia coup, came close to having the same effect on 3ela{inde ' s
Acci5n Popular. Senator Alfonso Montesinos was a member of
Accion Popular, one of the most important men in that party.
It was general knowledge in the political circles of Lima
that Hontesinos would be chosen to run in the number two
position on the Belaundista ticket in the I962 election.
However, during the first two weeks of September i960,
while Prensa was trying to sell Beltran's petroleum bill
to the Peruvian people and El Comercio was doing its best
to make sure the bill failed, BeD.aaide reached an important
"Asalariados de la IPC llegaron ayer a Lima; Han sido
traidos para manifestar su apoyo al proyecto petrolero
del Ejecutivo," El Comercio, October 11, I96O, p. 3«
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decision. Ke decided to accede to the general principles
of the government's petroleum bill, but to demand that the
time span of the new concession be reduced from thirty
to five years. In accordance with his decision and in
keeping with his role as party leader, he sent a message
to Montesinos on September I9 explaining his reasoning
and asking that ilontesinos conform to this more conciliatory
position. Montesinos reacted with anger and announced
that if the party took the Belaunde position, he would im-
mediately repudiate Accion Popular in public. Efforts to
placate Hontesinos failed, and finally Belaunde had to
accept the senator's point of view in order to avoid a
split in the party. Accion Popular vjas virtually forced
to introduce a bill in Congress ordering the immediate
confiscation of La Brea y Parinas without compensation.
Despite Belaunde ' s concession to party unity. Montesinos 's
star dimmed considerably following Ravines 's television
appearance. During I961, it became apparent that Belaunde
would not choose Hontesinos as his running mate, or even
as senator for another term. After the election of I962.
61
Montesinos was forced out of politics.
Noveiuber i960 brought still another dramatic move on
the part of the very resourceful Prime Minister and his
3l
Zimmermann, pp. 99-106.
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associate. Eudocio Ravines. On November 16. a group of
Cuban exiles, allegedly guided by Ravines, conducted a raid
on the Cuban embassy in Lima. They came away with several
suitcases filled with confidential papers from the embassy
files. In time, select documents were passed on to the
Peruvian military and the press. These included several
communications from the Cuban Ambassador to Peru. Luis
R. Alonso to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Havana. In
a report dated October t,, i960, the Cuban ambassador gave
a detailed account of "political expenditures" and noted
that
,
In accordance with the instructions
received from the Armed Forces Minister.
Commander Raul Castro, I have directly
concerned myself with the organization
of insurgent groups in cooperation with
the Communist Party and Apra Rebelde
/a radical spinoff from APRA7. as well
as with the other friends of the left
who are ready to go all out, in case
the announced imperialist invasion of
Cuba should take place.,
.
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Funds vrere passed directly by the ambassador through the
Peruvian Communist Party to individuals in responsible
V2
"
Photostatic copies of the documents were provided by I.P.C.
While the authenticity of the papers has been denied by the
Cuban government and the alledged recepients of the funds,
it has on the other hand been upheld by defecting employees
of the Embassy.^ The fact that a raid did take place, and
that the expose reached into the ranks of La Prensa as much
as El Comercio tends to support the authenticity of the
papers. The fact that ant i -I.P.C. forces seemed to come
up vjith money to publish pamphlets and books on the pet-
roleum issue in a country where --rriters have to absorb the
initial costs of publication also suggests some outside financing.
165
positions in every political party and in numerous labor
unions, newspapers and other organizations, including one
publisher. From the list of
-political expenditures.- it
soon became clear that Havana was underwriting the publication
Of pamphlets and books in defense of the Cuban regime, that
it had friends on nearly every newspaper, and that it
provided heavy subsidies for the Social Progressist Hovenent.
particularly for its leader Alberto Ru£z Eldredge. the man
who distinguished himself as an advocate of the Cuban Revolu-
tion in the Peruvian Congress, and as the organizing element
behind the National Front for the Defense of Petroleum.
The Prado-Beltran government chose to delay release of
the Cuban documents, probably because they were sure to
evoke embarrassment not to the radical left alone, but to
many more prominent Peruvians. However, on January 196I.
all hell broke loose in the Peruvian Senate when the War
Minister, General Alejandro Cuadra Rabinez read the list
of recipients of Cuban funds. In a sense, the disclosure
of the Cuban papers brought this stage of the controversy
to an end.
The elections which were scheduled for I962 began to
loom larger and larger in everyone's mind. For El Comercio
the issue was once more how to prevent APRA from taking
control of the government. For APRA the problem was how to
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become acceptable to the Arnea Forces so that it could tal.e
over if it won an election. Thus, as I961 progressed. APRA
and Pedro Beltran. who had presidential ambitions of his own.
dropped the thorny issue of La 3rea y Parinas. and declared
an unofficial moratorium on the problem until after the election.
The period from July 1959 to the end of i960 proved
singularly important in the La Brea y Parinas controversy.
The International Petroleum Company entered this stage of
its history as a troubled entity, but there was no questi,
then concerning I.P.C.'s legitimacy in Peru's petrolei
industry. When the battle was over. I.P.C.'s legitimate
existence had been severely undermined. The question was
not whether I.P.C. should be removed from Peru, but how soon
it could be ejected from that country. Yet, in spite of the
overall political deterioration in the company's position,
the score was not completely negative.
The price increases of July I959 gave the company a
new lease on life, and despite opposition from the political
left, El Comer cio and even the i^rmed Forces, International
Petroleum Com.pany endured. It outlived the presidency of
Manuel Prado and even the premiership of Pedro Beltran. Poli-
tically weakened with its reputation in tatters, Standard
Oil's Peruvian affiliate navigated the stormy vraters of the
early i960 ' s and made ready for the final battle.
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CEAPTERV
ANATOMY OF THE ANTAGONISTS
£1 Comerclo
One of the most important participants in the contro-
versy surroionding la. Brea y Parinas. and in the general poli
tical process of Peru was a newspaper, El Comercio
. and the
family which has owned it since the 19th century, th Miro
Quesadas. Like The New York Times in the United States
or Le Monde ia France, El Comercio was. and still is, a
very influential publication in Peru—a gate-keeper to the
minds of many people. This newspaper is more important to
Peru than The New York Times is to the United States be-
cause its impact is not neutralized by competition from
other news media. All American papers compete with tele-
vision and radio for the attention of the public; however,
ix*i a relatively poor society like Peru that competition is •
minimized by the small number of receivers . Given the
relative concentration of political and economic power as
well as population in the Lima-Callao area, El Comercio
2
was even more important. There were other dailies in
In fact:, television only serves the Lima area. For the 2.1
million r&.dios in Peru, there are 150 radio stations. U.S
Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports ; Basic
Data, on the Economy of Peru ( ..'ashington : U.o. Government
Printing Office, I969T. P- !?•
2 Ibid . , p. 2.
168
Peru, but Peruvians considered only two of them "great"
newspapers. El Gomercio and La Prensa. The other news-
papers were generally categorized as prensa chica. or small
press.
Of the two important newspapers in Lima, only El
^^^^^^^Q
^ continuous existence under two generations
3
of the same family.
.Indeed, considering the countless coups,
dictatorships, wars and constitutions since £1 Gomercio 's
original edition, the newspaper endured with remarkable
stability in a country where governments, ideologies and
even constitutions come and go frequently. El Gomercio
has been an intensely political institution, and outlived
most of its targets, including the International Petroleum
Company—another old institution in the economic and political
life of Peru.
What prompted one enterprise to become the arch enemy
of another? Why did El Gomercio engage I.P.C. in mortal
combat x^rith disastrous effects for the company and nearly
disastrous effects for the newspaper? The answer to this
question must be sought in the background of this extraor-
dinary family rimning El Gomercio . The current generation
3La Prensa vias taken over by the Leguia government and turned
into an official publication during the Oncenio. In 19^7,
it editor Francisco Grana Garland v:as assassinated, and
there was then another change in oxmership and editorial
policy.
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of Hiro Quesadas took over c^nntr^r^i +-uo rol of the paper when their
father, the first Antonio Mir5 Quesada died in I905. The
editorship then went to this eldest son, Antonio, who ran
the paper with the help of his brothers until he was assas-
sinated in 1935. The position of editor-in-chief and head
of the family then went to Luis Hiro Quesada. the oldest
survivine- brother. This man has acted as editor of the
paper and family patriarch to this day.
While information about the affairs of the family is
scanty, several important factors m.ust be considered.
First, the family's only source of wealth and prestige is
the newspaper. They have made it a matter of pride that
their positions are not influenced by any extraneous
business considerations. The family has grown large over
the years; even though by custom they should carry only
the Miro of their last name, they have kept the two last
names of the family founder. They carry the name Hiro
Quesada with great pride. Since this family is a sort of
institution in itself, its interests are carefully guarded
against the changing winds of Peruvian politics—a feat
usually accomplished by having important family members in
nearly every political party in Peru. Thus no matter what
group or political movement wins in Peru, there is sure to
be a Hiro Quesada in its leadership. The one important
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exception to this practice which cannot be ignored is the
Aprista Party.a group which the Hiro Quesadas have engaged
in an unparalleled vendetta during the last forty years.
To illustrate the uncanny flexibility of the family.
many examples can be drawn from the political literature
of Peru. During the 1930 's. when fascism was over-running
Europe, one of the Miro Quesada brothers. Carlos, travelled
to Italy. Convinced of the virtues of fascism, he wrote a
series of very favorable articles for El Comercio. The
Italians were so pleased with his statements that they
compiled and published the articles in book form in Italian.^
By 19^0. the situation had changed enough to prompt Carlos
Miro Quesada to withdraw his sympathies. His reason was:
"The Thrid Reich has sacrificed its principles and has
permitted communism--a barbaric Asian phenomenon--to dictate
the law in Poland and the Baltic.""^ It was not long before.
Peru's Communist Party returned fire. In one of their
resolutions passed at the Party Congress of 19^2, the
Communists denounced the Miro Quesadas as part of a native
6
pro-nazi fifth column.
Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Intorno Af^li Scritti e JDiscorsl di
Mussolini (Milan: Fratelli Treves i:^ditori, 1937).
^Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Lo que he visto en Europa (Lima:
Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1940")
, p. 197
6
Partido Coraunista Peruano, Congreso Nacional. Resoluciones
del Primer Conp;reso del Partido Comunista del Peru (Lima:
n.p. , 19^2) , p. 8.
171
In 1959. under the impact of sputnik and the Cuban
revolution, the Miro Quesadas began to take a second look
at the Communist movement. In that year. Francisco Miro
Quesada Cantuarias. more commonly known as Paco. took an
extensive trip to the Soviet bloc nations, including visits
to Moscow and even Peking. Francisco was a nephew of Don
Luis, and as the intellectual and philosopher of the family
he was very influential with his uncle.
After his return from the Communist x^orld, Francisco
Miro Quesada wrote several articles for the Sunday supplement
of El Comercio, and his articles in turn were compiled
and published in book form. While Francisco did not engage
in outright praise of the Communist regimes of the Soviet
Union and China, he shocked many in the circle of family
friends with his participation on an officially sponsored
tour and the subsequent publication of his friendly account
of Soviet society. In the book preface, Francisco Miro
Quesada related a conversation with a friend who had read
the articles in El Comercio . The friend, he reported,
told him:
Whoever reads them, realizes that you
have been impartial, understands that
you have not gone to the Communist
coimtries to criticize or to praise
them, but rather to observe them. One
realizes that you have returned to
tell the truth. But, at the end of
the reading, one is left with a feeling
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of sympathy. The reality you describe
through your pen has defects. But thefinal impression is that one is dealina:With a sympathetic realiT;y.^
Francisco Miro Quesada was clearly impressed with the Soviet
arguments, and even more interestingly, with Chinese argu-
ments.
In Peking, he was told that there had been two kinds
of bourgeoisie in China, the national and the bureaucratic.
The latter was allied with Chiang Kai-shek and was exiled
to Formosa, but the national bourgeoisie vjas told that
despite their destined disappearnace
, they would be allowed
to keep the means of production for awhile. The regime
merely took over the means of distribution. Francisco
Miro Quesada was told that the Chinese government actually
allowed this national bourgeoisie to exploit the workers
during the first stage of the reordering of Chinese life.
The Chinese hosts assured him that the national bourgeoisie
would be re-educated and would take up management positions
in the nationalized industry. But even if they were not
ready, additional time would be allowed for them to make the
transition. Hiro Quesada was so impressed by the Chinese
presentation that he entitled the chapter dealing with China
7Francisco Miro Quesada Cantuarias, La Otra Mi dad del ilundo
,
Vol. 1 (Lima: Tipografia Santa Rosa, S.ii., 1959). P- 9-
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"About capitalism in China. The Chinese went so far as
to tell riiro Quesada that there were several political parties
in China-he was even introduced to the leaders of some of
these parties, the Kuomintang and the Association for the
Construction of Democracy of China—a political party
supposedly composed of bourgeoisie and many small and large
9
capitalists.
Francisco Miro Quesada returned to Moscow from Peking
in a state of bewilderment. He never quite understood that
what the Chinese described as political parties were nothing
more than various state-sponsored associations or groupings
along occupational lines. He continued to attack Marxism,
but concluded that the Soviet Union was not really a Marxist
state. Through what he called "a supermarxist analysis of
jazz" he decided that since art reflects the conditions of
production in Marxist theory, and the Soviets enjoy jazz--
a capitalist art form, the Soviet Union was turning into
a bourgeois, capitalist and exploiting society. "^^
Coinciding with Francisco Miro Quesada 's pilgrimage to
the Soviet Union and China, El Comercio began to include
articles by a great riumber of leftist writers in the pages
_
Ibid .
, pp. 97-100.
9 ibid
. , pp. 101-103.
"*"^Ibid.
, p. 136.
17^
of its Sunday supplement. A new humorous column entitled
"Behind the Nylon Gurtin" and authored by someone with the
pen name "Sofocleto" began to appear regularly; this column
ridiculed the life style of people in the United States.
It was after Pace's return from Moscow that El Comercio
began its most extensive campaign against the International
Petroleum Company. I.P.G. executives who were personally
acquainted with Francisco Hiro Quesada saw a definite trend
in the chain of events involving their company. The .management
of I,P.C. believed that Don Luis Hiro Quesada feared a
violent swing to the left similar to the one vrhich had
taken place in Cuba. The only way to preserve the family's
status and its liveUhood in such an eventuality was to make
their position more compatible with the Peruvian left by
reflecting an increasingly anti-American point of view."^"^
Naturally, International Petroleum Company acted as a
lightning rod in the subsequent storm.
Of course, neither the company nor Pedro Beltran let
Mir5 Quesada 's challenge go unanswered. Augusto Zimmermann
Zavala, a loyal employee of the I-Iiro Quesadas, claimed that
I.P.C. .joined hands with foreign capital to destroy El Gomerci o .
He states that Beltran and I.P.C. management contacted various
^"^Confidential interviews vJith I.P.C. executives, Coral Gables
Florida. Hay 23-28, 1971-
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industrialists and advertisers and tried to persuade them
that El Gomercio was ant i
-American, anti-free enterprise,
and an ally of international communism. As a result of thi;
pressure during the early 1960's. National Broadcasting Com-
pany (N.B.G.) cancelled an agreement to operate a television
station in Lima jointly with El Gomercio
. The Hiro Quesada
family had to sell the station at a loss of several million
soles. A similar fate befell a radio station operated by
_ _ 12
£1 Gomercio . International Petroleum Company management
candidly admitted that they did suggest to other American
businesses that El Gomercio had taken an anti-Am.erican tone,
and that it would be wise not to advertise in the newspaper .
""''^
Not all the exchanges between I.P.G. and El Gomercio
were acrimonious. In late I959 or early i960, a top company
executive visited Alejandro Miro Quesada. one of Don Luis 's
sons, and tried to convince him to ease the I.P.G. issue out
of tne headlines. Alejandro promised to intervene; however,
El Gomercio continued the attacks on I.P.G. The same exe-
cutive then tried his powers of persuasion on Francisco Hire
Quesada. At a dinner meeting arranged by Francisco, El Gomercio
'
s
motivation in attacking I.P.G. was explained as an attempt
12
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La His coria Secreta del Petrolfao
(Lima : Editorial Grafica Labor, I968), op. 167-I70.
13
Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida,
Hay 26, 1971-
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to put down Pedro Beltran. Francisco Mlro Quesada declared
that the editor of U Prensa sent letters to various firms
m the United States. Includlns advertising aeenoies,
and suggested that they cease doing business with El Coraercl o
because of its ant i
-American attitude. Hir5 Quesada stated
that he regretted the difficulties with I.P.C. but that
the Miro Quesada family would not rest until they had the
"political corpse of Beltran. ""^^
Even though the company management did not accept
Francisco's explanation as the complete truth, it is pro-
bably correct to assume that the elder Miro Quesada. Don
Luis, perceived both International Petroleum Company and
La Prensa as his enemies. The events of July I959 provided
him with a good opportunity to launch a simultaneous attack
on both. This animosity for Beltran was to a large extent
the result of normal competitive irritation between the
two leading newspaper entrepreneurs. However, this competition
did not prevent the two men from interacting on a social
level before Beltran became Prime Minister. '''^ Bon Luis
Miro Quesada felt personally offended at Beltran 's rise to
power. For decades he had viewed El Comercio as a source
i5Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida, Hay 25, 1971.
^•^Up to the time when Beltran became Prime Minister, he used
to send Don Luis complimentary vratermelons from his hacienda.
Ziramermann, p. 16?
.
177
of political power; New Prensa
'
s editor Pedro Beltran
had out-maneuvered him at his own game.
It was unfortunate that International Petroleum Company
had to request a price raise from Miro Quesada's arch com-
petitor, for the company automatically became involved in
a quarrel from which it had little to gain. 3y 1962, Beltran
and I.P.C. had ceased to deal with the Hir5 Quesadas socially
In a sense, they broke diplomatic relations. Since in
Peruvian politics, most of the problem solving takes place
on a personal level, this social break bctvieen Beltfan and
I.P.C. 's management on the one hand and the Hiro Quesadas
on the other hand precluded face-to-face interaction, and
consequently eliminated a major bargaining medium.
The Social Progressist Movement
Another group prominently involved in the campaign
against I.P.C. vras a relatively small political party, the
Movimiento Social Progresista. The Social Progresistas , as
members of this group x^ere called, claimed to be "socialist
humanists" and "revolutionary."—men opposed to capitalist
society's failures and human exploitation. They were "revolu
tionary" because they believed that "the great national
problems can only be solved through a profound change in the
social and economic structure of the country. " However,
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unlike the radical fringe of the Aprista party which broke
ranks and launched a guerilla movement in 1965. the Social
Progressists by and large operated within Peru's political
framework. Among their basic objectives were the socializatio
of Peruvian agriculture and the suppression of the feudal
system which they claimed existed in Peru, the nationaliza-
tion of natural resources and the means of production, and
the reform of the credit or banking system so that financial
resources would no longer by in the hands of the privileged,
but rather in the service of the country for development.
Peru's development and improvements in the standard of living
required a planned economy, according to the Social Progres-
sists. The 1959 Cuban Revolution heavily influenced this
Peruvian political movement, as much of its rhetoric on
"socialist humanism" reflected. No concession to "the
economy of free enterprise and the imperialist interests
which are the beneficiaries of the country's dependence. . ."
would be allowed. The movement urged its follovrers "to
erradicate the capitalist system" and to "deliver to the
people the political and economic power. ""^^ Members of the
Social Progressist Movement in the Chamber of Deputies x^^ent
on record as sponsors of a resolution censuring the Beltran
TT
See the ideological statement of the Movimiento Social
Progresista in S. Martinez, Ideario ^ Plan de Gobierno de
los Partidos Politicos (Lima, n.p., I962), pp. 130-140.
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Cabinet for supporting the United States 's O.A.S. moves against
the Cuban government in 1960.^^ When the documents allegedly
stolen from the Cuban Embassy in Lima were made public, the
leader of the M.S. P.. Alberto Rufz Eldredge was listed as
one of the recipients of the largest Cuban revolutionary
welfare payments.
The Social Progresistas were the product of Peruvian
higher education and social structure. Many were trained
as lawyers, doctors, and other professionals, but their
upward social mobility was thwarted by their lack of con-
nections With the Peruvian oligarchs. I.P.G.'s management
admitted that these radicals were intelligent and well-
educated; however, given their lack of contacts they would
never occupy a place in Peruvian society commensurate with
19their professional capabilities. Like the young reformers
of Accion Popular who had been inspired by Papal encyclicals,
the radical M.S. P. members wanted to reform Peru. However,
unlike the men of Accion Popular, most Social Progressists
did not have the family pedigree of a Fernando Belaunde, a
17
Peru, Camara de Diputados, Diario de los Debates. Tomo I.
Legislatura Ordinaria de I96O (Lima; Pnbli cfic~r5n Ofi-^ial
i960), pD. 210-213,
18
See th3 report on political expenditures. Luis Ricardo
Alonso Fernandez to Carlos Olivares Sanchez, Department
of Latin American Affairs, Havana, October ^, i960.
19
One I.P.C. executive stated that he knew several M.S. P.
leaders during their university days. Confidential inter-
view with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables, Florida, May 25, I971
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man whose ancestors had been prominent in Peruvian politics,
diplomacy and literature for several generations. The young
radicals formed the Movimiento Social Progresista in I955.
but it was not until the Cuban Revolution that they developed
their own pedigree, couched in the language of Cuban Marxism.
The Social Progressists despised the Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) vehemently, in the same man-
ner that Lenin had despised the socialist, gradualist and
other non-violent reformers. For them. APRA had become
"the defender of the oligarchy and the large foreign enter-
prises.
. .
the submissive servant of the interests of
20
imperialism." The M.S. P. had long despaired what its
members saw as the collusion of the wire services and the
newspapers with United States imperialism. When the Miro
Quesada's El Comercio. APRA's ancestral foe. launched the
1959 offensive against I.P.G., the M.S. P. quickly grasped
a golden opportunity. El Comercio was an institution of
the establishment but it shared common enemies with them.
Out of this mutual hatred grew an iinlikely alliance of one
of Peru's foremost oligarchs and one of its militant revolu-
tionary groups. However, the ultimate objectives of El Comerci o
and the Social Progressist Movem.ent were quite different.
20
Martinez, p. 135
.
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The first wanted to keep APRA out of power and I.P.C. out
of Peru, but basically it had no quarrel with the socio-
political structure of which it was a beneficiary. The Movi-
miento Social Progresista. on the other hand, merely wanted
to use the I.P.C. issue as a first step in what it hoped
would be the eventual destruction of Peru's entire socio-
political system.
The Military
The Social Progressists knew that in order to make a
real impact on Peruvian politics they needed more than 21
Comercio 's cooperation. Their credibility was greatly en-
hanced by the Cuban xRevolution; what had happened in Cuba
could happen in Peru. El Comercio's daily coverage of
their congressional speeches added an aura of respectability
to a group which five years earlier was dismissed as an
inconsequential fringe of the Peruvian left. The M.S. P.
now needed to convince Peru's ultimate power brokers, the
military, that it was their movement v^hich vias best tuned
to the temper of the times.
The opportunity to mingle with the military came \ihen the
M.S.P.'s leader. Alberto Huiz Eldredge vjas invited to speak
to the students and staff of the Center for Higher Military
Studies (C.A.S.M.). Rufz Eldredge used this opportunity
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to the fullest. He developed close relationships with several
C.A.E.M. officers-much to the dislike of I.P.C. management,
which had for years sponsored an annual course about the
petroleum industry at the Center. Eventually, an officer
friendly to I.P.C. attempted to alert the Armed Forces com-
mand of the close relationship between Social Progressist
activists and C.A.E.M. officers, only to be told that the
C.A.E.H. curriculum called for the officers to be exposed
to all types of philosophical orientations, including Marxism.
By the middle 1960's. even though I.P.C. continued to send
lecturers to the Center, the officers began to react more
and more belligerantly towards the company's general manager
and his staff, thus indicating that to a very large extent,
the Social Progressists were able to persuade C.A.E.M.
officers that their position was valid.
Several scholars have vrritten about the Peruvian military
in general and about the Center for Higher Military Studies
22
in particular. According to Luigi Einaudi and Carlos Astiz,
among others, C.A.E.M. 's curriculum during the late I950 '
s
Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables,
Florida. Hay 25, 1971.
22
See Luigi R. Einaudi. Peruvian Military Relations with the
Unit ed States (Santa Monica. Ca. : Hand Corporation. Jvjij,
I970TT Luigi Einaudi. Revolution from V/ithin? Military
Rule in Peru since I968 . See also: Carlos A. Astiz, ' i'he
Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite: Can They Develop
a New Developmental Model?" Paper delivered at the I969
Round Table of the International Political Science Association,
Rio de Janairo, Brazil, October 27-31. 19^9; Victor Villanueva,
El Militarismo en el Peru (Lima: Empresa Grafica T. Scheuch,
S.A.. 1962.
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and early i960 •
s evolved from the traditional and technical
fare to a far more comprehensive program including a heavy
dosage of social science. The officers ceased to concern
themselves exclusively with the specifications of weapons
systems or Prussian battle plans, and began to look into the
socio-economic problems of Peru. By I962, C.A.E.PU officers
predicted that in less than twenty years Peru's population
would be twenty-one million; seven million people would
have to be incorporated into a productive modern economy.
and at Peru's current rate of growth the goal would never
23be achieved.
It was at the Center for Higher Military Studies that
I.P.C. was found wanting as a corporate citizen of Peru.
This inquisitive body of officers--a truly new breed of
soldier, judged that I.P.C. 's role in the Peruvian economy
was damaging to the national interest. It was from this
foruu that radicals such as Ruiz Eldredge, Hontesinos, and
Benavides Gorrea persuaded the Army that I.P.C. owed Peru
large amounts of money, and that the national honor demanded
not only the expropriation of the company but its complete
humiliation. In other words, a mutual agreement between the
government and the company for even a token compensation was
23
Villanueva, p. I76.
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out of the question for the radical anti-I.P.c. forces;
the company had to be unceremoniously routed from Peru.
International Petroleum lost its cause in spite of
the fact that for years it had courted the favor of the Armed
Forces. In 19^6. the company gave the Air Force a sub-
stantial amount of land in La 3rea y PariKas for the con-
struction of the air base
-El Pato. " In 195^]-, I.p.c. gave
a buildins to the Air Force for use housing officers, and
it also gave houses to the Army. In this and in every case
where I.P.C. ceded land to the Armed Forces or the government,
it required the receivers to legally acknowledge its claims
to the subsoil even ^onder the land or property ceded.
I.P.C. supplied its neighboring military installations with
electricity and water. How could the- military overlook the
company's generous efforts and side with the radicals?
The answer to this question must be sought in the
military's hatred for APRA. On July 7. I932, the Apristas
carried out a revolt in the city of Trujillo. After a bloody
assault on the garrison of that city, they captured the
garrison and about sixty military officers and enlisted men.
The Apristas held the city during that day. but by night
it became apparent that the governraent forces vrould soon
2k
i^Ioticias de Petr6leo, XIII, No. II6 (April, i960).
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reclaim the garrison. The Aprista leaders fled before the
government troops launched their massive attack, but not
before they ordered the death of the officers they captured
earlier in the day. The Aprista mob even reportedly mutilated
some of the officers's corpses. When the Army recaptured
Trujillo, the officers in charge summarily executed any man
suspected of having participated in the uprising. Hence-
forth, the Army commemorated July 7 every year as the day
of the Trujillo massacre; the military held APRA responsible.
Although some Army officers were working with APRA during
the 1932 uprising, and some others have secretly worked with
that party since the massacre, the Army as a whole kept
alive an undying hatred for the Aprista party. It made a
well known commitment to the principle that APRA would never
win the presidency of Peru.
Alianza Popular Hevolucionaria Americana
The Trujillo massacre did not entirely explain the
Army's antagonism for APRA. As the military became more
involved in socio-economic engineering, and offered more
radical proposals to deal with national problems, APRA moved
in the opposite direction. According to Luigi Einaudi,
25
Fredrick E. Pike. The Modern History of Peru (New York:
Praeger, I967). pp. 26^-266.
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APP^''^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^i^S Started.
rignr, the two have moved tox«rard andperhaps passed each other in oppositedirections until today many military
officers may be more favorable toward
social innovation than the i\t)rista
leadership, which lives increasinglyin the past.^. ^
26
After the unsuccessful coup of 19^8 and the long period
of repression din-ing the Ochenio of Odria, APHA acquired
legal recognition only by throwing their support to one of
Peru's most traditional leaders, Hanuel Frado. During the
Prado administration. AFRA joined in what became known as
the convivencia
.
a political association which included APHA
and such notable representatives of the Peruvian establishment
27
as Pedro Beltran. In the words of former British Ambassador
to Peru, Sir Robert Harett,
At long last, and largely thani^s
to Hanuel Prado, the Aprista lion
and the Establishment lamb lay
down together.
2o
Later, in I962. APRA made a political deal with its former
enemy General Manuel Odria. These alliances clearly illus-
trated iiPRA's realization that it vras not longer Peru's only
popular mass party, but had instead become one party among
26, .
.Luigi i:.inaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United
States
, p. 15.
'
Carlos Astiz, Pressi;ire Grou:?s and Power Elites in. Peruvian
Politics (Ithaca, N.I. : Cornell University Press. 196977"
pp. 99-100; Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in
Contemporary Peru (New York: Praeger, I970), p. I85.
28
Sir Robert Marett, Peru (New York: Praeger, I969), p. I78.
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many. Haya de la Torre's willingness to deal with the
traditional political leadership indicated that the Apristas
and the Army indeed crossed each other's paths on the political
spectrum sometime during the late 1950 's, and by the early
1960's the military had come to look upon AFRA as part of
the inept establish^Tient which, in their view, was keeping
Peru stagnant. This conception had some validity, considering
APRA's turnabout on the petroleum issue. In I931, an Aprista
leader T^rrote denouncing "imperialism" and partially defined
it thus:
Imperialist is the Standard Oil Company
(yankee company) which in the United
States pays ^ and 5 dollars to its workers
for a day of work of 7 or 8 hours, while
in Peru it pays two soles and 53 cents
for a work day of 10 or 8 hours.
According to the Aprista leadership, the answer to this imper-
ialism was nationalization."^^ Hovrever. by 19^6 APRA changed
its position on the petroleum question. Hanuel Seoane.
Eaja de la Torre's second in command, delivered a speech
pointing out that unlike countries such as Argentina, Peru
produced more petroleum than it consumed, and thus it needed
the exporting and technical expertise 7J-hich foreign capital
provided. APHA's solution to the oil problem vras to increase
29
Luis E. iieysen, El ABC de la Peruanizacion (Lima:
Editorial APRA, 193177 p. 1^.
30
Ibid., p. 17.
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Peru's share of the petroleum industry's profits. As the
party's position developed over the years, several questions
were crucial. if Peru expropriated La Brea y Parinas. would
Standard Oil allow Peruvian oil to enter the international
markets? Where could Peru get the tankers to transport it
oil if it could be sold? As an alternative to an unfeasible
nationalization. A?RA preferred their "most practical program,'
to force I.P.C. to pay higher wages and higher taxes. The
resulting revenues would be used to create other industries.
The problem with APRA
• s reasoning was that as time went on
it became less and less valid. Domestic consumption in Peru
increased astronomically while exports dropped. In I962
Peru became a net importer of oil. APHA forgot the reasons
for it 19^6 position and stuck to its conclusions. Sir Robert
I'larett observed that: "Among liberals in the U.S.A., the
conviction grew that APRA represented the true forces of
democracy in a country which for too long had groaned under
33the heel of a rich oligarchy. " Perhaps the Apristas pre-
ferred to safeguard these North American sympathies by
keeping their favorable attitude towards the American oil
company even in the face of changes which rendered their
31Manuel Seoane, Gredito Externo v justicia Social --Un discurso
polenico (Lima: iiditorial Atahualpa, 194-67^ p. 54-.
32Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista
Movement (New York: Octagon Books, I966), p. 78.
-^-^Marett, p. I68
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previous reasoning obsolete.
APRA's support in Congress for Beltran's I.P.c. programs
led the Peruvian military to conclude that indeed I.P.G.
and APRA were closely tied. Therefore, the Army's aversion
for APPJi was automatically translated into an aversion for
International Petroleum Company. This dislike was then
reinforced by the military's traditional fear that foreigners
controlled their fuel supply. By allowing I.P.G. to control
the production and distribution of oil in Peru, they felt
that the destiny of their country vias too much in the hands
of foreigners—this x^as a rather traditional view of defense
policy.
Pedro BeItfan and La. Prensa
Another major participant in the controversy over
La Brea y Parinas v:as Pedro Beltran—editor and owner of
La Prensa and a very wealthy man with many commercial and
agricultural interests. Beltran was described by an I.P.C.
manager as Wall Street's ideal of the South American busi-
nessman, newspaperman, and statesman, and he was proud of
the esteem in which American businessmen and government
officials held him. La Prensa regularly reported his many
Luigi Einaudi, Oral Presentation at the 67th iinnual Con-
vention, American Political Science Association, Chicago,
Illinois, September 7, 1971« (Panel: Comparative Military
Regimes in Developing Societies).
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commendations from the United States. An article in the
February I962 issue of Fortune magazine hailed Pedro Beltran
as the Peruvian statesman who could very well become his
country's next president. La Prensa greeted the Forti:une
article with a front page headline. "Beltran an exceptional
statesman considers Fortune magazine. "^^ Americans were
generally impressed with the results achieved by the Beltran
cabinet. Peru's gross national product grew to a annual
rate, and the country's foreign exchange reserves were re-
plenished. A United States commercial mission which
visited Peru in late i960 found that country much improved
in stability, and ruled that Peru's investment climate vjas
most favorable for U.S. capital.
^"^
Originally. La Prensa was strongly antagonistic to
APPiA. for the 19^7 assassination of La Prensa ' s editor
Francisco Grana Garland was linked to that party. VJhen Pedro
Beltian succeded Grana Garland as editor, he reportedly
swore eternal hatred for APRA on GraKa Garland's grave.
However, by the late 1950's Beltran 's animosity for APRA
vjas wearing thin. Like many other Peruvians with political
ambitions. Beltran knew that it would be difficult to A'overn
3 ^
Freiisa
.
January 29, I962, p. 1.
^^Pike. p. 298.
37
"Estabilidad en el Peru," la Prensa
,
January 7. I962. p. l^l-.
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Peru Without the co-operation or at least the acquiesence
Of AFRA. Don Luis Miro Quesada. Beltran's competitor, seldom
missed a chance to reproach this accomodation with the
Apristas. and as early as February I958 he editorially
condemned Beltran for shaming the memory of Grana Garland
by associating La Prensa with the APRA-Prado coalition.
As the 1962 elections approached, Beltran began to
maneuver for his own presidential nomination. He resigned
from the Cabinet, but it soon became apparent that he did
not have the popular support he needed, even if Fortune
and the U.S. Department of Commerce endorsed his fiscal
accomplishments. He withdrew from the presidential race,
and by early I962 it was clear that he would support the
Aprista leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre for the office
of president. La Prensa ' s support for Haya de la Torre
took two forms; first, the large front page headlines
depicted Haya de la Torre as the triumphant leader making
the final bid for the long-denied presidency. APRA supported
Prado in I956 because of his promise to legalize the party.
The Apristas regarded Prado as a transitional ruler who would
make it possible for Haya de la Torre to assume the leader-
ship of Peru in I962. But one institution blocking APRA's
-^^"Nueva maniobra del organo de los exportadores , " El Comercio
,
February 2, 1958, p. 2.
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probable success was the Army. Would the Army use its
veto power in I962 as it had done before in order to dash
Haya de la Torre's presidential ambitions?
Clearly, the Apristas hoped that the Army would acquiese.
After all. APRA had long ago renounced its revolutionary tactics
The party had ceased to advocate socialism in any meaningful
form, and it had in general become a political grouping
acceptable to the Peruvian oligarchy. Even Washington looked
with favor on Haya de la Torre; his support for I.P.C. did
not go unnoticed. Beltran called on his Army friends to
assure the country that Haya de la Torre would be an accept-
able president of Peru. On January 5, I962, General Alejandro
Cuadra Rabinez, Beltran 's Minister of War. declared that the
Armed Forces would not only abide by the results of the
39elections, but would in fact guarantee their "purity."
Here was La Prensa ' s second task—to publicize positive
commitments to free elections, elections which vrould determine
the next president of Peru. Although Cuadra Rabinez 's position
within the Armed Forces was not a strong one, on January 12
he again declared that "whoever the People elect will occupy
^0
the chair." To further press this point of view. La Prensa
39
"Las Fuerzas Armadas Garantizaran Sugragio," la Prensa.
January 6, I962 , p. 2.
"Qui en Elija el Pueblo ocupara la Silla—Fuerzas Armadas
Garantizan Pureza del Proceso Electoral, " La. Prensa
,
January 13, I962, p. 2.
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carried an article by another general, arguing that the
Armed Forces were "essentially obedient and hence cannot
engage in political deliberation."'^'^
The Oligarchy
During most of the 19th century. Peru, like other Latin
American nations, was dominated by an oligarchy composed
of the Roman Catholic Church, the Armed Forces and the
landed elite. land was then the trademark of wealth and
high social status. As Peru became incorporated into the
world markets, the resulting specialized demand for parti-
cular products made certain types of land more valuable
than others. Since the demand was for sugar and cotton,
large plantations along Peru's coastal strip were developed
to meet that demand. This agricultural emphasis had an
impact on the nature of the Peruvian oligarchy. The aristo-
crats of the sierra, the gamonales
, retained their vast
holdings—their self-sufficient haciendas; however, they
lost much of their power and influence to the prominent
coastal families. This coastal oligarchy differed from the
sierra oligarchy because they were oriented to exports.
It was their crops which generated most of Peru's foreign
^
General Pedro A. Kerida. "Ortodoxia Institucional del
Ejercito," La Prensa , January 18, I962, p. 8.
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exchange, and consequently they tended to dominate the import
market as well. As a direct result of their strength in
the foreign trade of the country, the landed coastal oligarchy
dominated the credit institutions of Peru. Through their
control of the banks, they controlled most of Peru's commer-
cial and industrial ventures. French scholar Francois Bourri-
caud wrote
:
There is ... a Peruvian oligarchy,
in the sense of a nucleus of TDowerful
families who control the nation's
wealth. Its members are not mere con-
sumers, and while they may not them-
selves be producers or organize pro-
duction, they determine its scope and
direction. Is this plutocracy a
governing class? The question is hard
to answer. The povxer of a governing
class is always difficult to define;
the fact that such a class exists, hovr-
ever manifestly, does not mean that it
governs everything. And in Peru, the
problem of measuring the extent of the
oligarchy's power is especially baffling.
The "oligarchy" which Beltfan and Prado represented
was an entity difficult to categorize, and this difficulty
stemmed from the fact that the oligarchy closely guarded
its affairs. Since many Peruvian businesses functioned
an family-owned enterprises rather than publically-owned
corporations, disclosures of ownership and operations were
far less prevalent than those in the United States. It vxas
^
Bourricaud. p. ^8.
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banking system of Peru which many Peruvians, including the
military, regarded as one of the chief culprits of the in-
equitable social structure. The Social Progressist Movement
wanted to reform the credit system so that it would be
available to the population at large and not only to a few
privileged elements of Peruvian society. The large Peruvian
banks were used as holding companies (companies which own
other businesses) for the oligarchy or for foreign business
interests. For instance, the Banco Internacional was in fact
owned by the Bunge Born firm, an agricultural conglomerate
based in Argentina, but also operating in Peru. This bank
accepted the public's money, but it lent money almost exclu-
sively to Bunge Born ventures.
The Prado family controlled not only the presidency
through Manuel Prado. but it also controlled a vast financial
empire through the Banco Popular. The lending policy of
this bank was to give funds for a venture only if the bank
got a substantial share of the business. If the venture
failed and the loan was defaulted, the bank simply took
over; if the business suceeded. the Banco Popular had a
share in the success. The Prado family bank ovmed the news-
paper La Cronica
.
and a radio station of the same name; thoy
55Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida, May 2?, 1971.
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also had a 20% interest in A.P.S.A.. the Peruvian airlines.''''
While the Peruvian oligarchy was not homogeneous on an
economic or political level, it was quite homogeneous and
cohesive on a social level. Therefore such institutions .
as the Jockey Club and more importantly, the Club Nacional
were significant. Membership lists for these groups are
secret. However. Phillip Gilette. a sociologist at the
University of California. Los Angeles, obtained Club Nacional
membership lists going back to the 19th century. He found
that during the 20th century the proportion of high political
office holders belonging to the Club Nacional progressively
declined, except dui^ing the Frado administration, when tv-is
trend was temporarily reversed. This temporary upswing
in the political fortunes of the oligarchy perhaps caused
a kind of over-confidence. The oligarchy was now brave
enough to carry out a public internal struggle over the
petroleum problem. Peru's military officers, especially
those steeped in social science at C.A.S.M., probably
perceived this increase in oligarchical pov;er as a direct
threat to the pre-eminent role of the military, with its
middle class and rural background.
mi r.r
Ibid.
Interview vxith Phillip Gilette, V/ashington, D. C.
,
Hay 18, I97I
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The Presidential Campaign of I962
Seven candidates sought the office of president in the
1962 election campaign in Peru, but only four were running
in earnest, and only three had realistic possibilities of
Winning the election. General Odrfa
' s followers, who had
backed Hernando LaValle in I956. now supported the general
himself—under the banner of the Union Nacional Odriista
(U.N.O.). Haya de la Torre once more was the standard bearer
of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, and Fernando
Belaunde Terry was the candidate of Acci6n Popular. The
fourth candidate was Hectro Cornejo Chavez, the leader of
the Christian Democratic Party, a political grouping which
closely paralleled Accion Popular in its ideology. The
Christian Democrats appeals to the same young, reformist
Catholic constituency that Accion Popular attracted. ' How-
ever. Fernando Belaunde Terry was a far more charismatic
candidate than Cornejo Chavez, and therefore Accion Popular
got the bulk of the votes of this constituency.
While Cuadra Rabinez and other senior officers had
attempted to commit the Army to support vjhomever won the
election of I962, the younger officers were definitely un-
happy with the possibility of eithor Haya de la Torre or
or even General Odria assuming the presidency. Their
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favorite candidate was Belaunde. The olisarchy divided
its sympathies amons Odrfa. Belaunde, and Haya de la Torre.
However. Beltran and the very large financial interests
With which he was associated decided to support Haya de la
Torre. This group was impressed by APRA
' s "good" behavior
during the Prado administration, and they were now willing
to let APRA have a try at the presidency.
The coming of the election offered a breathing spell
for International Petroleum Company. In a report covering
1962, the American embassy staff in Lima commented:
The Government of Peru was occupied
with politics during the first half
of 1962 so that the La Brea-Parifias
controversy remained in the backn:round.
Six of the presidential candidates
running for office. . . expressed them-
selves as being in favor of immediate
nationalization of the la. Brea-Parinas
and Lobitos concessions and one candi-
date identified himself with progressive
nationalization.
V/hile the single candidate was not identified in the re-
port, there was little doubt to his identity. Belaunde
and Come jo Chavez were both committed to nationalization
in principle. The minor candidates were all radical leftists.
I'iarett. p. 185; Astiz, "The Peruvian Armed Forces as a
Political 21ite." p. 20.
'U.S., Department of State, Supplement to Annual Petroleum
Report— 1962—Peru
.
U.S. Departm.ent of State Document .'Jo.
A-717, April 10, 1963. p. 1.
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The only traditional conservative, General Odrfa vaguely
pledged his party to:
Defend the national resources, whilepromoting their exploitation in ac-
cordance With the Constitution andLaws of the nation; demanding theimmediate and definitive solution
the problem of La Brea y Parinas.
to
^8
Victor Raul Kaya de la Torre was the only candidate committed
to "progressive nationalization." or "covert adaptation"
as the enemies of I.P.C. preferred to call it-the alternative
which Pedro Beltran and APRA had supported since I961.
While I.P.C. attempted to project a low profile during
the election, its sympathies for Haya de la Torre could hardly
be concealed. Early in the campaign, the Aprista leader
traveled to Talara, where I.P.C. personnel gave him a
tumultuous reception. Speaking to what was reported to be
the greatest crowd ever assembled in Talara, Haya de la Torre
once more pledged his support to "progressive nationalization,"
a statement which won him warm support from the I.P.C. workers.
After the speeches, the Aprista leader was treated to dinner
at the iLsso Club.
Of the minor candidates for election in I962, only one
was running almost exclusively on the petroleum issue. That
candidate i-as Cesar Pando, a retired general and the head
ITHSee the official statement of the Union Nacional Odriista in
rianuel del Elector (Lima: J. Hejia Baca, 1962), p. 2kl
"Entusiasta Recepcion Tuvo Haya en Talara," La Prensa,
January 28, I962, p. 2.
200
Of the Front for the Defense of Petroleum. The other radical
candidates were Luciano Castillo, of the ninlscule Socialist
Party, and Alberto Ru£z Eldredge. head of the Movimiento
Social Progresista. The elections were held as scheduled
on June 10, and the vote counting process began immediately.
However, vote counting took weeks in Peru, and the candidates
were condemned to a long wait. There x.as usually a considerable
amount of speculation between the election and the announcement
of the results. The Lima papers published a daily count
of the votes processed up to that point, and tension built
up as time passed. For reasons only known to him. Fernando
Belaunde Terry chose to claim victory on the basis of the
votes counted during the first few days. El Gomerclo, which
had favored his candidacy, echoed Belaunde 's enthusiasm.
However, as time went on. it became increasingly clear that
Belaunde would not receive the minimum one third of the vote
to get the presidency. Claims of victory gave way to ac-
cusations of fraud in the pages of El Comercio
, and soon the
the Armed Forces began an investigation.
When the results of the election were finally announced,
Eaya. de la Torre had the highest number of votes (557.047),
closely followed by Belaunde (5^^.180) and Odria (480,798).
The other candidates received between nine and fifty thousand
votes apiece. Cesar Pando ran fifth, ahead of Castillo and
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Rufz Eldredse. who came in last.^° m order to win the
election a candidate had to have at least one third of the
vote, and since the closest candidate missed the mark by
a fraction of a percentage point (Haya de la Torre received
33.0;^ of the vote), it was clear that the contest would have
to be decided by the Peruvian Congress. In the Congressional
elections. AmA won lUf seats out of a total 21^1, just short
of an absolute majority, but with a very definite edge over
the runjier-up parties. Furthermore, since the Odriistas
were far more compatible with Haya de la Torre than with
Belaunde. it seemed as if the APRA leader's victory was a
51foregone conclusion.
With Haya de la Torre on the brink of achieving the
presidency, the Belaundistas and El Gonercio launched a
shrill fusillade of accusations, all the time appealing to
the Army to correct what they claimed was an Aprista fraud.
Realizing that the Army would not stand for the election
of Haya de la Torre, the Apristas compromised. They agreed
to support their former enemy. General Odria, for a second
terms, with the understanding that they would have an even
50
,
oee "Cuadro del riesultado I'inal con las Cifras Oficiales
del J.N.E. de I962," Hunberto Uglotti Dansay, Las Eleccione;
de 1963 ^ la Eleccion del 62 (Lima; n.p. , I963) . p. 181.
^""Marett, pp. 185-186.
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larser role in the new administration than they had had with
Prado. Their compromise came too late, for the Army had
already set up a coup d'etat. In the early hours of the
morning of July 18. I962. a mere ten days before the change
of governments, a crack unit of Peruvian Rangers surrounded
and then captured the Presidential Palace and placed Manuel
Prado under arrest. El Comercio probably had advance notice
of the coup, for its photographers were there as a tank
crashed through the iron gates of the Executive mansion.
That very day the Lima newspaper gave profuse coverage to
what must have been Peru's best photographed military coup.^^
During the next few hours, and in front of the cameras of
El Comercio reporters, an officer asked the leaders of
the Peruvian Congress to clear the congressional building.
The military's announced intention in carrying out
the coup vjas to annul the results of the I962 election.
They promised, as the military usually does on such occasions
in Latin American countries, new "clean" elections. But,
unlike previous coups in Peru, the Armed Forces did not in-
stall a strong man in power. Instead, the officers insisted
on calling their take-over an "institutional '• coup, meaning
that no dingle man was responsible—the military as a whole
52
El Comercio
,
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.
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engineered the governmental talce-over. A junta was estab-
lished to rule Peru in the interim, with members of all
three military services participating. The Junta insist,
on maintaining collective leadership, and when Junta chair.
General Hi cardo Perez Godoy showed caudillistic tendencies. h<
was promptly dismissed and substituted by General Nicolas
Lindley. The J.onta surprised the country when it announced
that it would not merely preside over a new electoral process,
but intended also to work towards solving Peru's most urgent
problems in the interim. This task fell to the colonels
and majors at the Center for Higher Military Studies (C.A.E.H.).
who then searched their files for answers to Peru's dilemmas.
The Junta proceeded to create a Planning Institute,
given the task of formulating a comprehensive plan for national
development over a period of several years. This institute
eventually produced a national plan of economic and social
development to span the time from I962 to 1971."^^ The Junta
also created a Housing Bank (Banco de la Vivienda)
.
with the
purpose of b7/-passing the oligarchically-controllcd credit
institutions in order to provide low interest loans to would-
be hom.e owners. The generals started several "oilot land
reform projects; their most well-known effort was in the
53i^stiz, "The Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite." p^. 24-
54
Banco Central de Reserva del Peru. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
Econor.ico ^ Social del Peru . I962 -I971 (Lima: Banco Central. 19^
^o^
Convecion valley, where peasants appropriated lands 11-
legally. The junta even declared I963 as Literacy Year, and
made plans for a massive effort to teach the Peruvian illi-
terates how to read and write. There was talk of annulling
the concessions of La Brea y Parinas, a move apparently ad-
vocated by General Bossio. the junta government's minister
most directly associated with the Center for Higher Military
Studies.
However, the junta's reformist zeal lasted only from
July to December I962. In early I963. the government took
a more moderate course—many of its radical projects were
forgotten, and the military leaders accepted Prensa '
s
pressing argument that there was a grave danger of a communis,
tic take-over by the labor unions and peasant movements. •
During the first week of I963, some 2,000 persons were
arrested in .Peru; many of them were leftist leaders.
General Bossio was apparently forced to resign by his follovj
officers as early as October I962, and with him went any
hopes which the radicals might have entertained concerning
the nationalization of International Petroleum Comapny.
V/ith Bossio out of the way and the junta engaging in anti-
communist campaigns, the United St'ites vjas quick to warm up
^^Pike, pp. 301-302; ^stiz, "The Peruvian Armed Forces as a
Political Elite," p. 26.
56
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diplomatic relations which had been cool since the coup.^^
I.P.C. was relieved by the More concllliatory attitude on
the part of the military. Before the Junta handed over the
reins of government to a civilian president, the company
made a substantial purchase of eovernBent bonds-bonds which
were not specifically issued for I.P.C. but which were de-
finitely a way^for private enterpreneurs to show their support
for the junta.
Even though the military junta mellowed in terms of
many of its original plans, it did pursue one of its goals
to the very end. The military supported the election of
Fernando Belaunde Terry. Belaunde was the kind of reformer
x^hom the C.A.E.H. officers could identify mth— he seemed
to have the vision and the charisma to make major changes
in Peruvian society. The question became how to assure
Belaunde 's victory.
With many of the radicals out of the picture, the
Armed Forces believed that Belaunde would easily catch the
votes which had been cast for them in the I962 election.
Just to be on the safe side, Belaunde reached an agreement
with the Christian Democrats. In exchange for some Gon-
gressiona] -eats in safe districts, the Christian Democrat
r
57 Ibid.
, pp. 26-29.
^^Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables,
Florida, May 25, I97I.
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backed his candidacy.
'Jhen fh^y wn t e election was over. Belaunde
had received 39. 0.^ of the vote. Haya de la Torre got J^.oi
and Odrfa got 25.5,?. Peru's military junta handed the reins
Of power to Fernando Belaunde Terry on July 28. 1963. m
What can only be described as an atmosphere of general
euphoria over what appeared to be a new age m Peruvian
politics.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL PETR0LELJT4 GOHPANY AND
BELAO-NDE FACE EACH OTHER: THE FIRST ROUl^D
Neither in the campalsn of I962 not in that of 1963
did I^ Brea y Parinas figure as a major issue. Most of
the political parties avoided the thorny question in their
formal platforms. Candidate Belaunde did promise that he
would solve the problem, but he did not specify how he would
so about doing so. Fernando Bela.:bde Terry was inaugurated
as President of Peru on July 28. I963. in the midst of
general euphoria. He had the support of many Peruvians,
including the Armed Forces and El Comercio
. During his
inaugural address. Belaunde promised to settle the La Brea
y Parinas controversy within ninety days. Soon after he
was installed in office, negotiations between Peru's
president and the management of International Petroleum
Company began.
All during the month of August and well into October
1963, I.P.C. and the government negotiated. I.P.C. was
willing to exchange its rights over the subsoil of I^ Brea
y Parinas for a contract to operate that property for a
period of at least two or three decades, a plan which com-
pany management had advocated since the early 1950' s.
According to the company, considerable progress towards
"adaptation" was made during this period. However, on
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October 17. I963 the government ca.e up with a proposal which
surprised the company. That proposal included an exchange
Of I.P.C.-s property rights for a twenty year operation
contract, but it also set forth a "tax debt" payment of
fifty million dollars over a five year period, and a tax
regimen which according to the company would have exceeded
100;^^ of the profits.
While Belaunde and his party. Accion Popular, had al-
ways maintained a strongly nationalistic position on the
I.P.C. issue, their campaign rhetoric had probably gone far
beyond what they were actually willing to do with the large
American company. In i960 Belaunde had given qualified
support to Pedro Beltran's "progressive nationalization"
plan, but Alfonso Hontesinos's threat to split the party
had forced Accion Popular leadership to introduce a nation-
alization bill in the Peruvian congress. However, by I963,
Montesinos was out of the party, and in fact out of politics,
and Benavides Gorrea. another vocal I.P.C. critic, had also
affected a tactful withdrawal from politics. Even the Social
Progressists had done very poorly in the I962 and I963 elec-
tions. Despite his relative freedom from pressures of the
"^The La Brea y Parinas Controversy
.
Vol. I (International
Petroleum Company, i^ebruary, I909), pp. 7-8.
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extreme left. Belaunde adopted a
-'get tough', policy with
International Petroleum Company.
Several reasons can be given for the President's strong
position. Of course. El Comeroio was as committed as ever
to I.P.C. speedy demise, and Belaunde was quite aware of
the power of that newspaper. In fact, after his presidential
inauguration. Belaunde noted that Luis Hiro Quesada had
not dropped by to congratulate him as many of his supporters
had done. He decided to visit Miro Quesada at his office
at El Comeroio headquarters, and a time was prearranged for
the presidential visit. As Belaunde entered the building
which houses the newspaper, he was received in several
lobbies by progressively more prominent members of the rlir6
Quesada family. Finally he was escorted to a great stair-
case, and at the top stood Don Luis himself. The patriarch
of the family descended but a few steps to meet the presi-
dent of Peru; this reception was widely interpreted as a
snub in Lima circles. The incident well illustrated the
power of the Miro Quesadas, and the willingness of even the
president of the "supremo gobierno" to humble himself before
2the pov7er of this one newspaper. With La Prensa allied with
APRA and the Union Nacional Odriista (U.N.O.), rielaiinde
2This incident was related by I.P.C. 's former general manager
in Peru, Fernando_Espinosa, during an interview at his
residence in Key Biscayne, Florida, May 28, 1971.
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feared losing the support of El Comercio. a consideration
which made a compromise with I.P.C. very difficult.
Another factor which appeared to have strengthened the
hand Of Belaunde was the election of John Kennedy as Presi-
dent of the United States. Kennedy had been in the White
House Since I961. but Peruvians had been busy with internal
politics and there had been no major confrontations with
I.P.C. since the Democratic administration had taken over
in the United States. Peruvians knew enough about .American
politics to discern that the Democratic Party was not nearly
as sympathetic to big business as the Republican Party. They
were well aware of the fact that Presidents Franklin Roosevelt
and Harry Truman had had several confrontations with big
business, and they knew of Kennedy's confrontation vrith
the steel industry. Peruvian leaders watched intently how
the young American president handled the situation concerning
the unilateral abrogation of certain contracts between the
Argentine government and several American oil companies,
and they concluded that without a doubt, Kennedy would not
stand behind Standard Oil of Mex^ Jersey in a confrontation
3between its subsidiary, I.P.C. and the government of Peru.
3
-^Robert Kennedy, brother of the president, is reported to
have said: "You Peruvians want to nationalize La Brea y
Parinas. V/ell, do it. Nothing is going to happen." For
Peruvian opinions on the Kennedy administration, see:
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, la Historla Secreta del Petroleo
(Lima: Editorial Grafica labor, I966), pp. 153-168.
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Fernando Belaunde. a relatively young Catholic reformer,
probably derived sone comfort from knowing that his counter-
part in Washington was. lilce
. himself
. a young Catholic presi-
dent. This feeling was reinforced when Kennedy ordered
Teodoro Moscoso. the Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress,
to fly to Lima immediately after Belaunde >s inauguration with
an offer of substantial American aid. There are differing
accounts of Hoscoso's aid mission. According to Richard
Goodwin, announcement of the aid grant was withheld pending
a compromise between the Peruvian government and I.P.C. so
that Belaunde could then use the announcement of American
aid to blijint any opposition to the compromise over Brea v
Parinas. The company's management suspected that iioscoso
was annoyed by Belaunde 's suggestion that the announcement
of aid be used in such a manner.^ In any case, Belaunde
was assured of American aid regardless of the outcom.e of the
dispute with International Petroleum, provided of course
that no outright confiscation without compensation took place.
In conversations between Moscoso and Belaunde, the American
envoy made it clear that the I962 coup had delayed American
aid, but now that the country was bad: on a ccnstitutioiial
IT
Richard h. Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," The New Yorker
(Ilay 17, 1969), p. 58.
^Interview with Fernando Sspinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
May 28, I97I.
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course, more aid would be forthcoming/
The Alliance for Progress itself had a very dramatic
effect on both I.P.C.
-s antagonists as well as on its Peru-
vian allies. The development plan set forth by the Planning
Institute in I962 included a provision that future foreign
investment in Peru would change from private corporate
sources to United States government aid through the Alliance
for Progress. Hence, there would be no need to be parti-
cularly careful with foreign capital as such, since the
incoming capital would be public rather than private.
In reaction to this attitude. I.P.C.'s Peruvian allies
began to resent very deeply what they saw as Kennedy's policy
of promoting reform in latin America through the Alliance
for Progress and at the expense of private enterprise. Peru's
oligarchs had long ago recognized the United States as an
international ally in the defense of property rights. They
sided vrith I.P.C. on many occasions, probably reasoning that
if I.P.C. could be deprived of its property, there v/as no
guarantee that their property would not be eventually taken
as well. The Peruvian oligarchy observed an inconsistancy
in the United States position. Many American citizens
^
"Golbe del Ano Pasado Retraso A^^uda de E.U Lo Revela
Teodoro Hoscoso, " La Prensa
,
August 25, I963. p. 1;
"HoscoGo Prometio iias Ayuda. al Peru—Hablo 3 horas con
Belaunde," La Prensa
,
August 27, I963, p. 1.
n
'Banco entral de Reserva del Peru, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
Economico 2 Social del Peru, I962 -I971 (Lima: oanco Central,
1962), p. 37.
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Vigorously protested any attempts to tamper with the pro-
perty of American companies abroad, while at the same time
approving various agrarian reform schemes which included the
confiscation of Peruvian lands long held by families of the
oligarchy. In an article which accused the Kennedy admin-
istration of promoting two kinds of property. American and
Peruvian, with the latter wide open for confiscation. Enrique
Chirinos Soto, an important Aprista writer for 1b, Prensa
noted
:
If the Alliance for Progress V7ere aninvitation to confiscations and socialism,
... it could not be at the same time,
a carefully delineated invitation so as to
exclude American investments from the
confiscatory free-for-all.
The American investors will have to
go also into the pot of confiscations.
. .
8
This belief that the United States government was interested
only in protecting American property while sacrificing
Peruvian private property on the altar of reform was rein- '
forced by the fact that throughout I963. a very limited number
of peasants organized and appropriated private haciendas
located in the La Convencion Valley. The Peruvian government
did not prove very effective in dealing with this problem,
and the liberal American press reported these invasions
"S
'
Enrique Chirinos Soto, "Kennedy y el Hi jo Prodigo, " la
Prensa
. November 10, I963, p. 14.
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in a very favorable light. If Washington was willing to
promote reform at their expense, the Peruvian oligarchy
could Play the same game. Why not reform Peru at the expense
of Standard Oil of New Jersey?
What the Peruvian oligarchy could not see was that
Kennedy himself was wavering in the defense of American
capital in Peru. They interpreted the Alliance for Pro-
gress as a betrayal, and promptly withdrew whatever support
they had given previously to I.P.C. Belaunde decided to
take full advantage of the situation; he pressed the com-
pany to secure concessions to the very end. As the deadline
he had set for himself approached with the company not yielding
substantially. Belaunde prepared a bill to send to Congress
on the appointed day. On October 28, I963, three months
after his inauguration as president, Belaunde sent a pro-
posal- outlining U^o alternative courses of action. The
President wanted Congress to authorize him either to impose
his solution on I.P.C. in the form he had made knovm to
the company on October 1?, or else to transfer la. Brea y
Farinas to Peru's Empresa Petrolera Fiscal (E.P.F.).
Belaun.de
'
s Droposal was awkward ^n qq>ooc» ^4-
solved nothing; it merely served notice on the company that
9" ~" ^The I^ Brea ^ Parinks Controversy , Vol. I, Exhibit 6.
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it would have to accept the government's terms or face con-
fiscation. Belaunde probably introduced this measure to save
face, for October 28 was his deadline to solve the la Brea
y Parims dispute and some dramatic announcement had to be
made on the appointed day.
It was at that point that International Petroleum
Company began to fight back energetically. Up to then.
I.P.G. kept scrupulous discretion on the negotiations with
Belaunde. Even when the Peruvian government leaked infor-
mation, thus arousing the curiousity of the Lima press, the
company limited itself to declaring that negotiations were
under way but that a solution was yet to be found. However,
upon the introduction of the government's bill m the Peruvian
Senate on October 28. I.P.C. issued a strongly worded press
release stating that Belaunde's proposal amounted to "economic
confiscation." I.P.C. 's president. M.M. Brisco issued a
simultaneous statement in New York indicating that I.P.C.
had for the first time heard from the Peruvian government
that the company had a "debt" for back taxes. He denied the
debt and charged the Peruvian executive with promoting
"economic confiscation" of I.P.C. 's operations in Peru. In
what must be considered a significant diplomatic blunder.
Brisco suggested that the Peruvian Congress would not approve
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the Belaunde's proposal."'''^
President Belaunde was so angered by I.P.c.'s press
release and by Brisco's New York statement that he "admon-
ished" I.P.c.'s general manager Loren Smith. The government
then issued an official communique saying that Smith had
been officially rebuked for issuing a press release which
contained "false and tendencious affirmations" which the
government naturally denied. The communique also noted
that Smith was reprimanded for trying to create Impressions
favorable to the company abroad by lying about the nature
of the Peruvian government's bill.
The management of International Petroleum Company
remained undaunted by Belaunde's reprimand, and for the
following day the company took a full page ad in nearly
all of Lima's newspapers (with the exception of El Comerclo )
to present its point of view. Under a large title reading,
"The Executive's bill implies Confiscation," the company
said in part that
:
Due to the overwhelming taxes and the
other requirements which the bill estab-
lishes, it vjould imply that the Company
"IPC Dice que Proyecto La Erea Serfa ' ConfIscaclon Ecnomlca
Dice que nada debe y que nunca de la ha cobrado, " La Prensa
October ;c9, I963, p. 1; "Peru reivindica Brea y Parinao, '
El Comerclo , October 29, I963, p. 1.
-'--^"Gobierno llamo al Gerente IPC y lo i^monesto— Comunicado
Oficial," La Prensa, October 29, 1963,^p.l; "El Goblerno
amonesta a~Ta IPC por emltir informaclon tendensiosa, " El
Comerclo
, October 30, I963, p. 1.
in
21?
would have to operate at a loss-
therefore, the bill proposes
ECONOHIC CONFISCATION.
^2
On October 31. another full page announcement appeared
the Lima papers. In this one. I.P.c. intended to show with
facts and figures that Belaunde's proposed solution '^ould
tax more than 100;^ of the company's profits. According to
I.P.C, its net income before taxes for the year I963 would
be 70 million dollars; from this sum the company subtracted
^7 million dollars in operating and producing costs, thus
leaving a net income before taxes of 23 million dollars.
From that 23 million. I.P.C. subtracted 7.8 million in pro-
posed debt payments, duties and taxes, thus leaving a profit
of 15.2 million dollars. In theory, the government demanded
60% of the profit; - however , since the government- did not
allow 10.9 million dollars as legitimate, costs, the total
profit from which the government wanted its oOfo was 26.1
million dollars—an amount which would be 15.66 million dollars
or ^^^^-60.000 more than the total profit calculated by I.P.C.
This discrepancy stemmed from the fact that the Peruvian gov-
ernment considered I.P.C. 's payment to its employee retirement
fund excessive; it also did not allow the costs of producing
the oil which the company gave the government as a royalty
12See the advertisement entitled "El Proyecto del Ejecutivo
implica Confiscacion. " La Prensa
.
October 30. 1963, p. 3.
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as a tax deductible expense. Furthermore Peru did not con-
sider the payments on the alleged 50 million dollar debt
deductible from taxable Income. What Just a few days be-
fore had been hi.,hly secret information discussed only m
the privacy of the Persldentlal Palace was now spread over
the pages of the Lima paper. International Petroleum
Company was determined to take its case to the public, an
eventuality which President Belailnde probably did not forsee.
Not only did I.P.C.'s general manager Loren Smith speak
up on October 29. but on the following day he made additional
statements. He reasserted that the government's bill was
confiscatory, and declared that he had been "admonished"
for expressing an incontrovertible truth. To underline
the solidarity of the workers with the management of the
company, I.P.C. personnel m Lima held a large luncheon for
Loren or.ith. There, they made speeches and road a "public"
letter to Belaunde. In that letter, the employees and
workers of International Petroleum protested the "admonish-
noiit" of the general manager, and asserted that they would
continue to press their point of view regarding the negative
'la Jstado absorberia mas del 100 por cionto de la Utllldade
Fron^, October 31, 1963, p. 7; "Dice presidente de
International Petroleum Co. --At cernativa del Gbno. a I.P.C.
es autrcconomica, " Gomcrclo, October 30, I963, p. 1.
"i:il Proyecto es Gondiscatorio Heitera el Gerente de la IPC, "
La Prensa, October 31, I963, p. 1.
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aspects Of the executive's bill. The only oonolllatory note
came froa Smith himself. v,ho suggested that negotiations
between the^company and the Peruvian government be initiated
once more.
Another strong reaction T.hich Belaunde did not foresee
came from the American embassy, which actually circulated
a communique to the Lima press expressing its "disillusion-
ment" With the course of action taken by the Peruvian execu-
tive. Spokesmen for the American embassy stated that it hoped
for an agreement between the company and President Belaunde
prior to the submission of a bill to the Peruvian Congress.'^
In Washington, a spokesman for the United States Department
of State described official reaction as one of "surprise"
and wonderment as to what might have brought about such a
course of action by the Peruvian president. The Associated
Press cable to Peru covering the State Department's reaction
noted that just a few months earlier, President Kennedy
sent "v7arm congratulations" to Belaunde upon his election,
and Under Secretary of State Edwin Hartin had recently des-
cribed the Belaunde government as the most progressive
T5
-^"Gerente de IPG cree Posible se Reinicien ITegociaciones , "
la Frensa
,
October 31. I963, P- ^! ; "Carta Abierta al Senor
Presidente de la Republica, " la Prensa
, October 31, I963,
p. 10; "Kmpleados de la IPC apoyan actitud de desacato a
Presidente," 1^1 Comercio , October 31, I963, p. 1.
16 ————
.
"Embajada de E.U. ExDresa Desilucion con el Case IPC,"
La Prensa
, October 31, 1963, p. 1.
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one Peru had ever had. if nationalization of I.f.c. pro-
perty was carried out without compensation. American aid
would be suspended, and such a suspension would have a very
negative effect on Belaunde's announced plans of economic
and social development.^^ How much of the report from
Washington was actually planted by the Department of State
and how much was pure
. embellishment by the Associated Press
remains uncertain. But In any case, the message was clear;
Washington encouraged Peru to solve the I.P.c. problem, but
the solution envisaged by the United States government did
not include any form of unilateral nationalization. Belaunde
misunderstood Washington, for he assumed that the Kennedy
administration had given him carte blanche to deal with the
company In whatever manner he deemed necessary. He also
overestimated the weight which Kennedy's personal sympathies
would carry within the complex forces which actually shape
American foreign policy.
From London came word that unidentified sources were
questioning the effects of the Belaunde bill on future foreign
investment In Peru. From Coral Gables, Florida—the corporate
headquarters of Esso Inter-America, came some additional saber
rattling remarks. Brisco once more repeated his charges for
Repercusion en E.U. e Inglaterra del Proyecto de Brea y
Parinas," La Prensa
. October 31. I963. p. 4.
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the eager Associated Press, and in effect, he identified
Belaunde's position as one held by "some Peruvian extremists.
This clamor from abroad and from I.P.C.'s management
backfired on the company. While Washington. London and Coral
Gables produced ominous sounding statements, the Peruvian
congressional factions tried to outm.aneuver President Belaund
in what became a highly popular anti-foreign campaign. In
the Chamber of Deputies, an Aprista spokesman took the floor
to claim credit for Belaiinde's action. He said that APRA
had been struggling to recover La
-rea y Parinas since I929.
and he also claimed that Belaunde's proposal vias patterned
after the earlier Beltran-APRA proposal. This Aprista deputy
Armando Villanueva. added that his party would support Presi-
19dent Belaunde's stand. However, instead of actually sup-
porting the president's bill. APilA and the Union Nacional
Odriista. which had formed a congressional coalition, intro-
duced and passed two bills of their own, and Belaunde signed
them into law on November 6. I963. The first. Law Mo. 1^695
revoked the law vjhich in I9I8 had authorized the executive
to settle the La Brea y Pariffas controversy by international
arbitration; the second, Law Ho. 1^696. declared the
Ibid .
19See statements by Armando Villanueva in: "En las Camaras,
1^ Prensa. October 31. I963. p. 2.
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Arbitration Agraement of 1922 "null i£so jure" for "having
violated the pertinent legal requirements.
. By passing
Its own bills, the opposition coalition hoped to steal the
thunder from Belaunde. his party Aoolon Popular, and his
allies, the Christian Democrats. Both the opposition and
the government coalitions had their eyes on an impending
election which would determine who would be the mayor of
Lima,
During the debate over the bills which were introduced by
the APRA-U.N.O. coalition, a curious development occured in
the Chamber of Deputies. A deputy from Belaunde 's party.
Accion Popular took the floor to claim that impending vin-
dication of La 3rea y Farinas was "a patriotic act of the
present government." Realizing that the Selaundistas
. with
the help of El Comercio
. were not about to let the Apristas
and Odriistas cash in on Belaunde
' s hard fought battle, AVRA
once more returned to the floor. Speaking for that party,
Armando Villanueva remarked that his party had always favored
the vindication of La Brea y Parinas. and accused El Comerclo
of trying to confuse the issue. He went so far as to say
that when Luis Miro Quesada was secretary of State in 1931,
he failed to do anything about the laudo of 1922. Villanueva
20
The La Brea Parinas Controversy
, Vol. I, Exhibit ?.
nas
,
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was answered by Sandro Hariategui
.
an Acoi6n Popular deputy.
Who attacked APRA for claimins credit. He declared that APRA
had in fact never been in favor of vindicating La Brea y Pari
Some Communist Party deputies proposed that the American
ambassador. John Wesley Jones, and I.P.C.'s general manager.
Loren Smith, be declared unwelcome persons in Peru, but their
motion was rejected. An Accion Popular senator. Juan Cravero
characterized the I.P.C. employees who wrote the public
letter to Belaunde protesting his policies as "traitors"
and demanded that they be investigated by the police. How-
ever, his demands were not seriously considered. A dissident
U.N.O. senator who was later dropped from the party proposed
that the government use military force to occupy I.P.C.
installations—to prevent any disruption of the oil supply.
When this rush to capitalize on the popular anti-I.P.C. sen-
timent was over, it was Belaunde who came out on top. For
mayor of Lima, the APRA-U.N.O. coalition nominated General
Odria 's wife, Maria Delgado de Odria. Accion Popular
and the Christian Democrats nominated Luis 3edo;>-a Reyes, a
man who had the personal support of Belaunde. In December
———
-
-^'Tor unanimidad aprobaron las dos Camaras la Derogatoria de
ley previa al Laudo, " la Pronsa
.
November 6, I963. p. i^.
"Diputados Rechazan Ilocion Roja contra Embajador de liU e
IPC--Senador AP Censura a empleados de esa Em^resa. " la
Prensa
.
iJovember 5. I963, p.'l.
^^See the statement by U.N.O. senator Fernando Noriega Galmet
in "En las Camaras. La Prensa. October 31. I963. p. 2.
1963 Bedoya Reyes became mayor of Lima.
Even thoush Belaunde managed to raise his already high
level of popularity in Peru by taking a tough position against
I.P.C. in the La Brea y Parinas controversy, by early November
it was clear that his position ms not without serious risks.
On November 7, the National Federation of Petroleum Workers
announced that they would proclaim an indefinite strike if
the government nationalized I.P.C. Ignoring this threat.
Belaunde pressed on in Congress, and asked that his bill of
October 28 be passed quickly. Despite his efforts, some
radical senators began to criticize the president for not
25going far enough. Realizing the political dangers of a
petroleum strike, a suspension of American aid. and radical
criticism, Belailnde decided to chart a more conciliatory co^orse
In a November 12 interview with an Associated Press cor-
respondant, the president declared that he was not in favor
of the creation of a state monopoly over the petroleum
industry. Clearly, since the nationalization alternative
of his own bill would result in a state monopoly. Belaunde 's
statement indicated that he would prefer a settlement whereby
International Petroleum Company would continue to operate La
"Los j-etrolerons Pararan si se Expropia la IPC," I^ Pren^a
,
November 8, I963, d. 1.
25
-'^"Senadores Griticaron Duramente la Exposicion que Hizo
Pestana, " La Pronsa , November 8, 1963t p. 5.
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Brea y Parlnas.^^ Belaunde^s statements „orrled the „ore
extreme antl-I.P.c. elements In Peru, for he preferred I.P.c.
to continue to operate La Brea v Par-in^c. ti3xt.ci y Jr^armas. In the words of
August© Zimmermann
:
The danger of this alternative was not
^^""^^ th^^^ appearedin the mind of the Chief i^xecutive theidea of keepin,- I.P.C, but rather thatthe articles in the bill were written insuch a way, that one could perceive with
clarity an absolute identity of conceptsbetween the so-called Beltran bill and
alternative "a" in the ^roDosal of Presi-dent Belaunde.
Zimmermann forgot that in his own account of the events of
i960. Belaunde x^as basically in favor of the Beltran solution,
except for the fact that he wanted a shorter period of time
for the operating contract.
In the same November 12 press interview. Belaunde also
stated that Peru's relations with the United States government
"had not suffered alteration. " Either the president x-ianted
to minimize the impact of his decision on his relations
with Washington--intending to calm Peruvian domestic tempers,
or he believed that Washington was merely going through the
motions of protest in order to satisfy the American petroleum
lobby. Did Belaunde have assurances from Kennedy that the
2^
"Belaunde dice que no Pretende KonoDolio Zstatal del Petroleo
la Prensa
.
November 13, I963, p. 1."
27
Zimmermann, p. 180.
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United States would merely stage a standard diplomatic pro-
test while backing Belaunde in his encounter with I.P.C?
The answer to this question lies hidden in the files
Of the Department of State-files which are inaccessible to
scholarly researchers for at least another decade. The issue
was certainly confused during the first half of November
1963. for Belaunde did not expect the American embassy to
react as it did. Either the embassy played its part in a
meaningless staged protest, or Washington was genuinely
"surprised," and Belaunde's understanding was nothing more
than a misunderstanding of Washington's Intention.
President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22,
and Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency of the United
States. The fact of Kennedy's assassination in Eallas, a
city which Peruvians perceived as the heartland of Texas,
"the richest oil emporium of the United States," v/as a bad
28
^omen. Almost as if to confirm Peruvian fears, Lyndon
Johnson immediately changed the Department of State's Latin
America head, bringing in fellow Texan Thomas Hann. Belaunde
had great misgivings about this appointment; he knew that
Mann had a long association with Texas oil interests, and
ho believed that Hann was an attorney for several American
28
Ibid.
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petroleun companies. He expected a much tougher fight,
for I.P.C. would surely have the solid backing of the United
States Department of State.
In Belaunde's vieT^^. the balance of power between his
sovernment and International Petroleum Company changed in
favor of the company at this point in time. With Brisco
in charge of I.P.C. and Thomas Ilann in charge of U.S. Latin
American policy, Peru would run into trouble, for the two
men constituted a formidible team bent on forcing his coun-
try to accept I.P.C. 's terms. Instead of negotiation the
company assumed a position of stubborn insistence on its
30
terms of settlement. The Department of State suspended
all foreign aid to Peru. Journalist and one time Kennedy
staff member Richard Goodwin quoted a State Department
official as saying:
The idea was to put on a freeze, talk
about red tape and bureaucracy, and
they'd soon get the message. Unfor-
tunately, thev believed we were as in-
efficient as we said, and it took about
a year for them to get the message.
Goodwin stated that the Department of State acted on its
own, v7ithout I.P.C. pressure for a suspension of American
29 i^nterview with former president Fernando Belaunde Terry
at his residence in Chevy Chase, rlaryland. May 21, 1971.
30ibid.
31
Goodwin, p. 60.
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aid; I.P.c. management claimed that they put no pressure
on the U.S. government. ^2 However. President Belaunde
saw the situation in quite a different light. As far as
the Peruvian chief of state was concerned. Standard Oil
was behaving in its old traditional way. Belaunde believed
that through its powerful lobbies in Washington and New
York. I.P.C. secured a suspension of American aid. The
company did bully various credit institutions into technically
stalling action on several loans for which Peru had con-
tracted. Without aid and without credit. Belaunde saw
his development programs come to a grinding halt. To this
day, the Peruvian leader places full responsibility for
the slow development of his country during the middle i960 '
s
on Standard Oil of New Jersey, and claims that the Peruvian
people concur with his opinion. "^"^
Whether I.P.G. was instrumental m bringing the sus-
pension of aid or not, the fact remains that aid was sus-
pended pending a solution of the controversy. The British
soon joined hands with the American government in exerting
pressure on Belaunde. On January 3, 196-^, the British
government sent a diplomatic note to the Belaunde government
advising it that Britain considered the Arbitration Award
32
Ibid.
; Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne,
Florida, May 28, 1971.
33
IntervleX'T with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase,
Maryland, Hay 21, I97I.
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Of 1922 completely valid, and that it did not recognize
Peru's^right to unilaterally disavow the international agree-
ment. This note was most likely sent at the urging of
the U.S. Department of State, since the British had virtually
no interest in the Brea y Parinas controversy.^^
In early l^G^-, Belaunde
' s bill was finally shelved,
and in its place the Peruvian Congress passed I^w No. 14863.
That bill. Signed into law by President Belaunde on February
12. 1964. authorized the executive to "make suitable arrange-
ments to resolve the pending matters on 'La Brea y Parinas.
Congress established no significant guidelines on the nature
of the future arrangements; it merely stated that the
petroleum deposits in .question should be exploited in a
manner "which best benefits the interests of the country."
There was only one important requirement in this otherwise
wide grant of discretionary powers to the Peruvian president.
Whatever solution was arrived at would have to be submitted
^ n 36to Congress for ratification. V/as this new law a Congres-
sional booby trap set for President Belaunde? By its passage,
the APRA-U.N.O. coalition avoided the issue altogether by
making it Belaunde 's responsibility to arrive at a solution.
35
^-'^Certain minority interests ovm shares of I.P.C, and some
are reportedly British citizens. :iowever, this is a very
small r>ortion of I.P.C. stock. Interviev^r with John Oldfield.
Coral Gables, Florida, May 25. 1971.
^^The La Brea ]i Parinas Controversy , Vol I, Exhibit 8.
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However, at the sa.e ti.e. the, reserved the ri.ht to crucify
Belaunde politically should the solution be unacceptable to
them. Since APR., had managed to shroud its oun position in
a veil of vasue contradictions, the party could simply wait
out Belaunde. If the president arrived at a compromise with
I.P.C.. APRA could accuse him of sellins out to American
pressures, if Belaunde took a hard line towards the company.
APRA could attack him for damaging Peru's international
standing and foreign credit.
In April 1964. a new round of negotiations between
International Petroleum Company and the Peruvian government
was initiated. In order "to clarify basic concepts and set
the stage for active negotiations," Brisco. I.p.C.'s presi-
dent, and Haider, Standard Oil's president travelled to
Lima and held conversations with President belaunde .
"^"^
Since • personal relations betvjeen I.P.C.'s general manager
in Lima, Loren Smith and President Belaunde had grown con-
siderably worse during the first year of Belaunde 's term
in office, a new general manager v;as appointed.
Fernando i^spinosa, an I.P.C. executive of Cuban origin,
was a man particularly suited for the job. He was the company'
manager in Colombia just prior to his assignment in Lima, and
^"^Ibid.
, p. 9.
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While in that country, he had successfully mediated a poten-
tially disastrous crisis for the company. ^spinosa was
the opposite Of what many Latin Americans perceive as the
typical North American businessman-cold, blunt and calculating.
A very urbane and well educated man. Fernando Espinosa was
more a diplomat than a business executive. His task was to
reach an agreement acceptable to the Peruvian political
leaders, and naturally to the company. In the pursuit of
this quest, the new I. P.O. general manager found himself
acting as an intermediary between Belaunde and his political
rivals. Mot since the I930 ' s was I.P.C. so deeply involved
in the politics of Peru.
From Hay to July 196^. the company negotiated with the
government. Fernando Espinosa visited President Belaunde
frequently, and the two men developed a personal friendship
which went beyond strict negotiation."^^ 3y the end of July,
an unofficial agreement was achieved. The company would
cede its property rights over La. Brea y Parinas in exchange
for a release from all claims for back taxes, .^s payment
for operating the oil fields, the company would receive 20%
of the sales of petroleuju products from La Brea y Parinas
;
Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables. Florida, Hay 23,
Intervieii vrith Fernando Espinosa. Key Bi seayne, Florida,
Hay 28, 1971.
-'^Intervievr with Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
Kay 28, 1971; President Belaunde also indicated a personal
liking for Espinosa in an intervievj. Chevy Chase, Haryland,
Hay 21, I971.
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that fee was to cover production costs. Any funds remaining
after the company had been paid its production fee would be
split on a fifty-fifty basis between I.P.C. and the Peruvian
government. Both the basic and the contingent fees received
by the company would be subject to a 50:^ income tax. It
was calculated that this arrangement would result in a 65-
35fo split of over all profits in favor of the Peruvian gov-
ernment. I.P.G. gained a greater measure of control over
the operation of its refinery, but at the end of a 25 year
period, ownership of the refinery would revert back to Peru.
"Suitable provisions" were made so that pricing of petroleum
products would cease to be a political issue of major pro-
portions.
Now that a private verbal agreement had been worked out,
President Belaunde faced the problem of whether or not it
would be acceptable to APRA, La Prensa, and El Gomerci o.
In his conversations with Sspinosa, Belaunde is reported
to have asked repeatedly, "VJhat would El Gomercio say?"^"^
Even though President Belaunde placed some fourteen members
of the Niro Quesada family in various government jobs, in-
cluding some top choice diplomatic posts, and even though
Don Luis's nephew Francisco Miro Quesada \ia.s Minister of
The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy , Vol. I, pp. 10-11.
Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Bisca yne, Florida,
Hay 28, I97I.
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Education-a Cabinet position. President Belaunde related
that he could not count on Luis Hiro Quesada to support
him in anythin,^ short of the nationalization of I.P.C.''^
There was little that Espinosa could do in regards to
the position Of El Comercio. The last effort at personal
persuasion was made by company manager Jack >\shworth in
late 1959. He flew from Lima to New York on the same plane
as Luis Miro Quesada. Ashworth attempted to convince Don
Luis of the error of his anti-I.P.G. position, only to be
rebuffed by the editor of El Comercio
.
who was quoted as
saying
:
Please do not try to persuade me.
You are the General Manager of IPC
and you do well to defend your Com-
pany. I am the Editor of El Comercio
.
and I do well to defend my country.
You have to be responsible to your
share-holders. I have to be responsible
to my readers.
,
Fernando Espinosa, I.P.C.'s general manager during
most of the Belaunde administration, was so angered by the
policies of El Comercio that he called in the company's
legal staff with the intention of instituting a libel suit
against that newspaper. However. I.P.C.'s Peruvian lawyers
persuaded him to abandon this idea. They argued that it
Ibid .
^3Zimmermann. p. 32.
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would be difficult to Win against Miro Quesada, and that
even if the company were to win, Don Luis could have a sud-
den heart attack or stroke and die-thus providing the anti-
I.P.C. forces with a formidable martyr/*"^
I.P.C.'s unsuccessful bid for a change in El Comercio's
policy did not daunt the company from approaching Belaunde
•
s
main political adversary. Vfctor Raul Ha^-a de la Torre.
Soon after the president expressed his fears of AFRA to
Espinosa. the latter got in touch with APRA
' s high command.
He explained the nature of the agreement he had reached with
Belaunde and asked whether it would be acceptable to AFRA.
After a brief consideration of the details of the proposed
agreement, the Aprista leadership expressed its willingness
to accept the terms. Espinosa communicated APRA's assurances
to Belaunde, but the Peruvian executive declared that he could
not put his trust in such private assurances. Espinosa
returned to the APRA leadership, and persuaded them to make
a public commitment; an unidentified Aprista leader v/as
instructed to endorse a solution to the I.P.C. controversy
in a public address—a solution which matched the agreement
already arrived at between the president and the company.
Espinosa pointed out this public commitment to Belaunde, only
to be told once more that APRA was not to be trusted.
^^Interview vrith Fernando Espinosa. Key Bi seayne, Florida,
Hay 28. 1971.
^^ibid.
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Seeking a way to convince Belauncle of APRA's honorable
intentions, Esplnosa then Insisted on talking to Haya de la
Torre personally.
.-El Jefe." as the Aprista leader is known
to his AmA associates, had Just returned from his 196^ stay
in Europe, and he agreed to see Esplnosa. I.P.c.'s general
manager talked with Haya de la Torre at several interviews,
and managed to convince him that Belaunde required his per-
sonal assurance that the agreement was acceptable, and that
AFRA would not try to capitalize on it once Belaunde sent
it on to the Peruvian Congress. Hox^ever, when Esplnosa met
again with Belaunde and referred to Haya de la Torre's
personal assurances, Belaunde snapped: "That is a banana
peel.'"—a reference to the fact that the president inter-
preted the Aprista leader's assurances as part of a great
political trap.
Since President Belaunde had a Hiro Quesada in the
Cabinet, and a score of family members in other government
jobs, he should have been able to secure at least silent
acquiesence from ly, GomGrcio in regards to whatever policy
he wished to pursue. Furthermore, since he had the personal
assurances of Haya de la Torre, he should have been able to
proceed with the La Brea y Parinas agreement. However,
there did not seem to be anything APRA could do to convince
him.
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Was Belaunde really afraid of political repercussions
from AFRJ. and El Cornercio? While Fernando Espinosa accepted
the president's explanation for not sending the agreement
to the Peruvian Congress for ratification, there is an alter-
native explanation. Perhaps Belaunde did not want to solve
the La Brea y Parinas problem during I964. After all, al-
though American aid was suspended. Peru had been told that
there was no suspension-merely a delay due to red tape in
Washington. President Belaunde might have been playing his
own red tape game with the company. If Thomas ilann had
decided to suspend aid until the I.P.C. issue was settled
Without ever informing Peru of its policy. Belaunde might
have been vjaiting for aid to resume before settling the
I.P.C. issue Without ever informing Washington of his inten-
tions.'
This conclusion is supported by the impressions of the
general manager, Fernando Espinosa. de noted that the
Peruvian chief of state seemed to operate under the assumption
that the government of the United States was very much under
the influence of American business, particularly Standard Oil
of New Jersey. During the conversations between Belaunde
and Espinosa, Belaunde brought up the question of American
aid several times. Espinosa got the impression that Belaunde
actually thought that all that was needed for a resumption
of aid v:as a telephone call from Standard Oil's president
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to Lyndon Johnson. However, as Espinosa pointed out in
an interview Hay 28. I97I. if Standard Oil of New Jersey
had that kind of influence, it would certainly have put
it to better use by having the United States government
drop the pending anti-trust suits against the company, or
make slight adjustments in the U.S. oil imports quota. .
Either action would have represented a greater dollar gain
for the conpamy than the entire Peruvian operation was
worth.
Fernando Espinosa met on some sixty occasions with
Belaunde. and if he was correct in his interpretation, then
a conclusion that President Belaunde lacked perspective
on Standard Oil's ability to influence the i\merican govern-
ment, and the importance of I.P.G.'s Peruvian operation to
that company is quite valid. I.P.G.'s oil operations in
Peru represented but an infinitesimal portion of Standard
Oil's assets--reported in I968 as nearly I7 billion dollars
"book value. Standard Oil of rjew Jersey, the world's
largest corporation, could not be easily swayed by Peru's
pressure on what vras at best a remote and almost forgotten
province of its immense financial empire.
liT
Ibid .
For figures on Standard Oil of New Jersey's assets, see:
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), I969 Annual Report
(New York: n.p., 1970).
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Nevertheless. President Belaunde might have thought
that he was holding an important hostage within the borders
of Peru, and that if he waited long enough. Standard Oil
would order Lyndon Johnson to ransom I.P.C. with a bountiful
aid grant to Peru. This hypothesis does not deny the pos-
sibility that Belaunde was at the same time genuinely afraid
of opposition from other Peruvian political leaders. After
all. APRA had not inspired much confidence when it had be-
come an ally of General Odrfa in I962. From I952 to I956,
Odrfa persecuted the Apristas and even tried to do away
with Haya de la Torre.
For such domestic and international reasons, the Belaunde
administration decided not to settle the I.P.C. controversy,
at least not by the terms vrhich had been worked out during
the first half of 196^^. The Peruvian government stalled
for nearly six months while I.P.C. 's general manager tried
to rally support for the agreement from potential opposi-
tionists. Ironically, I.P.C. management was as slow to get
the Peruvian point of vievr of la Brea y Parinas as the Peru-
vians vfere said to have been in getting the message behind
the American "red tape" delays on aid. By the end of 196^1-,
President Belaunde presented a "revised" version of the Ju] y
agreement to the company.
This new proposal of December 30. 196^ substantially
changed the July agreement. The exchange of property rights
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for an operation contract was a principle deleted from the
"revised" proposal, and the company got no clear release
from claims for back taxes. More significant perhaps was
the fact that the profit ratio was changed to 90-10^ in
favor Of the Peruvian government^^ I.P.C. could have nego-
tiated on the basis of the president's proposal, but instead
the company expressed "surprise and consternation. "^° and
rejected it.
In a sense, this rejection sealed the fate of the
company in Peru. 1964 was the year in which Belaunde received
his largest measure of political support. In January of
that year. West Germany's President Lubke visited Lima, and
in September, none other than Charles de Gaulle graced Peru
with his presence. Belaunde 's ambitious plans for the de-
velopment of Peru truly captured the imagination of many a
foreign leader, as well as the imagination of most Peru-
vians. He had a resevoir of good will /Jhich would have
made a compromise with I.P.C. politically tolerable.
I.P.C. had more reasons than ever to compromise. The
oligarchy deserted the company due to their disenchantment
v:ith the Alliance for Progress. American insi stance on a
more equitable income distribution I'or the country, and tax
The Brea Parinas Controversy
.
Vol I, pp. 11-13.
/
^^Ibid.
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and agrarian reforms made it seem as if the United States
was sponsoring change at the expense of Peru-s traditional
establishment. Whereas they looked upon Washington in the
past as the protector of property rights, now the United
States seemed to support only American-owned property. The
oligarchy had successfully avoided a property tax during
Peru's republican history; yet. under the general cover
of the Alliance for Progress. Washington pressed for such
a tax using the leverage of the International Monetary Fund.^^
As the oligarchy perceived the situation, with allies like
the Americans, they needed no enemies. The oligarchy grew
at first detached from and eventually antagonistic to the
American presence in Peru, and correspondingly, the country's
public opinion grew ever more aware of I.P.C. as a source
CO
of nationalistic irritation.
Another reason which should have swayed the company
towards compromise was the fact that Standard Oil's original
51 A^merican policy makers took on the cause of righting latin
American social injustices. For instance, they virtually
demanded that industrialists and landowners in' Latin America
be taxed, a proposition which was particularly difficult
to implement in the case of Peru. See the testimony of
James Fowler. Acting U.S. Coordinator. Alliance for Progress,
Agency for International Development, in : U. S. . Congress
,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs, Nevr Directions for the I970 ' s : Tovrard a
Strategy of Inter -American Development
.
;^lst Cong.. 1st Sess.
,
1959. pp. ^-35.
In 1962, Peruvian visitors to Talara often asked to be shovm
the Laudo of 1922 because they had heard so much aboub it.
However, many thought that it vras some kind of landmark.' Private
investment In Peru had been amortized over the years, a
relatively s^all return should have been acceptable to the
company. Yet. the golden opportunity slipped through the
flnsers of International Petroleum Company and President
Belaunde. Why did both parties to the controversy fall to
compromise at a time when It „as Imerpatlve that they do so-
to the benefit of both?
The inability to reach a compromise was due to Peruvian
nationalism, and a corporate phenomenon very similar to
nationalism-company pride. The essence of Peru's demands
on the company was not that more money be given to the
state, or that I.P.C. comply with existing general legis-
lation; it was rather that the company be humiliated.
Peruvian felt wronged and defrauded by the Laudo of I922.
It was as if With hindsight the country boy suddenly realized
that he was cheated by the slick city cousin. Peru's demand
for humiliation took the form of a claim for back taxes.
While the exact amount varied over the years, the demand
that the company pay the alleged taxes remained constant
throughout. A payment of the taxes would have been a public
acknowledgement that I. P.O. was VNrrong, and that it owed
surveys by I.P.C. 's public relations office showed that
95/0 of the total population was totally i.gnorant about
I.P.C. and La Brea y Parinas. By I965, that percentage
had dropped to 50;i—one half of the population v;as aware
of and usually detested the Laudo, a change in public
sentiments largely attributable to El Conercio . Confidential
Interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables, Florida,
May 27, 1971.
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reparations to Peru. Peruvians also wanted the company to
give up its claims over the subsoil of la. Brea y Parifias.
and in so doing, again admit that it was wrong to claim
such ownership.
International Petroleum Company consistently refused
to acknowledge any debt for bad: taxes, and furthermore,
the company insisted that it would give up its rights
over the subsoil of La Brea y PariHas onl^ in exchan,.-:e
for a contract to operate the fields. If the company
successfully exchanged its ownership of the subsoil for
a contract from the government of Peru, then the govern-
ment would implicitly acknowledge the Laudo of 1922 as a
legitimate document setting forth I.P.G.'s property rights
in Peru. As a matter of principle, every major political
group declared the Laudo of 1922 to be an anathema to the
nation, and Belaunde vras not about to recognize its
validity—implicitly or not.
^ conversation between the General Hanager of I.P.C.
and unidentified Odriista (U.N.O.) senator well illustrated
the heart of the problem. After considerable discussion
over vrhether the company owed Peru back taxes, the senator
agreed vrith Espinosa that the company did not. Nevertheless,
the senator asked txhat the company make a settlement of
50 or 60 million dollars and terminate the controversy.
To this suggestion, Espinosa replied "but we have proved
2^3
there is no debt." only to hear the senator m turn declare.
"but the natter of the debt Is a national psychosis.'"^'
Fernadndo iCspinosa's reasoning for not capitulating
to Peruvian demands for debt payment v;as eminently practical.
A private corporation cannot disburse fifty million dollars
as therapy for a psychotic condition. Hovrever. the
expediency of the senator's suggestion deserved attention.
The amount of money was not the issue, for if I.p.C. felt
that fifty million dollars was too high a price to pay. then
it might have been adjusted downward. Furthermore, since
the pa.yments on this debt would have stretched over a period
of years, the Peruvian government would have acquired a
vested interest in the success of I.P.C.'s operation so
that the debt payments could be made. At the end of the
payment period, the company could have returned to the fold
of Peru's good corporate citizens—having expiated its sins.
The company vras willing to pay the money, as the frustrated
agreements between I.P.C. and the Beltran Cabinet and the
Belaunde administration proved—these agreements provided
for special payments of one sort or another. V/hat the
company was unable to do was to acknowledge v:rong doing,
to humiliate itself.
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Interview vjith Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida.
May 28. 1971.
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This is indeed a surprising conclusion given the
senerall, accepted belief that a corporation such as
Standard Oil or New
.erse, ,s interested In profits and
nothing else. If the ultimate lo^lty of the co.pan,
was to the dollar sign, how can the company's behavior
be explained? I.p.c. risked car^^t^i ^-±xi>K^a pi al to save face to
preserve its corporate pride.
..l.P.c... or "the cl„-
is composed Of a group of hu.an beings subject to the full
range of e.otions-fear
.
hatred, love, anger, compassion,
and pride. They strive to do their Job. which might be
to protect the profits of the enterprise, but not at the
price of their own personal dignity.
While exploring the gamet of options which the
company had during the Selaunde administration, research
pointed to this conclusion. John Oldfield, I.P.C.'s top
executive officer in Coral Gables, headquarters of Esso
Inter-America, adknowledged that International Petroleu.m
Company would not have considered the possibility of relin-
quishing ownership over the subsoil without an operating
contract, and moreover, the company would not have publicaJly
apologized to Peru as a tactical move designed to vent the
company's long accumulated hatred for the company. For
the group of men who had been responsible for their company's
policy during the last thirty years, the men who had seen
^^Interview with John Oldfield. Coral Gables, Florida, Hay 28, I971,
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polio, durln, the last thirty years, the
.en .ho had seen
Talara ,row fro. a miserable village into a bustlm, an,
prosperous Industrial city, it was hard to ad»lt that they
had been defrauding the Peruvian nation all along, especially
since they certainly bore no more responsibility for the
developments than .en such as
.ugusto Le^ufa or Luis Sanchez
Cerro, both Peruvian chiefs of state.
President delaunde held Fernando Esplnosa m his
highest esteem, and the feeling „as returned by Esplnosa,
yet the two men represented tv,o Incompatible points of view.
Compromise was Impossible unless either man was willing to
alter his point of view. Perhaps each man assumed that the
other would yield eventually. Unfortunately, they both
embarked on a course which led only to the mutual failure
Of their causes.
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CHAPTER VII
THE END OF INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
COMPANY AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN PERU
While the best opportunity to solve the La Brea y Parinas
problem was lost in the I964-I965 period, negotiations con-
tinued. Nearly four years of President Pelaunde's term re-
mained, and International Petroleum Company hoped that political
conditions would change enough to make an acceptable settle-
ment once more likely. However, the I.P.C. controversy was
a millstone around Eelaunde's political neck throughout the
remainder of his term and eventually doomed his effo-tc to
promote developrriont in Peru.
In outline, the Belaunde administration had several
favorite projects. The Peruvian president placed considerable
emphasis on agrarian reform, Cooperacion Popular, and on
various engineering projects, particularly the construction"
of a highway along the eastern slopes of the Andes--the
marginal highway. Since Belaunde had to contend with an
opposition legislature dominated by an APRA-U.N.O. coalition,
his programs faced an uphill battle almost from the beginning.
Mindful of the agricultural interests which controlled
the large sugar and cotton plantations, the congressional
majority chipped away at Belaunde' 3 agrarian reform until
the coastal estates were virtually exempt from its effects.
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congress also passed a Mil providing for i^ediate compensa-
tion for Whatever lands were distributed, thereby placing
a very high price tag on the program. The various construction
projects Which Belaunde envisioned were, or course, capital
intensive projects. Only Cooperacidn Popular, a self-help
program wherein the government provided the organizational
and technical expertise, as well as the necessary materials,
and the peasants contributed the labor to construct schools!
wells, roads and health facilities was a relatively in-
expensive reform program. However, the Peruvian congress
voted against the necessary funding for this program when
it was barely begun.
Since Congress refused to increase taxes to finance
adequately the executive's programs, aid from abroad, parti-
cularly from the United States, became Eelaunde's only hope
for success. His reforms were very close to the prescrip-
tions which the Alliance for Progress had issued as a cure-
all for Latin American problems. Therefore, Belaunde
expected that the United States would contribute heavily
to financing Peru's development through the Alianza.
Those expectations were unfulfilled to a large degree
Selden Rodman, "Peruvian Politics Stalls Eclaunde's Reforms."The ^ororter
.
Vol. 35, ^^o. 1 (July l^i-, 1966), pp. 37-Ato. '
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because the controversy with I.P.c. remained unresolved
throughout most of the 1960's.
As a result of the lack of American aid, and the rel
ance of the Peruvian Congress to vote in new taxes, Peru
began to experience serious inflationary problems in
1965. The rate of inflation increased during I966 and 1967,
forcing a 30.^ devaluation of the sol on September 1, 1967.
This devaluation viae particularly damaging to President
Belaunde's credibility, for he promised in April of that
year that he v/ould uphold the then existing rate of exchange
between the sol and the dollar. In spite of this dramatic
devaluation, the unofficial rate of exchange continued to
drop until by the Fall of 196S, the sol had depreciated by
3
about '^1% in relation to the dollar.'
As the Belaunde administration lost ground, its •
opposition grew bolder. In mid-June 1965, a guerilla
movement developed in the center of the country, in the La
Convencion Valley—the area which had witnessed considerable
peasant unrest during the early 1960's. The guerilla move-
ment soon spread to Southern Peru as well . Many of the
guerilla leaders were former Apristas who disapproved of
Haya de ]a Torre's moderate position. In Congress, the
'"Sir PxObert Marett, Peru (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 192.
3
Ibid
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APHA-U.N.O. coalition passed a law establishing the death
penalty for the guerrillas, and voted extraordinary funds
for the Ar.„ed^Forces to support their effort to wipe out
the movement.
The first nine months of 196^ qqw i^ffi-^.ui lyo sa iittle progress in the
negotiations between I.P.c. and the Belaunde administration.
Accion Popular and the Christian Democrats reaffirmed their
commitment to nationalization of I.P.C. during their
respective party meetings in June. In his July 28 annual
address to Congress, President Belaikde made only slight
references to La Erea y Parir^as. It was not until September
1965 that the controversy once more acquired momentum.
On Septem.ber 1, 1965, U.S. Under Secretary of State
Jack Hood Vaughn visited President Eela^de. The Lima press
reported that Belaunde told Vaughn that petroleum was too
grave. a problem to leave in the hands of
' the oilmen, and that
Peru would take the road to expropriation if no prompt agre^-
5
ment with I.P.C. was possible. Since no progress was made
during the month, President Belaunde made good his threat
and sent a "Bill of Expropriation with Ponds" to Congress
on September 30. This bill did not mentio-' I.P.C. or La
Brea y Parinas. It merely referred to "expropriations" for
5
"Dijo Belaunde al Sub-Secretario de Egtado de E.U.," El
Comercio
. September 2, 1965, p. 1.
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purposes of agrarian reforem. irrigation projects, enlarge-
ment Of cities and tovms, etc. A.ong the properties listed
for possible long term expropriation via 18 to 22 year bond,
there was a category entitled "sources of energy." Accord-
ing to International Petroleum Company, the purpose of the
bill was to pressure I.P.c. into reaching a settlement.^
The United States Embassy in Lima informed the company that
it considered the proposed methods of compensation unsatis-
factory under the Hickenlooper Amendment to the U.S. Forei gn
Aid Bill. If the Peruvian government expropriated La Erea
y Parinas and then compensated I.P.c. with long term local
currency bonds, aid to Peru would be discontinued. Since
the bulk of American aid was already being withheld, the pos
tion of the U.S. Ambassador John Wesley Jones must have been
very awkward—he threatened that the United States would
officially suspend aid that had already been unofficially
suspended.
In December 1965 a new round of negotiations began, and
at the end of the month, I.P.C. submitted a draft contract
which reflected the areas of agreement up to that point.
z
La PJ"^?^ Z Fariras Controversy . Vol. T (February, I969),
p. 13. The entire text of the bill appears as Exhibit 11
in the same volume.
7
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However, by January, the company encountered what it inter-
preted as "clear evidence of the President's intention not
to press for a solution.
.
.
- Henceforth, l.P.c. tried to
isolate the La Erea y Farinas ownership dispute from all
other related operating problems. The purpose of this n
company policy was to press for government permission to
proceed with a refinery expansion at Talara, and with a
corporate realignment whereby l.P.c. would establish
subsidiary ovmer of the Talara refinery and the distributi
apparatus
—
Egso Peruana.
In early 1966, a new Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, assumed office.
In an effort to clear up misunderstandings between Washingto
and Lima, the State Department announced in February for the
first time to the Peruvian government that American aid had
been suspended pending a solution to the La Brea y Parinas
controversy. In March, U.S. Presidential Assistant Walter
Rostow flew to Lima and during conversations with Belaunde
he assured the Peruvian executive that if Peru did not
expropriate La Brea y Parinas, American aid would be resumed
8~
Ibid., p.l';.
9
"La Decada del 60-Del Colonialismo Liberal a la Revolucion,
O^-^'a (J'-^^nuary, 1970) v. k7: Richard Goodwin, "Letter from
Peru," The New .Yorker; (May 1?, I969), p. 60
.
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promptly. President Belaunde in turn declared
' that he had
never intended to confiscate the company. American aid began
to flow into Peru soon after.
American aid, however, was destined to another sus-
pension, but this time it had nothing to do with I.P.C.
It was the result of a dispute between Washington and Lima
over the purchase of some jet planes for the Peruvian Air
Force. The Peruvian Armed Forces had proved themselves rather
capable in their dealings with the giaerriUa movement, for
in less than a year they had virtually eliminated the
guerrilla threat. However, the military had come to look
askance on their role as internal policemen; they envisioned
themselves as the defenders of Peru in potential inter-
national conflicts. U.S. military aid policy vis-a-vis
Peru and other Latin American countries seemed to be one
of re^inforcing their counter-insurgency roles. The matter
came to a head when the Peruvian government attempted to
purchase some of Northrop Aviation's F-5 fighters, a
relatively inexpensive aircraft with which the Peruvian Air
Force planned to replace their aging F-80's. Under U.S.
Congressional pressure against aid for military hardware,
Washington delayed authorization for the sale, and the
Goodwin, ibid .
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Peruvians, in a fit of anger, purchased some very expensive
and far more sophisticated French Mirages. In retaliation
for the purchase, the American government once more suspended
aid to the Belaunde government. Thus, out of his five
years in office. President Belailnde received full American
aid for about one year. Between the I.P.C. controversy and
the disagreement over the jet fighters, his administration
was denied aid for most of its time in office.
On July 28, 1966, President Belaunde once more addressed
the Peruvian Congress, and he referred to the La Erea y
Parinas controversy. Belaunde told the Congress that
considerable progress had made in the negotiations with the
company. He added that in a projected agreement, twenty of
twenty-one articles had already been accepted by both sides.
Only one article remained to be ironed out, a task which
he expected to complete by early December 1966. President
Belaunde criticized his political opponents, and without
directly mentioning APRA, he noted that it would not be
sensible for those who had been ready to give La Erea y
12
Parinas away to now demand expropriation.
Lungi Eiaaudi, Pom.vir'.n Military Rel -wA nnr vn th iinlHid
:at:cs
.
(Santa Tlonica, Calif.: The liana Corporation, 1970),
^^PP. 33-36.
For tVie text of President Belaunde 's remarks on the subj;Dct
:
,
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La ili storia Sec rota del
roleo (Lima: Editorial Grafica Labor, 1963), pp. 183-18^1-
see
Potroli
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Andres Townsend Ezcurra, speaking for the Apista
delegation in Congress, responded hy attacking Belaunde
for not pursuing the type of radical solution which his
own party, Accion Popular, had advocated while out of
office. He pointed out Montesinos's Congressional bill
calling for the expropriation of La Brea y Parinas, and
'
remarked that while APRA backed "progressive nationalization,
Belaunde 's Accion Popular engaged in demagoguery, calling
for more radical steps. Tovmsend Ezcurra asked: "What
has changed? Has the Company changed? Has the problem
Changed? ^Or is it the President of the Republic who has
changed?
"
The intent of the
-APRA-U.N.O. coalition was clear--
to embarrass President Belaunde by contrasting the tough
position of former prominent Accion Popular members such
as Alfonso Kontesinos with the current conciliatory politics
with which the President hoped to settle the long-standing
problen of I.P.C. This intention to embarass the President
became even more clear between August and November I966,
when the Pelaunde Administration agreed to let I.P.C.
proceed with an eight million dollar refinery expansion
at Talara, as well as the creation of a v.'holly-owned
13
Andres Townsend Ezcurra, Re spue 5 ta a im Discurs c
Presidenci.^1 (Lima: Sdiciones Pueblo, 19^6), p. 8.
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subsidiary "Esso Peruana" to act a- fh^ h.^^-L o t e holding company of
the TalarP- refinery. The Congressional opposition
criticizea the Peruvian Executive so severely that approval
for the expansion and the creation of a subsidiary was
withdravm
.
Durlns the same month of November, negotiations
proceeded, based on thp "Dr^ar-t- ^-p .zne Draft of December I965," and once
more, agreement seemed within reach when the President
suggested a 60-im profits split with the company's share
subject to a 50% tax. International Petroleum accepted
the Executive's proposal and returned it to him with some
minor revisions, without altering the profit split or
the tax level. Once again, there was no action, and six
months elapsed before negotiations were re-initiated.^'
•
By the middle of I967, the Belailnde administration faced
great economic adversities. Although the President had
promised not to devalue the_sol, he had no choice but to
do so because of Peru's ram.pant inflation. Against this
background of economic unrest, Belaunde turned to Congress
TU
'^^'5 La Proa v Parinas Controversy
, p. 16; U.S., Depar-m.^^t
of State, A-inu3.1 Petroleum H c r.o r t - - 1 Q -^^ 6 -
1
F ? rn 'tj.S. D--.-^-V'~
ment of State Document Mo. A- 639 "(Washington: ' U.'s! ciJ-'r---
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 6.
Th£ ]± g£±E I j::^inas Controversy . Vol. I., p. 17.
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in an effort to raise revenues. However, Haya de la Torre
declared his opposition to new taxes in February, and APRA
responded to Belaunde's proposal by unleashing more
criticism. On June 20, the Commission which the Chamber
of Deputies had established to deal with the La Erea y
Parinas controversy declared itself in permanent session
with the avowed purpose of sifting through all of the
proposals which had come up over the years, and to make
a unanimous recommendation of the best solution/^ Ey June
22, the entire Chamber of Deputies was once more debating
two bills which would have effectuated expropriation;
one was submitted by the Christian Democrats and the other
was backed by the APRA-U.N.O. coalition/ Feeling the
pressure, the president's party, Accic^n Popular, joined
in the new wave of pro-expropriation sentim.ent. On June
23, Accion Popular publically demanded that the State-owned
petroleum enterprise, Empresa Petrolera Fiscal, take over
the La Brea y Parinas fields.
rr
"En sesion perm.anente se declare Comision de la Brea de
la Gamara Paja," El Comercio, June 21, 196?
,
p. 1.
"Sxpropiar Erea y Parinas se di scute en diputados—Hay
dos proyectos en Mesa: de la Coalicion y de la D. C,"
El Comercio
. June 2^, I967, p. 1.
18
"AP pide que la EPF explote La Brea y Parinas," El
Comercio
. June 24, I967, p. 1.
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However, the APRA-U.N.O. majority prevailed with their
version of a solution, and by July 8 the bill was approved
by the congress and sent on to the president. Belaiinde
signed it into law on July 26, 1967. Law No. 1667^1 reiter-
ated what a previous law (No. 1^696) had already
established: the Laudo of 1922 was null and void. But
it went on to state that in passing Law No. 1^1696,
congress intended to transfer ownership of the La Brea
y Parinas oilfields to the state. The new law also
instructed the Peruvian executive to enter the oilfields
in the property regi stories in the name of the state since
all other inscriptions were null and void, and to establish
an exploitation plan "most consistent with the national
interest." President Belaunde was also authorized to
expropriate equipment, installations and other assets
which either might be needed to operate the fields or to
cover the debts owed the Peruvian state by the company.
A thirty day period begirjning the day the law was
promulgated v;as given as the maximum time the president
would be allowed to effectuate the provisions of the
19
bill.
Once more, the Peruvian State v:as "vindicating" its
rights over La Brea y Parinas. While these same rights
had been "vindicated" several times over the years, the
"'^The entire text of Law No. 1667^ appears in The La Brea y
Farinas Controversy
.
Vol. I, Exhibit 13.
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government of Peru seemed incapable of actually seizing
the oilfields in spite of its numerous laws and proclamations
to that effect. Mirroring past performance, this new
offensive merely signaled the beginning of another onrush
or papers, resolutions, and administrative orders—with
little effect on the actual operations of the International
Petroleum Company.
On July 31, President Eelaunde issued Supreme Decree
61-F, ordering that the oilfields be registered in the
name "of the state in the Real Registry in Piura; he also
instructed the Energy Bureau of the Ministry of Development
to evaluate the worth of the company's investment and to
authorize T.P.C.'to "temporarily" continue to ©Derate the
20
oilfields. On August 10 the Petroleum Bureau issued
Directional Resolution Mo. 76; I.P.C. was to continue
21
operating La Brea y Parinas. For its part, the company
began to flood all available legal and administrative
channels with sundry appeals v;hich argued in general that
Law No. 1667^ was unconstitutional because it deprived
the company of its property without due process. I.P.C.
also argued that the 1922 Laudo had merely settled the
20
Ibid
.
, Exhi bit I6.
21
Ibid . . Exhibit 17-
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question of taxation and that the property rights of
the company/ had nothing to do with tha Laudo; hence, the
invalidation of the latter had no bearing on its property
rights.
There was an electoral campaign under way in the
background of this new paper war. An Accion Popular
deputy from Lima died, and a special complementary
election was scheduled for November 12 to fill his seat.
The bi-election developed into a key test of Belaunde's
political strength. Running against the Belaundista
candidate was APRA's Henrique Chirinos Soto, the man who
had so well articulated Peruvian upper class frustrations
with the Alliance for Progress. Like another prominent
leftist, Eudocio Rabinez, Chirinos Soto had teen co-opted
into the fold of La Prensa by Pedro Beltran. However,
unlike Rabinez, who had broken completely with his former
allies, the Communists, Chirinos Soto could maintain
both his upper class connections and his APRA membership,
for APRA had become closely identified with the upper class.
22
For example, see "Administrative Appeal filed against
Lav; 1667''- v:ith Ministry of Development and Public Works,
August 1, 1967," ibid . Exhibit i;.
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On election eve, the Peruvian government published
what I.P.C. termed "measures of great demagogic appeal"
in the Official Gazette. The Tax Court ruled that I.P.C.
would have to pay the Peruvian government its profits of
the last fifteen years. President Eelaunde issued
Supreme Resolution l609-H ordering the attorney general
to institute^a suit against the company for "unjust
enrichment." November 12 brought ominous news to
President Eelaunde. Aprista Enrique Chirinos Soto
won the election, thus confirming what had been suspected
for some time—Eelaunde
• s popular appeal had declined
considerably and his personal endorsement could no longer
carry an election. Furthermore, since the Aprista
candidate ran on a platform openly hostile to the
president's policies, the election was atest which did
not go unnoticed.
President Eelaunde, who has always held I.P.C.
largely responsible for his political misfortunes, shifted
from a policy of negotiation to one of open confrontation.
The company was still in the process of preparing one of
Ibid., pp. 27-28; Exhibits 25 and 26.
Interview with Former President Fernando Belaunde Terry,
Chevy Chase, Maryland, May 21, 1971.
:een
.on
its appeals against the pre-election decrees when on Novem
ber 17 Belaunde issued an official co^ique declaring
that the National Superintendency of Taxation had oal-"
oulated the amount owed by I.P.c. to the government as U.S
.^I'^'^.OlS.SSa.aS. The figure was the government's
calculation of I.P.C..3 profits during the last fift,
years. Eight days later, a new Supreme Resoluti,
(Mo. 1770-H) ordered the company to pay "complementary
taxes" of 26 million soles within three days "under
warning of attachment." ' On November 21;, International
Petroleum filed an appeal against the government's last
collection order; this appeal was first rejected and then
accepted by the Peruvian government, but on November 29,
I.P.C. learned through the news media that the company's
26
assets had been frozen. I.P.C. immediately paid the
tax bill to free its bank accounts. This was the first
time that the company was directly affected by the
Peruvian government's drive to vindicate the La Brea y
Parinas oilfields!
A long string of government decrees rejecting the
company's appeals came in December and January. On
^5
-^'^ La Prea j Parinas Controversy , Vol. I., Exhibit 30,
26
Ibid
.
. pp. 29-30.
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December 19 the Attorney General was authorized to achieve
full "restitution" and to sue I.P.C. for "unjust enrich-
ment." On January 2?, the Empresa Petrolera Fiscal (E.P.F.)
was designated as the representative of the Peruvian govern-
ment in all dealings with I.P.C. Negotiations between the
managements of I.P.C. and E.P.F. began, and even though the
Peruvian government had expropriated the oilfields already
in law, I.P.C. still negotiated on the position that it
would cede Peru its rights and title over La Erea y Parinas
only in consideration for a cancellation of all debt claims
and for an operating contract whereby the company could
continue to work the fields. The Belaunde government was
willing to drop the debt claims in exchange for La Erea y
Parinas, but it would not give I.P.C. an operating contract.
By mid-February negotiations between I.P.C. and E.P.F.
broke down; neither side was willing to yield on the
27
question of the operating contract.
With his political footing badly shaken, President
Belaunde faced unsurmountable odds. On the one hand, the
opposition-controlled congress had decreed the expro-
priation— it was his responsibility to carry it out. How
could Belailme undertake such a battle with the American
27
Ibid ., pp. 32-33.
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giant and its allies at a time when he was so lacking
in political support? At the same time, the company
showed an unyielding face to the Peruvian executive,
making what amo^onted to a cLeinan.:! for Belaunde's political
head. There was little question that the president could
not have risked in 1968 what he did not want to risk in
196^ when he had far greater political strength.
During the last round of negotiations in January and
February, President Belaunde appealed to the company to
yield—to give up its rights to the oilfields and to the
surface installations. According to I.P.C., Belaunde
assured the company that by yielding La Brea y Parinas
without an operating contract, it would gain a new
28
"certificate of legitimacy." Belaunde 's anxiety
perhaps stemmed from the early 1968 rumor that General Doig,
then Peru's Military Chief of Staff, was preparing a
29
coup d'etat. But I.P.C.'s General Manager Fernando
Espinosa felt less urgency; he had personal meetings
with Generals Doig and Morales Berraudez, and found
28
29
The La Erea j Parinas Controversy . Vol. II (February I969,
International ?e ci-ol eurn Company )
,
p. 1.
Goodwir., p. 72.
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the. well-disposed towards the oo„,pany.^° General Dolg-s
coup never materialized, and mandatory retirement soon
removed him from the political scene. His replacement
was General Juan Velasco Alvarado-a man reportedly
antagonistic to International Petroleum Company for
31political and personal reasons.
On Farch 28, 1968 El Ccn^orcio carried a story declaring
that the Empresa Petrolera Fiscal recommended to President
Eelaunde that it be allowed to take over the La Brea y
Parinas oilfields. The article noted that the recommenda-
tion was unanimously approved by the E.P.F. Board of
Say'28^'lV7u^
Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
30
31
In 19^11, Peru was at the brink of war with Ecuador.There were rumors that the Ecuadorian Air Force wasabout to bomb Peru. I.P.C.'s personnel knew better,for in tneir capacity as gasoline suppliers to theEcuadorian air bases, they had noted that Ecuador'splanes were /^rounded due to poor m^aintenance
. At theheignt of this crisis, a Peruvian army captain arrived
at lalara, endeavoring to commandeer motor v^v^icl^- ^otake his troops to the front. The I.P.C. manager "Tn^Talara refused to co-operate with the captain untU hehad a chance to consult the authorities in Lima.
Communications being what they were then, it took some
24 hours to secure an answer from the capital. After
what must have seemed an interminable wait, the furious
captain received the equipment he needed and proceeded
to the front 2^!- hours behind schedule. The car)tain
became a General--Juan Velasco A?varado. Interview
with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida, Way 2^, 1971,
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Directors, on which General Jorge Maldonado represented
the Ar.ed Forces. The article also revealed that prior
to the final vote on the recommendation, General Maldonado
asked for a twenty-four hour delay so that he could consult
With the Armed Forces command, and that the latter was in
favor Of the recommendation. While the contents of '
the E.P.F.-Armed Forces recommendation was never made
public, the Miro Quesadas must have interpreted the
document as being quite radical, for on the following day,
El Com.ercio editorially applauded a document of which it
had very limited knowledge .
"^"^
While many of the actual details of these developments
were obscure, there was evidence to the effect that these
events in late March were very significant. According
to President Eelaunde, he requested the E.P.F. Board of
Directors and its President, Carlos Loret de Mola, to
draw up a recommendation for a final solution to the La
Erea y Parinas problem. On March 21, Loret de Mola
forvjarded a proposed decree to President Belaunde. The
"Reversion al Estado de los yacimientos de Rr'ea y
^Parinas pide E.P.F.," El Cc:'ercio
. March 28, 1968, p. 1.
33
"El Directoric de E.P.F. ha cumplido con su deber,"
El Conercio, March 28, I968, p. 2.
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proposal was remarkably tame; it ordered E.P.P. to take
over the npn-£roduclns areas of La Brea y Parinas and
develop them, while I.P.c. would continue to operate
the existing facilities. The proposed resolution provided
that all proceeds from the operation be deposited in a
bank. I.P.c. would be compensated for operating costs, but
the profits would remain in the bank pending a later agree-
ment with company. Included with the proposed resolution,
there was a covering letter from E.P.P. Director Carlos
Loret de Kola; he assured Eeladnde that General Maldonado
supported the resolution and that both E.P.p. and the Armed
Forces were behind it.
It is possible that Smpresa Petrolera Fiscal took this
position because Carlos Loret de Mola actually doubted the
ability of the state enterprise to run the complex operation
at La Erea y Parinas. It is also possible that the Armed
Forces acquiesed to Loret de Mola in a effort to trap
President Belaunde. Since a coup had been in the vjorks for
some time, the military might have wanted to encourao-e
Photostatic copies of both the proposed resolution and
the letter were shovm to this researcher by Former
President Eelaunde, who stated that he had never before
released tnic information. Interview with Fernando
^^Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase, Maryland, May 21,1971.
The information on Loret de Mola's doubts comes from a
confidential Interview with an I.P.C. Executive, Coral
Gables, Florida, May 25, 1971.
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Belaunde to reach a compromise, and then use the com-
promise itself as an excuse to take over the reins of
power. Someone leaked information to El Gomercio to the
effect that E.P.P. and the Armed Forces wanted to take
over La Brea y Parinas immediately; however, the details
were withheld. If Belaunde had interpreted the position
of the Armed Forces on the I. P.O. problem as rather lax
or even favorable to the company, he might have been
tempted to yield to I.P.C.'s demands for an operating
contract. Once the agreement was finalized, the Armed
Forces could have overthrown Belaunde and then denied ever
agreeing to such a concession, and the story in HI
Gomercio on March 23 would have corroborated their denial.
General Juan Velasco Alvarado vjas, in his capacity as
Army chief, involved with the proposed resolution.
Perhaps the "banana peel" which President Belaunde feared
from Haya de la Torre in 196'+ had actually been dropped
in his path by the Armed Forces command in 1968.
President Belaunde decided to i,gnore the solution
proposed by E.P.F. and the Armed Forces. He kept it
confidential, perhaps hoping that the version of the
story car-'ued by El Gomercio would provide additional
pressure on I.P.G. Fernando Espinosa indeed took note
of the El Gomercio article, and on April 1 the company
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filed a co^unique with the Minister of Development
Elvlng its own version of the negotiations with E.P F up
to that point. Acoording to this statement. Loret de Kola
remained adamant on the au^qfinn o^n q est o of an operating contract;
however, he had.
.
.
^^;-*.!:^^®^ persuade I.P.C. to assirn in «definitive manner an it--- ^-^^^ • "^^^-i-S^ ii^ a
located on La™rea1'pa^rnirto""iSf Itltt'
VolntTAlTtTl continue 'in
,,v,i-n ?, operate the oil fielduntil there might be formalized the abovementioned operating contract with ! ?
°
which could be finalized within a y^^^^ora year and a half. 36 ^
In other words, Loret de Mola wanted I.F.c. to yield its
claims on the promise that an operating contract could
be secured later on. The company refused.
April, May and June went by without any further
meaningful action on the petroleum front. The Peruvian
government was preoccuppied with the economic and
political problems of the day. On J-one 1, Acci6n Popular
selected Edgardo Seoane as its presidential nominee for
the 1969 elections. On July ?, Haya de la Torre announced
his own candidacy. Fernando Belaunde, constitutionally
barred from running, became a "lame duck" executive. But
IS
The La Proa x Parinas Controversy . \/ol . II, Exhibit ^1-7
.
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as the candidates lined up on crucial issues, the question
became whether President Eelaunde's government would endure
to the end of its constitutional term.
Realizing the extreme vulnerability of the constitutional
order in Peru, I . P.
C.
^decided to yield at last to the
President's demands. On July 25, three days before
Belaunde was to present his annual address to Congress,
an I.P.C. executive walked into the office of Belaunde's
Minister of Development and announced that the company was
now ready to transfer La Brea y Parinas and the installa-
tions thereon to the Peruvian State; the company also
agreed to renounce its claims over the subsoil, and would
abandon its insistance on an operating contract as a
condition of the agreement. In exchange for its con-
cessions, I.P.C. expected the government to drop all debt
claims against the company, and to agree to have S.?.F.
sell I.P.C. the petroleum from La Brea y Parinas so that
the company could continue its refining and marketing
operations in Peru. The government reacted "first with
33incredulity, and subsequently with unsurpassed delight."
In his July 28 address to Congress, President
Belaunde dedicated considerable time to the announcement
37
"^^e La Erea ^ Parinas Controversy , Vol. II. PP. 1-2.
38
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or the settlement. OnX, the details or the transfer as
-11 as subsequent arrangements for supping the I.P.c
-nnery at Talara re.aine. to be wor.ed out. The main
I.P.C. the petroleun, it extracted from the nationalized
La Brea y Parinas. Ecla^de also announced to Congress
that he would travel to Talara to sign the final agree-
ment with the company as coon a.=; tho •J o „u s e remaining details
had been worked out.
Arriving at an agreement on the celling price proved
-re difficult than anticipated. By Monday, August 5, no
agreement had been reached, but Belaunde, anxious to
finalize the deal, declared to the press that he would
travel to Talara during that week. Saturday brought "
still no agreement, and the President summcned the
negotiators to the Executive Palace in an effort to
pressure them into agreement. Joining I.F.C.'s Lima
management was the President of International Petroleum
Company, James Dean: joining E.P.P.'s management were
several Cabinet members and the President himself.
Pelaunde reportedly told the negotiators that he wanted
to keep his promise to travel to Talara. Mo progress
vjas made during the long day of negotiation. I.P.C.
wanted E.P.F. to supply it with at least 80% of the oil
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produced at La Brea y Parinas-at the price of $1.80 per
barrel. The company also wanted the State enterprise to
retain more La Brea y Parinas workers than E.P.F.
was willing to accept. Finally, speaking for I.P.C,"
James Dean insisted that Peru should give the company a
concession to exploit certain tracts in the Selva region.
This demand was later dropped.
"^^
Saturday's negotiations broke down late that night
when Relaujnde announced that he was being forced to take
stem measures. There was no movement on Sunday,
Belaunde's self-imposed deadline for his trip to Talara
with the agreement. On Monday morning, El Comercic
came out with a prominently displayed front page headline
announcing an "impasse" in the negotiations, and also
noting that I.P.C. demanded a concession in the Selva
region of Eastern Peru as well as a contract to purchase
E.P.F. petroleum for $1.80 per barrel.
On Monday
3 August 12, International Petroleum again
attempted to resume negotiations. The government's
position vjas now that since the company's demands had
been m.ade public knowledge through an unidentified leak
to El Comercio
.
the government could no longer accept
39
For almost an hour by hour account of the few days
preceding the agreement of August 13 see: Zimmermann.
PP. 11-19.
"Impasse sobre La Brea y Parinas--La IPC estaria
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these terms. I.p.c. dropped its demands for a con-
cession ir. the Selva region but car., to no agreement on
the priice it would pay for E.P.F. petroleum. Ey mid-
night, the negotiations broke do;vn once more. President
Relaunde then ordered that a decree of expropriation
be drav:n up, and at three o'clock in the morning of
August 13, 1968, the Cabinet approved the expropriation.
In a final effort to reach an agreement, Belailnde's
Prime Minister, Osvaldo Hercelles telephoned the American
Ambassador, John Wesley Jones to inform him of the step
the Peruvian government was about to take. The ambassador
asked for a three or four hour delay, and within that
time span he persuaded I.P.C. 's general manager, Fernando
Espinosa to return to the Presidential Palace and accept
the governm.ent
'
s terms. E.P.F. would take only 167 I.P.C.
workers and the rest would remain with the American company
I.P.C. would pay OI.97 per barrel for E.P.F. petroleum,
and the state enterprise would determine how m.uch petroleum
it would sell I.P.C. The company would supply E.P.F. with
water, and maintenance services from its utility plL.nt3
in Talara at a price to be determined later. The final
agreement vras signed at 5:30 A.M. on August 13, 196R.
pidiendo una concesion en la Selva. . ."El Comercio
.
August 12,. 1968, p.' 1.
hi
Ibid.; Goodwin, pp. 80-82.
"Zimmermann, pp. 11-19: Richard Goodwin, ibid .
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Later the same day, the President and several Members of
his Cabinet, the Presidents of both chambers of Congress
(both Apristas) and I.P.c. management flew to Talara and
in a brief ceremony signed the Acta de Talara-the official
document by which the^Peruvian state acquired the La Erea
y Parinas oilfields.
The Act of Talara was indeed an historic document,
but one which only outlined formally the details of the
agreement. The actual terms were delineated in the
contract signed earlier that morning at the Presidential
Palace. Unfortunately, E.P.F.'s Loret de Mola and I.P.C. 'c
Fernando Espinosa signed different contracts. Since I.P.C.
was to supply La Brea y Parinas with certain services, and
the price of these services was not immediately determined,
Loret de Mola insisted that I.P.C. should not be able to
make deductions for those services so as to bring the
price of crude oil below a certain minimum level--;|;i
.0835.
Espinosa refused to bind the company to provide the services
on such terms.
Each subscriber to the contract maintained that the
document he signed reflected his position on the nir^iT.um
price question. The typed contract contained no provision
^3
For the text of the Act of Talara, see The La Erea ^
Parina.i Controversy
, Bol. II, Exhibit ^i8.
for a minimum price- It- Vn^ „iP t had eleven paf:es. but the text
endea at the bottom or the tenth pa,e. The H.P.P. Oirectorlater claimed that he wrote: »In any event, the price
for crude oil shall be no less than $1.0835,» and then
sipjied his name near thp tr,r>^ne op of page eleven. Pdchard
Goodwin, Who investigated the matter in great detail and
interviewed both Espinosa and Loret de Hola, speculated
that While the document was in transit from one room to
the other, page eleven was removed. Espinosa then signed
at the bottom of page ten. The lawyers who handled the
contract asked Loret de Hola to sign each page on the
margin, so that Espinosa assumed that his E.p.p. counter-
part merely signed the document in that manner. The end
result was a ten page contract signed at the margin of
every page by Loret de Kola and at the bottom of page ten
by Fernando Espinosa, with no provision for a minimum
price
.
On September- 6, Carlos Loret de Mola and three other
members of the Board of Directors of Empresa Petroleo
Fiscal resiomed. In their letter of resignation, they
alleged a lack of cooperation from Minister of Development,
For a more detailed analysis of this contract mystery
see: Goodwin, pp, 32-86.
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Pablo Carriquiry. nore specifically, Loret de Nola and
his supporters argued that when they tried to assume the
administrative duties over the oilfields. I.P.c. turned
them away, saying that the agreement reached in August
called for the cornpany to operate the fields until the
end Of the year 1968. Furthermore, the for^.er E.P.p.
Director objected to the Peruvian govern.enfs permission
for I.P.c. to expand its Talara refinery.''' gi Comercio,
Which had been itching to openly attack Eelaunde, seized'
on the resignation of Loret de Kola and other Board members
to initiate a campaign against the Act of Talara. Through
its front page headlines and its editorials, don Luis
Kir$..Quesada once more dug into one of his favorite topics
the I.P.C. controversy.
On the evening of Septenber 10, almost a month after
the actual signing of the contract between I.P.c. and
E.P.F., Carlos Loret de Mola appeared on television to
^5
For the complete text of the letter, see: "'Por ^alta deCoordmacicn' Renuncio Directorio de EPF " La Fmr-oSeptember 8, 1968, p. 8. ' ~
^^-n.c
,
Carlos Miro Quesada, Peru's Ambassador to Italy v/asforcea to resign his post after he snubbed the" visit-ing Aprista President of Peru's Chamber of De-outiesPor detaixs, see: "Miro Quesada Ceso er Cargo "
La Prensa
. September 1, 1Q68, p. 2.
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publically denounce the disappearance of page eleven-
that page of the contract on which he claimed to have
set a minimum price of $1.0835 for the crude oil I.P.C.
would be purchasing from E.P.F. The following morning
both major Lima newspapers, which were by then quite
antagonistic to BelaWe, carried large headlines
suggesting foul play.
On September 6, the same day Loret de Mola resigned
from E.P.F.
,
a group of political leaders gathered in
a ceremony to mark the introduction of Augusto Zimmermann's
book, Historia Secreta del Petroleo
.
a frankly ant i -I.P.C.
work by the protege of Don Luis Mirb ^uesada, to whom the
book is dedicated. The book, which at the time covered
the controversy through the Act of Talara, was critical of
President Eelaunde for not giving credit to the Mirb
Quesadas and' the other anti-I.P.C. leaders during his
Talara speech. Present at the meeting were some of the
campaigners of the early 1960's, such as Alberto Ruiz
Eldredge and Alfonso Eenavides Correa. More importantly,
tv^o major political leaders were also rjresent:
m
"Grave dcnuncia de Loret de Mola--Contracto firmado
el 13 do Agosto fue alterado y le I'alta und pagina," El
Comercio
, September 11, 1968, p. 1; "Loret de Mola
Dcnuncio quo no Aparecc una Pagina del Gontracto
con la IPC," La Pronsa
,
September 11, 1968, p. 1.
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Hector Cornejo Chavez, the leader of the Christian
Democrats, and Edgardo Seoane, Accio^n Popular's Pres-
idential nominee. ' The meeting, which introduced a
book openly hostile to President Eeladnde, was in itself
a sign of the government's troubles. The Christian
Democrats ended their coalition with Accion Popular just
prior to the November 1967 bi-election, and Acci6n Popular
itself had veered left in support of its more radical
leader, Edgardo Seoane.
With the administration almost bereft of political
support, one of Belaurde's top advisor's, Manuel Ulloa,
apparently attempted to forge an alliance of loyal
Eelaundistas and Haya de la Torre's Apristas. While there
was no absolute proof of this alliance, the evidence
indicated its existance. For instance, in June 1968, the
APRA majority passed Law No. 1704^ giving the President
extensive powers for a period of sixty days ""to solve the
structural unbalanced conditions of public finances, to
strengthen the international balance of payments of the
country and to promote the complete development of our
^
"'Historia Secrota del Petroleo" reunion ayer a
Seoane y Cornejo," S]_ Comercio, September 7,1968, p. 3.
278
economy." The law allowed BelaOi.de to take extra-
ordinary measures by decree to deal with the deteriorating
economic conditions of the country. It wa. this law which
allowed Bela^nde to negotiate the Act of Talara without
Congressional approval, m fact, part of the urgency to
conclude the agreement with I.P.c. was due to the fact
that the sixty day period giving the President extra-
ordinary powers was close to expiring in early August.
Not only did APRA give Belaimdo carte blanche to deal
with Peru's problems, but it defended his use of the
extraordinary powers. In a television interview, the
ApriGta President of the Chamber of Deputies praised
the government for acting sensibly during the sixty days.'°
While Eelaunde's former allies, the Christian Doinocrats
villified hiG emergency measures, APRA defended them.
On Septem.ber 1, an Aprista Deputy who accused the govern-
ment of dishonesty v;as suspended; while Eelaunde's own
52party opposed the suspension, APRA pressed for it.
^^The La Brca v Farinas Controvercy, Vol. II, Exhibit 50.
"Tovjnsend Dice Actual Gabinete Actua con Acierto y
^^csura," La Prensa
, August 4, 1968, p. 2.
51
"PDC Cri.ica los Impuestos; SI Apr a Defiende al Siecutivo."
La Prensa, August 30, I968, p. 1.
52
"Suspended 2 Dias a Diputado Villaran Por Dccir
•Dishonesto' al Gobierno," La Prensa
. September 1, 196S
p. 1 .
*
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A Peruvian magazine, Oi^, had denounced the covert
Belaunde.APHA alliance for some ti.e, and by the middle
of 1968 La Prensa joined in these denunciations, thus
prompting APRA's Secretary Armando Villanueva to go on
television to deny the existence of a. understanding
between his party and President Eelaunde.^^
El Cor:crciq remained strangely silent through most of
this period. Given the strong antagonism the Miro-
Quesadas harbored for APHA, SI Comercio 's boss could not
have failed to notice the apparent v/arming relations
betvreen ^elaunde and APRA. When the Aprista President of
the Chamber of Deputies, Armando Villanueva visited Rom.e
in August, Carlos Miro-Quesada—Belaunde
• s Ambassador
to Italy, refused to receive him. The Peruvian Congress
demanded an apology, and when the Ambassador refused,
the Eelauiide government apologized on his behalf. Carlos
Miro-Quesada imm.edlately resigned, and the fate of
Eelaunde in the pages of El Comercio was sealed. On
August 15, that newspaper carried both a rather hostile
statement by the former Ambassador, and an editorial in
which El Comercio suspended judgement on the Act of Talara
53
"Alianza con A. P. o el P.S.D. Mego Villanueva por T,V.,"
La Prensa
, September 2, I968, p. 2.
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pending a clarification of the conditions of the contract
When Carlos Loret de Mola resigned and then denounced
the alteration of the contract. El Comercio
. La Prensa
.
the Christian Democrats, and even the Odriistas (U.N.o.'),
Which had earlier broken its coalition with APRA, joined'
their voices to attack Belaunde. The Act of Talara and the
"missing page" became their battle cry as they rushed to
destroy what had the potential of being a formidable poli-
tical alliance between Peru's t«o ^.ost appealing political
leaders, Fernando Belaunde Terry and Vfotor Ra^l Haya de
la Torre.
The day after Loret de Kola made his "page eleven"
denunciation on television, a group of thirty-cix Army
generals met to study the developments surrounding the
Acta de Talara- they were led by Juan Velasco Alvarado.
The Peruvian- Kavy and Air Force were reported to be studying
the matter separately. Only the Army generals reached a
conclusion— they disapproved of the measures taken by the
Peruvian governm.ent after the Act of Talara and sent a com-
munication to Belaunde via the Minister of VJar, Kith a re-
quest that it be passed on the Chamber of Deputies. Bv
5!^
"Exposicion del Embajador del Peru en Italia," ^ Comercio,August 15, 1963, p. 1; "La Becuperacion de La Erea y i'ariFa^ "
El Comercio
. August I5, I968, p. 2.
*
^^"El Ejercito emite opinion sobre La Brea y Parinas," El
Comercio
. September 13, I968, p, 1.
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September 15, neither the Navy nor the Air Force had joined
the Ar.y in disapproving of BelaOlnde's petroleum policies,
but General Velasco Alvarado publically affirmed that the
Joint Command (Army, Mavy and Air Force chiefs) would issue
a communique on the I.P.C. controversy . -^^
With the Armed Forces on a collision course with the
Belaunde administration, the political parties hurried to
realign their positions. In an effort to pacify the Army,
APRA demanded that I.P.C. pay for the privilege of exploiting
La Brea y Parinas until the end of the year. .Aprista
Congressional leaders also joined in the criticism of
Cabinet members most identified with the Act of Talara.
The Christian Democrats intensified their attacks on the
Act, and even the Catholic Church, in an obvious effort
not to be left out of what promised to be the political cause
of the century, demanded through Cardinal Juan Landazuri
57that the contract be clarified.
To complicate the president's already desperate situation,
Accion Popular' s presidential candidate Edgardo Seoane m.ade
a stinging attack on the Cabinet and deraanvied that the agree-
ment on La Brea y Parina? be annulled. The follovjing day,
^ "Solo el iljercito ha opinado hasta ahora sobre La Brea,"
La Pronsa
.
September I6, I96S, p. 1.
^"^See Ll_ Comercio and La Prensa, September 17-19, I968;
The La Brea '£ L-arinas Controversy « Vol. II, pp. 13-I6.
52"Dura critica de Seoane a T^inistros Populistas," La
Prensa, September 21, I968, p. 1.
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September 21, Eelaunde ousted Seoane fro. the party and
ordered a "reorganization" of Accidn Popular. This action
split the party into two groups siding with Seoane and
Bela^de respectively . ^9 At one point, Seoanistas and
Belaundistas battled for the Acci6n Popular headquarters,
with the latter gaining control of the offices with support
from the police. ^0 Through this inter-party fighting, APRA's
leadership remained loyal to Eelaunde, and attacked the
Seoanistas as people "acting without moral courage. "^^
With every major political group except APTA attacking
the Act of Talara, and even the Cardinal of Lima dem.anding
an explanation. President Eelaunde 's Minister of :.'ar, General
Jose Gagliardi moved to cool the ram.pant rumors of a coup.
On September 2D, General Gagliardi declared that the Armed
Forces would not assume "an attitude of force, at the margin
of the Constitution," and neither v/ould they take a position
on the controversy. However, the following day. General
Velasco declared: "The announcement by Minister Gagliardi
has no validity. Neither the Armed Forces nor the Joint
Command depends on one minister." The writing was on the—
Eelaunde destituyo a Seoane," La Prcnsa, September 21, 196S
^'^"Seoaniotas Sitiaron Local AP; ^olicia Golpeo a Diputadc,"
La Prensa, September 25, I968, p. 1.
^^"lo Votardn Moci6n de Censura; Incidente Frustro la Sesion,
La Prensa
.
September 27, I968, p. 1.
^2«La FA no Tomara actitude de Fuerza declare ayer el Ministro
Gagliardi," La Prensa
,
September 21, I968, p. 1; "General
Velasco dijo que la PA depende de un Ministro, Desautorizo
a Gaglio'.rdi , " La Prensa
.
September 22, I968, p. 1.
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the military was ready to seize the opportvu^lty to take
over the Peruvian government.
In a token effort to prevent the inevitable coup. APRA-s
secretary General, Armando Villanueva declared that Apristas
would not tolerate such an act. He warned the military to
pay no heed to the extremists of right and left «ho promoted
a coup, and he encouraged the Apristas to take arms against
any such attempt. - Despite Deputy Villanueva- s statements,
the end of the Belafede administration was just a matter
of time.
On October 2, Belaunde appointed a nevi Cabinet in the
hope of stemming the coup; but in the early hours of the
follox^ng day, the old routine arou^id the Presidential
Palace was staged once more. President Belaunde v/as rudely
awakened .by the Peruvian Rangers. The morning issue of
La Prensa carried a front page picture of a lieutenant and
a captain pushing President BelaCinde out of the Palace.
On October 4, the junta guided by General Juan Velasco
Alvarado issued a decree declaring the I . ?. C. -E. P.P. contract
and the Act of Talara null and void. On October 9, another
decree expropriated the Talara refinery as v;ell as La Erea
y Parinas; this action was justified by the new government
^3
"Villanueva autorizo Ayer a los Apristas a ccnbatir si hay
im Golpe de Estado," La Prensa, September 22, I968, p. 1.
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as an effort to collect the "debt" „hich I.P.c. owed the
Peruvian nation. Unlike previous ^overn.ent decrees on
the problem, this one was backed by action. Forty officers
and one thousand troops moved in to take the oil fields,
and a Rear Admiral of the Peruvian Navy was assigned to'
take Talara.
After the seizure, International Petroleum Company was
left with its 50;r ownership of the Lima Concessions (jointly
ovmed with Companra Petrolera Lobitos) as well as its net-
work of gas stations, storage facilities and offices. But
on January 28, I969 everything, including the compc^ny's Lim.a
offices, was expropriated. The Peruvian government took
the position that I.P.C. would be compensated for the expro-
priated property as soon as the company paid the alleged
debt of U.S. $690,524,283. This sum represented the govern-
ment's calculation of the value of all products extracted
from La Brea y Farinas from March 1, 1924 to October 9, 1963/^
After fifty years of involvement in Peru, Standard Oil
of New Jersey, one of the world's largest corporations with
enormous yearly profits and assets, was humiliated by the
Peruvian government, as it had once humiliated Peru by
I2. ^^"^a y Parinas Controversy . Vol. II, pp. 17-18.
^^Ibid., p. 30.
285
threatening to shut off its fuel supplies. Troops took
over I.P.c. property, and the eovemment issued warrants
for the arrest of its management personnel. It took Peru
half a century to grow fro™ a primitive society which could
be easily manipulated by foreigners with superior technology
and power, into a self-assertive nation ready not only to
correct the injustices, but to administer what it considered
just retribution to the foreign company which overstayed
its weloorae by several decades.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
.eum
In taking over the assets of International Petrol,
Company in Peru the military Junta headed by General Juan
Velasco Alvarado argued that I.P.C.'s was a "unique- case-
the company existed under historical circumstances unlike
those facing any other company in Peru.^ However, this
argument did not originate with the junta. It was part
of El Comercio.'s policy for years to report favorably on
the activities of other American companies, including oil
companies, while attacking I.P.G. This vehement anti-
I.P.C. policy was echoed in official circles and eventually
suceeded in isolating I.P.G. from other American enterprises
in Peru, who came to view the company as a potential spoiler
of their good standing in the host country.^
But the anti-I.P.G. argument had more than tactical
value as a means of dividing potential opponents. It had
logical validity. Asked vrhy he disliked I.p.C, an uniden-
tified Peruvian general with the present government responded:
"They bribed ministers, corrupted governments, and promoted
1
Peru, Petroleos del Peru, Departmento de Relaciones Publicas,
El Petr6le o en el_ Peru ; distoria de un Case Sin.^ular mra
que el Hundo lo J"uzgue . ( Lima : Petroleos del reru, 1965 }
.
2Both President delaunde and General Manager Fernando Espinosa
agreed on this assessment. Interview v:ith Fernando Belaunde
Terry, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Hay 21, 1971; Interview with
Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida, May 28, 1971.
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revolutions."^ The evidence pointed to the truth of this
Charge, at least during the period covered in the available
Department of State diplomatic correspondence between the
United States government and the American iilmbassy in Lima.
However, as Richard Goodwin noted, "it takes two to make
a bribe, and you cannot corrupt the incorruptible."^
Nevertheless, the generals who carried out the coup and
subsequent seizure of La Brea y Parinas in I968 i.ere aware
of I.P.C.'s historic role in Peruvian politics—as the
rescuer of doomed incompetent Cabinet officials, as
the undervTTiter of any government which promised to leave
the company alone, and as the promoter of international
intrigues designed to bend the will of Peru's public officials.
Luigl Einaudi suggested that during the 1960's Peruvian
military intelligence began electronic surveilance of I.P.C.'s
telephone communications, and they disliked their discovery
of the company's financial largess towards nearly every
major political party.
^
Simple nationalistic pride, vrounded by an awareness of
the historic political role of I.P.C., did not entirely
explain the decision by the military to expropriate I.P.C.'s
-^Richard Goodwin. "Letter from Peru," The Hew Yorlrer (liay 17,
1969). T).
'Ibid.
^Conversation with Luigi Einaudi at the 67th Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. Illinois,
September 7, 1971-
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assets. For years Peru's military trained itself through
the Center for Higher Military Studies (G.i..E.H.) to for-
mulate and carry out developmental plans for Peru. In I962.
they made a brief attempt at social planning but then decided
to slve civilian leadership a final chance. When President
Belaunde's program did not progress as quickly as they had
envisioned, the generals once more became restless to carry
out reforms. Many developments in I968 prompted the military
to take over the government. The "page eleven" scandal
weakened the already feeble Belaunde government. The pos-
sibility of a Civilista-type coalition including APHA and
the Belaundistas would have provided a formidable counter-
balance to the military's influence in Peruvian political
life, a state of affairs not seen since the 19th century.
The possibility of such a block, or "frente unico" as La
^^g-^s^ called it, had to be aborted at the earliest possible
moment if the C.A.£.l-l. plans were ever to become operable.
V/hatever the motive for the coup itself, the reason
for the seizure was clearly one of immediate political ex-
pediency. For years the Peruvian leftists such as the Social
Progressists and the m.em-bers of the Front for the Defense
of Petroleum, and some conservatives, notably the aire
Quesada family and some Odriistas, had sold the Peruvian
people on the importance of nationalizing I.P.C.'s La 3rea
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y Parinas. For almost ten years the Peruvian radical left
and El Comercio built up a political savings account payable
only to the person, group, or political party which nation-
alized 1^ Brea y PariHas. That gigantic pay check of national
political goodwill awaited the "vindicator- of the property.
Naturally. I.P.c..s staunch enemies hoped to be a party to
that final payment. But International Petroleum Company,
knowing that someone would benefit tremendously by the
nationalization of Brea y Parinas. decided that so long
as the benefit would be at the company's expense, I.P.c.
should have the power to determine the beneficiary. That
was why I.P.C. yielded to Belaunde on July 25. 1968, for
the company knew that by then the question was not whether
the property would be nationalized, but rather, by whom.
In an effort to save what was in fact its least antagonistic
political opponents, I.P.C. attempted to make President
Belaunde and APilA the political beneficiaries of the long
awaited "vindication.
"
It was precisely because I.P.C. jum.ped the gun on its
would-be executors that SI Comercio and the radical left
reacted with anger and frustration vrhen the achievement of
their goal was finally announced by President Belaunde on
July 28, 1968. Had they not been clamoring for the
vindication of La Brea y Parinas? The ansx-:er of course was
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yes. but by then. Fernando Belaunde and the APR^ leadership
in Congress who gave him the authority to reach the agree-
ment, would have become the recipients of a huge payoff of
political goodwill. It was after all Fernando Belaunde and
the Aprista leaders of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies
Who travelled to Talara to officiate in the actual ceremony
of Vindication. How
.could the arch enemies of AFRA sit by
and see that party share in the glory of the Acta de Talara
at the expense of the radical anti-I.P.G. leaders who had
fought the company for a seemingly interminable ten years?
What a relief to the radical left and to Zl Gomercio
when the scandal over "page eleven" developed.' Assuming
that the page did exist and that Carlos Loret de Mola did
write in a minimum price for the oil I.P.C. would purchase
from S.P.F.. the provision was relatively insi^gnificant
compared to the magnitude of the agreement reached. In fact,
the minimum price provision might have been irrelevant,
since I.P.C. 's utility service charges might not have reduced
its oil payments below that minimum price. In any case,
there was a clause in the contract X'Jhereby Empresa Petrolera
Fiscal could stop sales in tv7o years if the price was not
agreeable. Furthermore, the price of I.P.C. 's services to
ri.P.F. had to be negotiated in the future, and I.P.C. certainly
would not have been free to manipulate the price of petroleum
291
in such a way as to cause E.P.p. to lost money m La Brea
y Parlnas. But these considerations were ignored. To
Peruvians, what mattered was that I.P.c. allegedly conspired
to defraud their country, an accusation which found a
sympathetic hearing from people long conditioned to viewing
I.P.C. in the worst possible light. During the month of
September, the campaign of innuendos tagged responsibility
for the scandal on the Cabinet.
.Although President Belaunde
tried to rid himself of the suspected Cabinet, his own poli-
tical head came tumbling down.
International Petroleum's last gamble, foiled by the
military coup, would have been a masterful move had it
taken place before-even as late as I967. but preferably in
196^^-1965. The company could have given President Belaunde
a substantial boost x^Jhich in turn might have generated
American aid funds and success in many of his programs. But
International Petroleum Company did not, perhaps could not.
bring itself to yield earlier than July I968. By that time,
it was already too late; not even the devolution of La Brea
y Parinas could stop the impending coup. In fact, the com-
pany's acquiesence precipitated the coup by providing a
"now or never" situation which the generals could not overlook
They had to sieze power before Belaunde rallied political
support for the agreement.
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In spite Of the fact that President Belaunde reaped
the consequences of the forceful overthrow of the Peruvian
government, and to this da, appears to be the only significant
Peruvian political figure living in exile by order of
. the
junta, the military coup had a greater effect on APRi^ than
on the Belaundistas. For instance, the junta has given-
top priority to the agrarian reform program for the large
sugar plantations of Trujillo and Chiclayo, traditional
strongholds of Aprista unionism. Its purpose is said to
be "that of weakening the agricultural union of the northern
seaboard.
. .
Since a coup designed to keep AmA out of power could
hardly be justified, the seizure of I.P.G.'s La Brea y
PariTlas, the Talara complex, and later on the company's
remaining assets, became the legitimizing element. The
junta was forced to go beyond a mere seizure of La Brea -r
Parinas because, after all. Belaunde had already arranged
for its transfer to the state, rlssisted by the same radicals
who had led the anti-I.P.G. campaign in the early 1960's.
the military junta charged the company vrith a tax claim
so large (over 69O million dollars) that I.P.G.'s assets
in Peru could never match the aller.ad debt. By sparing
most other -American investments, and compensating the few
which were also nationalized, such as International
^Marcel Niedergang. "Revolutionary liationalism in Peru.
"
Foreign /affairs
, 49. ilo. 3 (April, 1971), pp. ^59-^60.
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Telephone and Telegraph, the junta insured the further
isolation Of I.P.G. from the native Peruvian and American
business communities.
By following a limited confiscation, the junta managed
to reap bountiful support from the left, while maintaining
the neutrality of and even securing support from the right.
Alberto Ruiz Eldredge. one of the radical champions in the
anti-I.F.C. offensive and leader of the Social Progressists,
actively participated in the shaping of the junta's post-
coup petroleum policy. He later irrote a pamphlet lavishing
praise on General Velasco Alvarado and designated October 9
as "The Day of National Dignity. ""^ The Soviet weekly Hew
Times began to carry highly favorable articles witten by
Peruvians—hailing the new Peruvian anti-imperialist policy.^
Evidence of the junta's support from the, right of the
Peruvian political spectrum was more difficult to find,
but according to Richard Goodwin,
Velasco has found support among the
conservative banking and commercial
families, who see his accession as
a way to increase their x\realth and
have encouraged him to place nevr res-
trictions on their foreign banking
com"Dct iters
.
'^Alberto nuiz iildredge. El Pia de la Dignidad -"aclonal
(Lima: Ministerio de Transportes y Comimlcaciones , 1971).
Gustavo Valcarcel. "Peruvian Paradoxes," New Times (Moscow),
No. 2 (January 13. I969). PP. 20-22.
^Goodwin, p. 100.
2Qk
Support from traditional conservatives in Peru Is difficult
to gase. Since the newspapers which in the past articulated
these interests, particularly Prensa. have operated under
less than complete freedom since the coup.
Perhaps the most frustrated of all Peruvian groups
involved in the I.P.C. controversy was the Hiro Quesada
family. The junta forced El Comercio to accept and deal
With a union, which has the statuatory right to space in
the editorial page of the paper to answer or refute editorials
With which it disagrees. The proud Don Luis Iliro Quesada
has been forced to print material which is uncomplimentary
to his oT-m family. The threat of union-sponsored editorials
and the possibility of a government shut down of El Comercio
and all other newspapers has deprived the Hiro Quesadas of
their power to make and un-make Peruvian governments.'
Clearly. Don Luis Miro Quesada did not foresee that
his anti-I.P.G. campaign would have the effects it had. He
hoped that with the creation of a powerful state petroleum
monopoly the power of the government would increase, and
since El Comercio ' s power is but a function of its ability
to influence, veto or prom.ote governm.ent "oolicy, he believed
that his paper's power would grow accordingly. Peruvian
chief of state Juan Velasco Alvarado appears to be unvjilling
295
to allow the Hiro Quesadas or Pedro Beltran to hold the
enormous power they held during the Prado and Belaunde
administrations.
Not satisfied with being the managers who act out
the directives of a board composed of prominent Peruvians
issuing their memoranda in the form of editorials and paid
announcements in the Lima dailies, the generals have become
the actual policy makers of Peru. Unlike the junta of I963-
1963. which set out to repress communists because la Prensa
said the country vias in danger from them, the I968 junta
has repressed the news media. The generals define Peru's
enemies
.
International Petroleum Company's former general
manager Fernando Espinosa suggested that the La Brea y
Parinas controversy was encouraged by and kept alive with
the blessings of the Peruvian oligarchy—a group which cal-
culated that as long as a highly visible foreign company
could be made the object of popular hatred, Peru's pressing
socio-economic problems would remain out of the political
10
vortex. If his assessment is correct, that strategy
indeed worked for some time. However, the I.P.C. controvers
''"^Intervie-.r x>Jith Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida.
Hay 28, 1971.
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eventually developed into a catalyst for reform. Having
billed themselves as radical reformers on the I.P.c. issue,
the generals had to keep the momentum by enacting programs
which are dramatically accelerating the erosion of the
oligarchy's power.
Beyond the immediate causes and effects of the I968
coup and seizure of I.P.C. 's property lies the far more
important lesson of that company's impact on Peru during
its half century tenure. It was easy for Peruvians to be-
come enraged over the foreign exploitation of their oilfields
as of 1966 it was estimated that the country's known petro-
leum reserves would last only fourteen more years. "''^ To
them, standard Oil of New Jersey and its subsidiary Inter-
national Petroleum Company were nothing more than the thieves
of their natural resources.
While a great deal of petroleu" extracted from La
Brea y Parinas was exported, even larger amounts were used
for domestic consumption at the lowest prices in the world.
I.P.C. provided Peru with an efficient and virtually self-
contained petroleum industry which encompassed every phase
of the business, from extraction of the crude oil to the
final sale at the gas station pump. In 1963, Peru was able
'""^U.G., Department of Commerce, Bureau of International
Commerce, Overseas Business Reports : Basic Data on the
Economy of Peru , prepared by oruce B. Sever (Washington:
U.S. uovernmont Printing Office, I969).
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to seize the entire industry, knowing that it would not
have to depend on a refinery or an oilfield located outside
the country.
I.P.C. provided training and technical education for
the thousands of Peruvians who worked in the various phases
of their operation. When the sovernment expropriated I.P.c.
it also took over its Peruvian work force, an asset of
greater value than the wells, tubes and buildings which would
have been useless without it. I.P.c. probably gave more
technical and managerial training to Peruvians than the
Peace Corps could ever hope to give. By raising the living
standards of its work force in Talara. the company showed
both the Peruvian elite and the Peruvian working class that
poor housing, inadequate health services and lack of educa-
tional opportunities viere not necessary conditions of a
worker's lot. How great an impact this example had on the
expectation level of Peruvian workers has not been measured,
but given the great amount of publicity which I.P.C. handed
out about its x^rork force, chances are that the impact xms
very significant.
International Petroleum Company's influence was not
limited to employers and employees; it extended into nearly
every intellectual endeavor of the Peruvian nation. In its
quest for legitimization, I.P.C. supported and encouraged
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nationalistic art and literature. The company provided a
vehicle. FAUAL for Peruvians' best literary efforts. Through
open essay competitions. I.P.c. encouraged an interest in
Peruvian history and national heroes. Yet. not even these
contributions to Peruvian arts and letters could undo the
accumulated hatred and suspicion with which two generations
of Peruvians had come to view I.P.G.
If anything, the company's efforts as a benefactor of
Peruvian intellectual and cultural pursuits reinforced the
conviction among Peru's leaders that I.P.G. had something
to hide, some burden of guilt which drove it to give part
of its ill-acquired profits to the victim of its "fradulanf^
dealings. While most of Peru's leaders were not well in-
formed of the facts of I.P.C.'s history in Peru, they auto-
matically chose to believe the worst. Ironically, most of
the actual rumors circulated among Peruvians concerning
I.P.C. were not factual. For example, the company was
charged with using double-bottomed ships to carry twice
as much oil as it declared; with "inventing" the Laudo of
1922 and the Sv;iss judge who presided over its formulation.
In all such cases, the charges against I.P.C. were false.
The company's actual machinations ixi Peru went unnoticed
by its detractors. During the last days of Jose Pardo's
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Civilista government. I.P.c. withdrew ships to force the
Peruvian congress to yield to the company demands; yet,
Peruvians remain unaware of this interference. The fact
that the company helped finance the administration of Luis
Sanchez Cerro during the early 1930's was also ignored.
Ironically. I.P.c. has been convicted in the minds of most
Peruvians of crimes the company never committed, while its
actual transgressions remain unpublicized.
Small countries such as Peru have great difficulty
trusting a multinational corporation dedicated to its own
enrichment. Even when International Petroleum Company was
Willing to negotiate factually with the government, the
Peruvian officials distrusted I.P.C. 's management on any
point. The dispute over the I968 contract and the Act of
Talara was a result of the fact that the president of
Smpresa Petrolera Fiscal, Carlos Loret de Mola, wanted to
cover every possible contingency. He assumed that I.P.C.
would maneuver with whatever loopholes existed to deprive
S.P.F. of its just share of the proceeds from the nation-
alized La i3rea y Parinas. In a sense, what S.P.F. manage-
ment feared was the superior expertise of International
Petroleum Company's personnel—a f-ar not reduced by the
knowledge that I-l.P.F. had the whole vreight of the Peruvian
government behind it in the negotiations.
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Fernando Espinosa. I.P.c.'s General I-Ianager during the
1960's. recalled that whenever he attempted to have Peruvian
political leaders examine contract proposals or any other
documents connected with the controversy, they declined such
an examination and requested an oral explanation, since the
details would be far too bothersome
. The fact was that
the Peruvian sovernment did not have the expertise necessary
to deal With an organization as sophisticated as International
Petroleum Company. Whatever Peruvian talent existed was
probably under hire to I.P.C. and other foreign companies.'
Deprived of expert advice, the government was unable to
accurately gage the reasonableness of I.P.C. 's or even its
own proposals. When agreement seemed near in 196^, President
Belaunde backed away because he sincerely believed that he
would be granting too much to the company. In his view,
I.P.C. was attempting to operate under a promotional petro--
leura law-
-one highly favorable to oil companies which were
13initiating their business operations. ^ However, Belaunde
determined his action on the basis of a ''gut feeling" that
the deal was too favorable to the company. He did not
really Imow and could not know if such was really the case
because his; only source of informacion was I.P.C, an obviously
Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
May 28, 1971.
13^Interview vrith Fernando Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase,
Maryland, ilay 21, I971.
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interested party. His uninformed advisors lacked the
technical knowledge to determine with accuracy how much
the Peruvian government was yielding. In the end. the very
fact that the company favored the agreement seemed to sug-
gest that there was something rotten lurking in the intricate
fine print of the incomprehensible proposal. This is not
to say that the Peruvian political leadership was incompetant
On the contrary. Peru had many highly educated and intelli-
gent leaders, with Fernando Belaunde Terry at the forefront.
Peru also had an abundance of legal scholars. What Peru
lacked was technical expertise of the business and indus-
trial variety, the kind of Imowledge necessary to determine
whether or not, for instance, the price of a barrel of oil
was fair—taking into consideration the costs of production,
transportation, storage, processing, etc-.
Peruvians knew that the large multinational oil concerns
set up machinery to fix prices in the international market,
and that the big oil corporations got together in 1928 and
signed the ashnacarry Convention by which they all agreed to
set a world price of oil based on the Texas Gulf Coast rate.
But Asiinacarry and oil's "seven sisters'' uere i-iell out of
Peru's j'Jiii3diction. The effects of such complex agreements^
on the daily life of a small country like Peru remained an
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enigma to its leaders. '''^
The United States Government has the power and re-
sources necessary to expose the full consequences of what-
ever the "seven sisters" agree to. While consumer advocates
have argued that the U.S. Government does not exercise this
power enough, one has only to look through Congressional
records to find that under supoena. the American oil com-
panies have been forced to reveal some of their secrets.
But the government of Peru has no such powers. In the last
analysis, Peru seized I.P.C. records in the Lima offices,
but the company records in Coral Gables and elsewhere would
never fall into the hands of a Peruvian official.
The ability to operate across international borders
and outside the complete jurisdiction of any one government
except their "home" country allows the multinational 'cor-
poration to function as a state within other states. Govern-
ments are supposed to command the supreme allegiance of their
citizens, yet Peru's largest tax payer. International Petro-
leiun Company, owed its allegiance to a foreign corporation.
General Marco Fernandez Baca, current chief of E.P.F.,
grasped this problem when he declared:
For a Peruvian viexf of the "sevtn sisters" and their agreement
see Cesar Levano, "Por la nacionalizacion del Petroleo,
"
Tareas del Pensamiento Poruano
,
I, rlo. 3 (liay-June, i960),
pp. 55-83.
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respect for its sovereignty.
. . when
lu^^''^^^^ insolent arro^-ance ofanother state within its o.^rn frontiers.
One need not accept the value judgement contained in the
statement to see that I.P.C. was indeed responsible not
to Peru, but to its parent company and its stockholders.
Because the operation of I.P.c. was primarily the
extraction and export of oil. during its early years the
company was safe in the assurance that without its ships
and its marketing facilities throughout the world, Peru
could not export its oil. However, as the company became
primarily a supplier of domestic needs, its strategic posi-
tion weakened. I962 marked the year when Peru ceased to ^
be a net exporter and became a net importer of oil. From
that point on, International Petrole^jm Company's position
was extremely precarious. It was to the credit of its very
capable management that the company survived as long as it
did.
International Petroleum Company contributed to the
development and national consciousness of Peru. It provided
a common enemy against which Peruvians v:ho might otherwise
have had nothing in common, united to fight on behalf of
their nation. Unwittingly, I.P.C. bestowed on Peru a modern
-^General Marco Fernandez Baca, as quoted by Goodwin, p. 48.
petroleum industry, a competent work force, and a national
unity Which has brought together the most unlikely alliance
of intellectuals, technicians, soldiers and middle class
elements ever to grace that country.
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